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Abstract 
 
 
Traditional tax compliance policy is based on a deterrence approach, whereby compliance is 
achieved through a tax authority’s threats of penalties and audits. This policy is based on 
Allingham & Sandmo’s (1972) standard model of tax evasion, which posits that an increase 
in the probability of detection and punishment will, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in 
compliance. However, this model has been criticised for lacking explanatory power for the 
majority of observed tax compliance behaviour. Consequently, a body of research has 
developed which attempts to identify the factors which influence compliance behaviour in 
addition to deterrence measures. This research has focused upon the concept of tax morale; a 
concept which broadly refers to the attitudes and beliefs of taxpayers which can influence 
their compliance behaviour. The concept of tax morale has developed into a growing area of 
research which investigates the potential for utilising the ‘carrot’ to encourage voluntary 
compliance, and reducing the reliance on the ‘stick’ to coerce compliance (Kornhauser, 2007; 
Torgler, 2007).  
 
One carrot which has been identified as having the potential to improve tax compliance is the 
use of rewards for compliant taxpayers. Several theoretical and experimental studies have 
been undertaken which have investigated the impact of rewards on participants’ tax 
compliance behaviour, and have indicated that the use of rewards is potentially an effective 
means of improving compliance behaviour. However, there is an absence of research focused 
on gaining an understanding of the views and opinions of tax practitioners and taxpayers 
regarding the potential introduction of a reward system. As such, a qualitative research 
approach utilising semi-structured interviews was adopted, in which interviews were 
conducted with five tax practitioners and two small business owners. These interviews 
covered issues such as the potential effectiveness of using rewards to encourage compliance, 
the features which should be included in a reward system, and the feasibility of implementing 
such a system.   
 
The findings from the interviews indicate that the use of rewards could be a more effective 
means of improving the compliance behaviour of non-compliant taxpayers, as opposed to the 
sole use of deterrence measures. In addition, it was thought that the use of rewards could also 
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be an effective way of maintaining the compliance of honest taxpayers and reducing the risk 
of such taxpayers acting opportunistically in the future. Furthermore, it was found that the use 
of rewards for compliant taxpayers could also reduce the risk of the ‘bomb-crater’ effect 
occurring.  
 
In regard to the features of a potential reward system, it was found that there was a strong 
preference for the use of financial rewards, which would be administered in the form of a 
percentage rebate. However, it was also noted that certain types of non-financial rewards 
could also be effective, particularly for maintaining the compliance of honest taxpayers. A 
key finding arising from the research is that in order for a reward system to successfully 
induce non-compliant taxpayers to become compliant, it is very likely that the reward system 
would need to be introduced in conjunction with a tax amnesty. 
 
In regard to the feasibility of introducing a reward system in New Zealand, the findings 
indicated some doubts as to the ability of Inland Revenue’s Information Technology (IT) 
system to adequately implement a reward system. However, these concerns were tempered by 
the fact that Inland Revenue is due to receive a $1.5b upgrade of its IT system over the next 
ten years, which the practitioners expected would be able to competently handle the 
implementation of a reward system. Furthermore, the findings indicated that it should be 
relatively straightforward for Inland Revenue to operate such a system. Finally, the findings 
highlighted several issues and challenges which Inland Revenue would need to overcome in 
order to successfully implement a reward system, which could impact upon Inland Revenue’s 
amenability to adopt such an approach.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and research questions 
 
 
The issue of tax non-compliance is a long-standing problem which has plagued revenue 
authorities around the world. The concept of tax compliance is rather difficult to define in a 
precise manner, with various definitions having been put forward which attempt to capture its 
elements. Roth, Scholz & Witte (1989, p. 21) provide that:  
 
Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer files all required tax 
returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in 
accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, regulations and court decisions applicable 
at the time the return is filed. 
 
James & Alley (2002, p. 32) define tax compliance as “the willingness of individuals and 
other taxable entities to act in accordance within the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and 
administration, without the application of enforcement activity.” This particular definition is 
useful as it emphasises that tax non-compliance can arise not only from tax evasion, but from 
tax avoidance as well. Wallschutzky (1988, as cited in McIntosh & Veal, 2001, p. 80) 
provides that “tax evasion is paying less tax than would otherwise be the case and it is 
achieved by means which are outside the law.” In contrast to tax evasion, tax avoidance 
occurs where taxpayers attempt to save tax through actions which, whilst being within the 
letter of the law, are not within the spirit of the law. As many aspects of taxation law are 
ambiguous, considerable scope exists for taxpayers to exploit grey areas of the law in order to 
reduce their tax liability. Whilst at first glance non-compliance in the form of tax avoidance 
may not appear as serious as evasion, Tan & Braithwaite (2011, p. 270) note that “this type of 
‘creative compliance’, if undetected, is considered to be even more destructive of the 
integrity of the law and, therefore, poses a much larger problem than outright evasion.” 
 
Tax evasion has developed into a serious issue in New Zealand. The most recent available 
figures highlighted that in 1994, it was estimated that New Zealand’s hidden economy 
amounted to $9.6 billion (Caragata, 1998, as cited in McIntosh & Veal, 2001). This included 
transactions which are of a criminal nature, as well as those of a legal nature which are 
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hidden from the tax authorities, which are categorised as reluctant sector evasion (McIntosh 
& Veal, 2001). Of this $9.2 billion, tax evasion was estimated at $3.2 billion, of which one 
third was due to criminal activity, with the remainder being caused by the reluctant sector 
(Caragata, 1998, as cited in McIntosh & Veal, 2001). McIntosh & Veal (2001) note that 
whilst there is often a public perception that it is large companies who are behind the majority 
of tax evasion, it is in fact small businesses and the self-employed who are responsible for 
most of the tax evasion committed in New Zealand. This is perhaps not surprising in light of 
the various studies which have indicated that the opportunity to evade is the most relevant 
determinant of non-compliance (Kirchler, 2007). As such, it can be expected that small 
business and self-employed taxpayers would pose a non-compliance threat to Inland 
Revenue, as opportunities to evade exist for this group of taxpayers, such as the potential for 
doing cash jobs which are not declared for income tax, or taking cash out of the till and not 
declaring it. Furthermore, Inland Revenue has acknowledged that this group of taxpayers 
poses a significant threat to the tax base, stating in its 1998-2001 strategic business plan (as 
cited in McIntosh & Veal, 2001, p. 93) that “we know that tax evasion is more prevalent in 
small to medium size business than large corporations, because of the greater internal 
controls operated within widely held businesses”. As such, this research thesis focuses on one 
particular approach which may potentially have a positive impact upon the compliance of 
small businesses owners (SBOs).   
 
Although a tax authority may be well aware of the tax evasion threat posed by small 
businesses and the self-employed, curtailing such behaviour is extremely difficult. This is 
reflected by a comment by Hasseldine (1999, p. 228), who notes that “although tax 
administration agencies generally possess wide powers to sanction taxpayers for non-
compliant acts, tax evasion remains a large social problem.” As alluded to in this comment by 
Hasseldine (1999), the most common approach adopted by tax authorities to combat tax non-
compliance is the deterrence model, which utilises coercive measures in an attempt to achieve 
compliance, such as the threat of penalties and audit. This deterrence approach is based on 
Allingham & Sandmo’s (1972) economic deterrence model of tax evasion, which provides 
that “the extent of deterrence, as the product of the probability of being detected and the size 
of the fine imposed, determines the amount of income tax evaded” (Feld & Frey, 2007, p. 
102). However, the ability of this deterrence model to explain the majority of tax compliance 
behaviour has been questioned by various researchers on the basis that this model predicts 
that levels of tax evasion around the world should be higher than they are in practice. This is 
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due to the fact that the deterrence measures applied in most countries are quite low and, 
therefore, taxpayers would be expected to evade more tax than they do in practice (Alm 
McClelland & Schulze, 1992a; Feld & Frey, 2002). Therefore, whilst the level of tax evasion 
around the world is worryingly high, it is not as high as would be expected under the 
deterrence model of tax evasion. As such, whilst deterrence measures such as penalties are an 
important aspect of improving tax compliance, it is clear that other factors have a significant 
influence upon the compliance behaviour of taxpayers.     
 
As a result of the deterrence model’s lack of explanatory power, a body of research has 
developed which attempts to identify the factors which influence compliance behaviour in 
addition to deterrence measures. This research has focused upon the concept of tax morale; a 
concept which broadly refers to the attitudes and beliefs of taxpayers which can influence 
their compliance behaviour, and is one potential explanation as to the discrepancy between 
observed levels of compliance and the deterrence model’s predicted levels of compliance 
(Kornhauser, 2007). A key element of tax morale is the idea that tax authorities should reduce 
their reliance on the use of deterrence measures, and increase the use of more positive 
measures which can potentially encourage voluntary compliance from taxpayers. In this 
sense, tax morale favours the use of the ‘carrot’ (positive incentives) to encourage 
compliance instead of using the ‘stick’ (punishment) to coerce compliance (McKerchar & 
Pope, 2011). However this is not to say that there is no place for the use of deterrence 
measures. As Kornhauser (2007, p. 604) notes, “...sticks as well as carrots are needed to 
ensure compliance...” Whilst one component of tax morale relates to intrinsic factors, such as 
individual traits which motivate a taxpayer to be compliant, tax morale also consists of 
external factors which can be influenced by a tax authority in an attempt to improve tax 
compliance, such as taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness, procedural justice and taxpayers’ trust 
in government (Alm & Torgler, 2006; Kornhauser, 2007).  
 
This thesis focuses on one particular external factor identified in prior research which could 
potentially improve taxpayers’ tax morale and tax compliance, namely the use of rewards for 
compliant taxpayers as a means of encouraging tax compliance. Several theoretical and 
experimental studies have been undertaken which have investigated the impact of rewards on 
participants’ tax compliance behaviour, and have indicated that the use of rewards is 
potentially an effective means of improving compliance behaviour (Alm, Jackson & McKee, 
1992b; Bazart & Pickhardt, 2011; Torgler, 2003). However, there is an absence of research 
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focused on gaining an understanding of how tax practitioners and SBO/self-employed 
taxpayers would view the introduction of a reward system.  Therefore, the aim of this thesis is 
to supplement the theoretical and experimental research in this area by approaching the issue 
from a different perspective; namely, through seeking to gain an understanding of SBOs’ and 
practitioners’ perceptions regarding how effective the use of rewards may be for improving 
compliance.  
 
In particular, the broad research questions which this thesis seeks to answer are as follows: 
 
RQ1 - How effective would the use of a reward system be for improving tax compliance, and 
how should such a system be designed? 
Prior research has put forward various types of rewards which could be applied, such as 
different types of financial and non-financial rewards, as well as various ways and 
circumstances in which rewards could be administered. However, it is still unclear how a 
reward system should be designed so as to maximise its potential for improving tax 
compliance. Therefore, this thesis sought the views and opinions of tax practitioners and 
SBOs in regard to what they believe would be the most appropriate features of a reward 
system. This led to the following sub questions. 
RQ1(a) - How feasible would the implementation of a reward system be in New Zealand?  
RQ1(b) - How amenable would Inland Revenue be to using such a system, and what are some 
potential difficulties which Inland Revenue would need to overcome in order to successfully 
implement such a system?  
As the majority of prior research on rewarding compliant taxpayers has been experimental in 
nature, the questions of whether implementing a reward system would be feasible, and 
whether a tax authority would be amenable to the use of rewards, have largely been 
unexplained. As such, this research project investigated these issues in the New Zealand 
context.  
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1.2 Importance of the research 
 
 
In regard to the importance of this research, Tan (1999) notes that “tax non-compliance is an 
area of concern for the government as it not only affects their ability to raise revenue, but also 
other fiscal aims such as economic stabilization and income distribution” (p. 433). As such, 
considerable enforcement resources are required to be utilised by the tax authorities in order 
to combat non-compliance. For example, Tan and Braithwaite (2011) note that in 2009-10, 
Inland Revenue utilised approximately 1,075,000 hours in tax audits. This highlights the cost 
of non-compliance, not only in the lost government revenue, but also in regard to enforcing 
compliance. Furthermore, this emphasises the importance of investigating potential means of 
improving tax compliance, such as through a reward system being implemented to 
complement the traditional penalty system, as a method of encouraging compliance.     
 
Slemrod (1992) notes that research focusing on providing an alternative means to deterrence 
in order to increase tax compliance, particularly research emphasising “the carrot for 
compliance rather than the stick for non-compliance” (p. 7) is important:  
        “... because, from the tax collection standpoint, it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange 
an enforcement regime so that, from a strict cost-benefit calculus, non-compliance does 
not appear attractive to many citizens. It follows that methods that reinforce and 
encourage taxpayer’s devotion to their responsibilities as citizens play an important role 
in the tax collection process” (Slemrod, 1992, p. 7)  
 
Echoing the sentiments of Slemrod, Torgler (2007) states that “the analysis of positive 
rewards in tax compliance research is an important topic and just in its infancy” (p. 94). 
The motivation for this research project stems from an interest to understand whether the 
implementation of a reward system is a feasible and desirable method of improving tax 
compliance in New Zealand.  In addition, there is the motivation to supplement the relatively 
small body of research pertaining to tax reward systems, and to contribute to redressing the 
identified absence of studies regarding the views and opinions of taxpayers and practitioners 
regarding the concept of a taxation reward system. 
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1.3 Overview of the thesis 
 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature regarding the topic of this thesis. Chapter 3 outlines the research approach 
and methodological position underlying this thesis, and provides details in regard to the 
methods utilised in this research. The research findings are presented in Chapters 4 and 5, and 
are analysed in Chapter 6. Finally, the conclusions, contributions, limitations, key 
assumptions and areas for future research are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
2.1 Traditional deterrence approach 
 
 
Traditional tax compliance policy is based on a deterrence approach, whereby compliance is 
achieved through the tax authority’s threats of penalties and audits. This policy is based on 
Allingham & Sandmo’s (1972) standard model of tax evasion, which posits that an increase 
in the probability of detection and punishment will, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in 
compliance. However, this model has been criticised on the basis that deterrence factors do 
not explain the majority of compliance behaviour. Specifically, due to the low level of 
deterrence measures applied in most countries, the model predicts too much evasion and too 
little compliance (Alm et al., 1992a; Feld & Frey, 2002). In other words, the level of actual 
observed compliance around the world is far higher than that predicted by deterrence models. 
As Alm et al. (1992a, p. 22) note, “a purely economic analysis of the evasion gamble implies 
that most individuals would evade if they are ‘rational’, because it is unlikely that cheaters 
will be caught and penalized.” Therefore, it is argued that there are other factors in addition to 
deterrence measures that compel taxpayers to comply.  
 
 
2.2 Tax morale 
 
 
Due to the traditional deterrence model’s lack of explanatory power for the majority of 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, researchers have sought to determine the various factors, in 
addition to the threat of deterrence measures, which influence the compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers. One concept which has developed in research focused on seeking to explain the 
unexpected gap between expected and actual levels of tax compliance is that of tax morale; a 
very broad, general term which relates to all of the non-rational factors, motivations, and non- 
deterrence aspects which can impact upon a taxpayers’ voluntary tax compliance, whereby 
higher tax morale correlates with higher tax compliance (Kornhauser, 2007). According to 
McKerchar & Pope (2011, p. 3), tax morale research signifies “...a shift away from deterring 
non-compliance towards instead encouraging voluntary compliance (i.e. with both the letter 
and the spirit of the law) – that is, more emphasis on the ‘carrot’ rather than the ‘stick’.”  
However, tax morale is a rather imprecise term, and the concept has been described as a 
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phenomenon which “...is somewhat elusive in many significant respects including its 
meaning and relevance in the context of taxpayer compliance; how it may be influenced and, 
of course, its effects” (McKerchar & Pope, 2011). Due to tax morale being a rather imprecise 
term, there is no all encompassing definition of the concept. Some researchers have defined 
tax morale as being taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Frey, 1997; Feld & Frey, 
2002; Torgler & Murphy, 2005, as cited in McKerchar & Pope, 2011). Schnellenbach (2006, 
p. 118) defines tax morale:  
 
...as the phenomenon that taxpayers (i) on average evade less taxes than an optimisation 
calculus incorporating only expected judicial punishment and reasonable levels of risk 
aversion would predict and (ii) systematically adjust their evasion levels according to 
how satisfied they are with public policy, processes of collective decision-making and 
the quality of their relationship to authorities. 
 
Whilst the concept of tax morale has often been treated as an “undifferentiated black box” 
(Kornhauser, 2007), research has sought to identify its various components. Torgler (2007) 
argued that tax morale consists of three main factors, namely moral rules and sentiments, 
such as norms and guilt; fairness; and the relationship between taxpayer and government. 
Kornhauser (2007) proposed that the norms influencing tax morale include procedural justice, 
trust and belief in the legitimacy of the government, reciprocity and altruism, which echoes 
the sentiments of Alm & Torgler (2006, p. 228), who argued that “tax morale is likely to be 
influenced by such factors as perceptions of fairness, trust in the institutions of government... 
and a range of individual characteristics.” These various components highlight that tax 
morale incorporates factors which are internal to taxpayers, as well as external factors which 
can be influenced by a tax authority. 
 
 
2.2.1 Framing and Prospect Theory 
 
 
The concept of cognitive and affective processes is a growing area of research in the tax 
morale field. Kornhauser (2007, p. 607) defines cognitive and affective processes as 
“...unconscious mechanisms that influence a person’s perception and response to information, 
people, and the environment.” One cognitive process of importance in regard to tax 
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compliance is ‘framing’, which refers to the idea that the manner in which situations are 
presented can affect how a person reacts to it. One of the most important elements of framing 
for tax compliance research is Prospect Theory, which investigates how people evaluate and 
react to risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). A series of experiments conducted by Kahneman 
& Tversky (1981) indicated that subjects consistently exhibited patterns of risk averse 
behaviour in situations involving gains, and risk seeking behaviour in situations involving 
losses. In other words, when a person was in a position to make a sure gain they were less 
willing to take risks, whilst people were more willing to take risks when they are in a position 
to make a sure loss. On the basis of these results, researchers have argued the relevance of 
Prospect Theory for understanding and curtailing evasion behaviour by considering the 
decision frames of two taxpayers who face, respectively, the prospect of a tax refund or a tax 
bill after withholding. For example, as Robben et al. (1990) explain, a taxpayer who knows 
that they are due to receive a tax refund may view themselves as being in a gain situation. 
Therefore, whilst they could elect to falsify their tax return and engage in tax evasion in order 
to receive a larger refund, Prospect Theory suggests that the taxpayer would tend to avoid the 
risks associated with evasion because they are already assured of a refund if they pay the 
correct amount of tax. In contrast, a taxpayer expecting to owe money may view themselves 
as being in a loss situation and, therefore, will be more likely to engage in tax evasion in 
order to reduce the anticipated loss.  
 
Robben et al. (1990) highlight that there is some existing evidence which supports Prospect 
Theory’s predictions, and make reference to analyses released by the United States Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) on the voluntary compliance rates for a sample of 50 000 tax returns, 
which indicated that income tax compliance varied as a function of the size of taxpayers’ 
refund of balance owed (Cox & Plumbley, 1988, as cited in Robben et al., 1990). For 
example, in regard to wage and salary earners, the compliance rate for taxpayers who claimed 
a refund of more than $1000 was 96 percent, compared to 89 percent for taxpayers who faced 
a balance due of over $1000. Similarly, for taxpayers earning business income, the 
compliance rate for individuals expecting a refund over $1000 was 95 percent, compared to 
only 70 percent for taxpayers with a balance due of over $1000.   
 
Results such as those obtained from the IRS analyses have prompted researchers to test 
Prospect Theory’s predictions in the tax compliance context, with various studies providing 
support for its relevance to tax evasion behaviour. For example, Robben et al. (1990) 
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conducted an experiment in which the participants simulated the tasks involved in running a 
small business for a two ‘year’ period, including the completion of tax returns. Half of the 
participants were assigned to the condition that they could expect a significant tax refund 
during each of the two ‘years’ in which they managed the business, whilst the other half were 
assigned to the condition that they could expect that a considerable tax payment would be due 
on top of the taxes already withheld. Results indicated that compliance was higher among the 
participants who were due a refund compared to those who faced a balance due.  
 
Schepanski & Kelsey (1990) found that taxpayers are less likely to claim a dubious deduction 
when in a position to receive a tax refund than when they are in a tax due condition. White, 
Harrison & Harrell (1993) experimentally investigated the effects of taxpayers’ prepayment 
position (payment due or refund available) on evasion behaviour, and found that subjects who 
were due a tax refund chose less aggressive filing positions than those with a balance due. 
Similarly, Dusenbury (1994) examined the influence of prepayment position on taxpayers’ 
preferences for risky filing options. The results indicated that taxpayers were more willing to 
take a risky position when they owed tax as opposed to being owed a refund, with taxpayers 
being owed a refund declaring 20 percent more of their uncertain taxable income. Anderson 
(1996) conducted a replication and extension of Dusenbury’s (1994) study in the New 
Zealand context, in which Dusenbury’s (1994) findings, and Prospect Theory’s predictions 
regarding tax compliance, were supported. 
 
Results such as those outlined above have led researchers to conclude that Prospect Theory’s 
predictions could potentially be used to inform the compliance policies of tax authorities. In 
particular, Prospect Theory suggests that tax authorities could seek to reduce the amount of 
risk that taxpayers take when making compliance decisions by ensuring that taxpayers are in 
a position to receive a refund (Dusenbury, 1994; Hasseldine, 1998a). Hasseldine (1998a) 
provides that one way to achieve this is for a tax authority to intentionally over withhold 
income so as to put taxpayers in a position to receive a refund. This raises the question of 
whether another viable option of achieving this is through the use of financial rewards, 
whereby compliant taxpayers receive a refund which is, for example, proportional to the 
amount of tax paid; an issue which is examined in this thesis. However, Dusenbury (1994) 
cautions that such an approach is unlikely to be a panacea, noting that habitual tax evaders 
will not necessarily become compliant when they are in a position to receive a refund. There 
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is, however, the potential to reduce taxpayers’ willingness to take the risk of evasion or 
avoidance if a refund is available. 
 
 
2.2.2 Reciprocity 
 
 
The concept of reciprocity has been identified as a component which can increase tax morale, 
and is an aspect which could potentially be influenced by rewards. The general principle 
underlying the norm of reciprocity is that an individual will respond to another’s act in the 
same manner in which that person treated them (Kornhauser, 2007). In the tax compliance 
context, the concept consists of two distinct dimensions. The first dimension, known as 
vertical reciprocity, relates to the relationship between taxpayers and the government/tax 
authority, whilst the second dimension, known as horizontal reciprocity, relates to the 
relationship between taxpayers (Schnellenbach, 2010). In regard to vertical reciprocity, a 
taxpayer’s willingness to be compliant can depend on how they perceive their relationship 
with the tax authority, in regard to factors such as whether they feel the relationship between 
them and the tax authority is fair, as well as whether they perceive the tax system in general 
as fair (Luttmer & Singhal, 2014). Smith (1992) notes that a compelling reason for believing 
that a positive action by a tax authority towards taxpayers will increase the likelihood of 
compliance is that people have a tendency to try and reciprocate actions directed toward 
them. Smith (1992) also highlights that there is evidence that the norm of reciprocity holds in 
regard to concessions, whereby people feel an obligation to make a concession to someone 
who has made a concession to them. As such, he argues that “cycles of antagonism might 
begin to be broken by a positive concession by the administrator” (p. 226).  
 
In regard to horizontal reciprocity, a taxpayer’s willingness to be compliant can be influenced 
by their beliefs about the compliance behaviour of other taxpayers (Schnellenbach, 2010). 
For example, a taxpayer’s perception that others are evading or avoiding tax may lead that 
taxpayer to act in a reciprocal manner, justifying their behaviour on the basis that they are 
behaving the same as others (Kornhauser, 2007). Conversely, taxpayers who perceive that 
most taxpayers are meeting their obligations may be more likely to act in a reciprocal manner 
and also meet their obligations. Therefore, Kornhauser (2007, p. 616) states that reciprocity 
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theory implies that an effective method of increasing cooperative, compliant behaviour is to 
“...promote... the shared belief that others can in fact be counted on to contribute their fair 
share to public goods...”  
 
 
2.2.3 The role of rewards in tax morale: The psychological tax contract 
 
 
Feld & Frey (2007) have conceptualised tax morale as being a psychological tax contract 
between taxpayers and tax authorities. The psychological tax contract, as broadly defined by 
the authors, is a concept which goes beyond the traditional deterrence model’s reliance on 
fear as a means of achieving tax compliance, and explains tax morale “...as a complicated 
interaction between taxpayers and the government establishing a fair, reciprocal exchange 
that involves the giving and taking of both parties” (p. 104). The operation of this 
psychological tax contract as a means of achieving tax compliance is built on two main 
pillars. First, the authors argue that taxpayers are more likely to be voluntarily compliant 
when they perceive that the tax authority has treated them in a fair, respectful manner during 
the course of their interactions. Such interactions could occur, for example, during the course 
of a tax audit. This highlights that the concept of procedural justice, which “...concerns the 
perceived fairness of the procedures involved in decision-making and the perceived treatment 
one receives from the decision maker” (Murphy, 2003, p. 380), plays an important role in 
improving tax morale.  
 
Second, the authors argue that for the psychological tax contract to be upheld, incentives 
must be provided. These incentives include both positive incentives, such as rewards for 
compliance, and negative incentives, such as penalties for non-compliance. The literature in 
regard to the use of rewards as a potential means of improving tax compliance will be 
discussed further below. Prior to this, however, the following subsection outlines how 
elements of tax morale and the psychological tax contract have been incorporated into the 
compliance strategies of Inland Revenue, and highlights where the use of rewards could be 
incorporated into Inland Revenue’s compliance strategies. 
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2.2.4 Elements of tax morale in practice: The Inland Revenue 
Compliance Model 
 
 
Kornhauser (2007, p. 622) notes that several tax authorities around the world have “switched 
their approach to tax administration from a one-size-fits-all enforcement model to a model 
that builds on the lessons of tax morale research.” Such an enforcement model is commonly 
referred to as a responsive regulation model. One of the key features of this model is that it 
adopts the use of ‘carrots’ as well as ‘sticks’ as a means of achieving tax compliance. The 
development and implementation of the responsive regulation model largely stems from 
research investigating the role that the concept of motivational postures has in the tax 
compliance context. Murphy (2004, p. 315) states that “motivational postures represent the 
ways in which individuals position themselves in relation to a regulatory authority, and are 
predispositions to compliant or non-compliant conduct.” Braithwaite, Murphy & Reinhart 
(2007, p. 138) defines motivational postures as being “...conglomerates of beliefs, attitudes, 
preferences, interests, and feelings that together communicate the degree to which an 
individual accepts the agenda of the regulator, in principle, and endorses the way in which the 
regulator functions and carries out duties on a daily basis.”  
 
In regard to the tax compliance context, motivational postures reflect the manner in which 
taxpayers view the tax authority and tax system, and in turn indicate taxpayers’ degree of 
acceptance or rejection of the tax authority (Leviner, 2009). Braithwaite (2003) has identified 
five motivational postures which are of importance in the tax compliance context. At one end 
of the spectrum are two postures of deference, known as commitment and capitulation 
postures, which reflect an overall positive orientation toward the tax authority. A taxpayer 
with a commitment posture perceives the tax system as being desirable and fair, and feels an 
intrinsic, moral obligation to meet their tax compliance obligations. A taxpayer with a 
capitulation posture accepts the tax authority as holding legitimate power, and perceives it as 
a benign authority, provided one meets their obligations and defers to its authority.  
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are three postures of defiance, known as resistance, 
disengagement and game playing. A resistance posture represents a negative orientation 
towards the tax authority, whereby taxpayers may doubt the authority of tax officers and may 
perceive the actions of the tax authority as being dominating and controlling, as opposed to 
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supportive. A taxpayer with a posture of disengagement has cut themselves off from the tax 
system and seeks to hide from the view of the tax authority. Braithwaite (2003) notes that 
taxpayers who possess this posture are likely to become uncooperative with the tax authority 
if they feel the tax authority has got ‘tough’ with them. The final motivational posture is that 
of game playing, which represents a taxpayer who enjoys the game of finding ambiguities 
and grey areas of tax law, and the challenge of trying to beat the tax authority in order to 
minimise their tax liability (Murphy, 2004). Braithwaite, Schneider, Reinhart & Murphy 
(2003) note that game playing relates to the tax avoidance aspect of non-compliance, as 
opposed to the evasion aspect, as it encompasses “...finding ways of legally using the law 
against the tax authority and sidestepping the obligation to pay tax” (p. 91). In contrast, 
Leviner (2009) posits that under the postures of resistance and disengagement, non-
compliance can take the form of both avoidance and evasion.  
 
The underlying rationale for seeking to categorise taxpayers according to their motivational 
posture is that the effectiveness of compliance strategies is likely to vary depending on which 
motivational posture a taxpayer holds (Leviner, 2009). This has led to the development of the 
Australian Tax Office Compliance Model (Figure 2.1), which has since been adopted in New 
Zealand in the form of the Inland Revenue Compliance Model, as provided in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.1: Australian Tax Office Compliance Model which has been adopted in New Zealand 
Source: Batrancea, Nichita & Batrancea (2012, p. 206) 
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Figure 2.2: Inland Revenue Compliance Model 
 
 
Source: Inland Revenue (2012) 
 
 
As indicated above by Kornhauser (2007), these compliance models incorporate elements of 
tax morale, as they reduce the reliance on compliance strategies which are solely based on the 
use of threats and penalties (Leviner, 2009). Instead, the model emphasises the importance of 
ensuring that a tax authority engages in appropriate interactions with taxpayers, with the 
underlying principle being that a tax authority “...will tailor its enforcement actions to match 
the underlying attitude of a taxpayer towards compliance” (Alley et al., 2012).  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, four of the five motivational postures identified by Braithwaite 
(2003) are explicitly incorporated into the compliance models, where each motivational 
posture corresponds with a different enforcement strategy, the severity of which increases 
with the level of a taxpayer’s defiance. In addition, the fifth motivational posture of game 
playing can sit anywhere along the left axis of the compliance models (Hodson, 2011).  
 
As such, it is evident that the Inland Revenue Compliance Model has incorporated several 
elements of Feld & Frey’s (2007) psychological tax contract. First, Inland Revenue starts at 
the bottom of the compliance pyramid by seeking to encourage compliance through building 
positive relationships with taxpayers and having respectful interactions with them (Leviner, 
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2009; Morris & Lonsdale, 2004). This is consistent with the first element of the psychological 
tax contract, which emphasises the importance of procedural justice. Second, where taxpayers 
are more defiant and less willing to meet their tax obligations, the compliance model instructs 
Inland Revenue to increase the severity of its enforcement actions and introduce the threat 
and utilisation of audit and penalties. This is consistent with the second element of the 
psychological tax contract, which advocates the use of negative incentives, such as penalties 
for non-compliance. However, Kornhauser (2007) notes that Feld & Frey’s psychological tax 
contract extends beyond the sole use of negative incentives, and has proposed the use of 
positive incentives, such as rewards for compliance. As such, this raises the issue of whether 
there is a place for rewards to be introduced into the Inland Revenue Compliance Model 
which would operate alongside the use of the traditional deterrence measures. Consequently, 
the literature regarding the potential use of rewards as a means of improving tax compliance 
is now discussed. 
 
 
 
2.3 The use of rewards to improve compliance 
 
 
Feld, Frey & Torgler (2006a) note that investigating the potential impact that rewards could 
have on tax compliance is a relatively novel approach. The authors highlight that instead of 
seeking to improve tax compliance by offering rewards to encourage compliance, 
governments and tax authorities are increasingly using tax amnesties as a ‘carrot’ for 
encouraging non-compliant taxpayers to improve their compliance behaviour. Richardson & 
Sawyer (2001, p. 218) explain that “a tax amnesty generally involves providing previously 
non-compliant taxpayers with the opportunity to pay back-taxes on undisclosed income, 
without fear of penalties or prosecution.” Tax amnesties have previously been utilised in New 
Zealand,  most notably with a relatively successful general tax amnesty being run by Inland 
Revenue for a two month period in 1988, which resulted in 24 685 amnesty returns being 
lodged, and $26.6 million of tax being assessed (Hasseldine, 1989). 
 
The use of tax amnesties as a means of improving tax compliance is largely based on the 
same rationale underlying the research putting forward the possibility of introducing rewards, 
namely that there are doubts as to the efficiency and effectiveness of relying on legal 
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sanctions as a means of increasing tax compliance levels (Hasseldine, 1998b).  However, it is 
unclear whether tax amnesties are an effective method for improving tax compliance in the 
long-term (Hasseldine, 1989; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Furthermore, the success of tax 
amnesties can often be impaired due to the unintended negative consequences that can arise 
from their use. For example, honest and compliant taxpayers may perceive the use of tax 
amnesties as being unfair and view them as a signal that tax evasion is a forgivable and 
insignificant action, which can lead to a reduction in their motivation to comply in the future 
(Feld et al., 2006a; Hasseldine, 1989; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001; Torgler, 2007). As such, 
this has led to various researchers proposing that the use of rewards could be a more effective 
carrot for encouraging the desired behaviour of tax compliance, as opposed to relying on 
punishments or allowing non-compliers to come clean through a tax amnesty (Feld et al., 
2006a). 
 
2.3.1 Psychological effects of rewards and Crowding Theory 
 
 
 
Kirchler (2007) posits that tax compliance behaviour could follow rules put forward in 
Operant Conditioning Theory; a learning principle popularised by Skinner (1938). 
Psychologists’ studies concerning learning processes have proved that the likelihood of an 
individual displaying a specific behaviour can be influenced through reinforcement of that 
behaviour (Kirchler, 2007). Influence is exerted through manipulating the consequences of 
the behaviour. Such manipulation can take the form of positive reinforcement to encourage 
desired behaviour, or punishment to deter undesired behaviour. Kirchler (2007) notes that 
whilst positive reinforcement has consistently proved to be effective, the effectiveness of 
punishments is mixed, as punishment tends to only suppress the undesired behaviour, as 
opposed to eliminating it. Furthermore, “...punishment may result in hatred towards the 
particular institution and in revenge-seeking actions” (Kirchler, 2007, p.127). This highlights 
the point that a sole reliance on the use of tax penalties may not be effective in achieving 
compliance, and that taxpayers who are penalised may seek to engage in further non-
compliance as a form of revenge-seeking behaviour. Instead, the addition of rewards may be 
more effective in achieving the desired behaviour of compliance.  
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A further rationale underlying the argument for the use of rewards stems from the concept of 
Crowding Theory, which relates to the effect that external interventions can have on peoples’ 
motivation to perform a certain activity or behaviour (Frey & Jegen, 2001).  Feld et al. 
(2006a) explain that according to Crowding Theory, external interventions that are perceived 
as being controlling in nature, such as deterrence measures, tend to crowd-out, or reduce, 
people’s motivation to perform the desired activity. For example, in the tax compliance 
context, the application of deterrence measures for a non-compliant taxpayer is seen as being 
controlling and may further reduce the taxpayer’s willingness to be compliant. Feld & Frey 
(2007) highlight that the empirical evidence on the effect of deterrence on tax compliance is 
ambiguous, with some results indicating that non-compliance increases when the level of 
penalties and control increase. The authors argue that this ambiguity can possibly be 
explained with Crowding Theory, stating that “higher control intensities increase deterrence, 
and thus tax compliance, on the one hand, but may be perceived as intrusive by taxpayers, 
and thus reduce tax compliance, on the other hand” (p. 108). 
 
Conversely, external interventions which are perceived as being supportive in nature can 
maintain and increase peoples’ motivation to perform a desired behaviour. In this sense, 
intrinsic motivation is crowded in (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Feld et al. (2006b) state that the 
provision of certain types of rewards for compliant taxpayers is likely to be perceived as 
being a supportive external intervention, and would therefore increase the intrinsic motivation 
of taxpayers, leading to increased compliance. As such, Feld et al. (2006b, p.4) conclude that 
“rewards could be more effective than punishments for eliminating undesired behaviour or 
for motivating desired behaviour because it is perceived as supporting.” Furthermore, the 
authors note that if taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to be compliant is not recognised or 
acknowledged, their intrinsic motivation may decrease and their willingness to act 
opportunistically may increase. Thus, there is a potential risk that ‘good’, compliant 
taxpayers may become non-compliant over time if their good behaviour is not acknowledged 
by the revenue authority. The introduction of a reward system could, therefore, be an 
effective mechanism for increasing tax compliance, as well as maintaining it.  
 
Despite the growing research investigating the potential for rewards to improve tax 
compliance, Torgler (2007) notes that this area of research is still in its infancy. There are, 
therefore, areas of uncertainty in which research can seek to investigate. For example, there is 
uncertainty as to the potential negative effect that rewards may have on taxpayers’ motivation 
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to be compliant, and the effect that rewards may have on different subgroups of taxpayers. 
These issues relate to the different possible features that a reward system could have and the 
different ways such a system would operate. The literature regarding these issues is discussed 
in the following subsections. 
 
 
2.3.2 Features and operation of a reward system 
 
 
An important issue to consider is the design and operation of a potential reward system, in 
regard to the type of rewards which would be provided, and the circumstances in which they 
would apply. Tax authorities would be faced with a trade off between the costs and benefits 
of providing rewards, and the costs and benefits of using other incentives, such as 
punishments. Therefore, in order to justify the use of rewards, such an approach must raise 
net tax revenues after deducting the cost of rewards (Feld et al., 2006a). One of the aims of 
using rewards as a compliance strategy is to design the reward system in a way so as to 
change the relative prices in favour of compliance and against tax evasion, such as through 
influencing taxpayers’ risk preferences (Feld et al., 2006a). However, Feld et al. (2006a) 
caution that rewards may induce strategic behaviour from taxpayers. The authors provide the 
example of a reward which is provided due to the reduction of evasive behaviour, in which 
case a taxpayer may strategically “...increase tax evasion as a first step in order to reduce it in 
a second step in order to generate higher benefits from the rewards” (p. 51). The authors 
propose that one way to reduce this risk is to make the provision of rewards dependent on a 
taxpayer being completely honest.   
 
The literature has identified various types of rewards which could potentially be provided to 
taxpayers, ranging from different types of financial rewards to different types of non-
financial rewards. In regard to financial rewards, Feld et al. (2006b) note that such a payment 
could be proportional to the amount of tax paid by a taxpayer, so the reward would be 
analogous to a percentage rebate. Alternatively, the payment could be administered at a 
single, set amount for all ‘good taxpayers.’ However, some doubts have been raised in the 
literature in regard to the potential effectiveness of financial rewards. For example, 
Kornhauser (2007) is critical of the idea of using financial rewards, stating that “monetary 
rewards, such as rebates of a percentage of the tax, can be counterproductive. They may 
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decrease internal motivations to comply because the taxpayer may consider them discounts, 
like rebates in a commercial setting, and thus ones to which s/he is entitled” (p. 639). This 
uncertainty as to the efficacy of financial rewards has led some researchers to propose that 
non-financial rewards may potentially be more effective (Feld & Frey 2007; Kornhauser, 
2007). Such researchers note that where the reward is clearly distinguished from the tax 
payment, it may be more likely to be perceived as a sign of acknowledgment, and therefore is 
more likely to maintain or increase intrinsic motivation, as the sign of appreciation from the 
revenue authority is arguably stronger than a mere reduction in tax liability. This highlights 
the fact that the use of non-monetary rewards may be preferable. Such non-monetary rewards 
could include improved and cheaper access to public services, such as transport and cultural 
activities (Feld & Frey, 2007; Feld et al., 2006b; Kornhauser, 2007). Feld et al. (2006b) note 
that there is some anecdotal evidence regarding the use of non-monetary rewards as a means 
of enhancing tax compliance. For example, taxpayers found to be compliant in Japan are 
offered the opportunity to have their photograph taken with the Emperor, and South Korea 
provides access to airport VIP rooms, as well as issuing certificates and awards.  
 
A further related area of uncertainty relates to the issue of how rewards may affect the 
compliance behaviour of different subgroups of taxpayers, such as the various motivational 
posture categories of taxpayers, and whether different types of rewards may be more affective 
for different categories of taxpayers. For example, Torgler (2002, p. 667) emphasises that 
“future efforts could, for example, examine whether some taxpayer subgroups, e.g. honest 
taxpayers, crowd out their intrinsic motivation when positive inducements are introduced.”    
 
A final identified issue in the literature relates to determining the circumstances in which the 
rewards would apply. This stems from the question of what criteria should a tax authority set 
for a taxpayer to be deemed compliant and therefore eligible to receive a reward? As Feld et 
al. (2006b) note, there are different levels of tax compliance, such as a taxpayer declaring all 
of their income, not overstating deductions, filing tax returns on time, and paying the taxes 
due.  As will be noted in the following section, an example of the circumstances in which 
rewards could apply is where a taxpayer is found to be fully or largely compliant after an 
audit. One advantage of applying rewards in this manner is the potential for reducing the 
bomb-crater effect; a term that is derived from World War I, where it is said that soldiers 
believed that the safest place to take cover from enemy fire was the crater of the most recent 
bomb, due to the belief that it was highly improbable that another bomb would strike in the 
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same place again (Kastlunger, Kirchler, Mittone & Pitters, 2009). Evidence of a similar 
phenomenon has also been identified in a tax compliance context, as several experiments 
have illustrated that immediately after a taxpayer is audited, the level of compliance 
decreases in consecutive periods (Guala & Mittone, 2005).  It is posited that the most likely 
mechanism causing this decrease in compliance is misperception of chance, whereby 
taxpayers mistakenly believe that the probability of being audited again in the subsequent 
period is low (Guala & Mittone, 2005). Figure 2.3 illustrates the bomb-crater effect on tax 
compliance, based on experimental evidence. 
 
Figure 2.3: Bomb-crater effect as represented by the decrease in compliance after an audit  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guala & Mittone (2005, p. 505) 
 
As it is apparent that the level of taxpayers’ non-compliance may increase as a result of being 
audited, an interesting issue to consider is whether the introduction of rewards into the tax 
system could reduce, or eliminate, the bomb-crater effect. This possibility was identified by 
Kastlunger et al (2011), where experimental evidence indicated that subjects’ compliance 
levels subsequent to an audit were higher when the reward was introduced as compared to the 
control condition. 
 
Another possibility is for a reward to apply for the early filing of tax returns and making 
payments on time, whereby a tax discount could be granted. Such a reward is analogous to 
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the use of discounts by a number of New Zealand power companies, such as Meridian 
(2015), Mercury Energy (2014) and Genesis Energy (2014). Discounts are also utilised in a 
tax context. Cornia, McCluskey & Walters (2012) highlight the use of discounts for early 
payment of property tax as an incentive for encouraging compliance. In a New Zealand 
context, an early payment income tax discount applies to SBOs, as a means of encouraging 
them to voluntarily pay tax in the year before they are required to pay provisional tax 
(Income Tax Act 2007, s RC 37-40). Inland Revenue, therefore, has some limited experience 
in administering income tax discounts. Whilst no direct evidence regarding Inland Revenue’s 
experience of implementing the discount is available, the fact that the scheme has been in 
place for a rather considerable length of time (since 2005) may suggest that the discount has 
been successful in achieving the desired behaviour of taxpayers.  
 
2.4 Theoretical and experimental studies 
 
 
Despite the fact that tax compliance research investigating the potential for using rewards is a 
relatively new and undeveloped field, there are several theoretical and experimental studies 
which have examined the potential effectiveness of using rewards to improve tax compliance. 
 
Falkinger & Walther (1991) provided the first detailed theoretical study in economics 
analysing the potential for incorporating a system of pecuniary rewards as an incentive for 
taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. The authors proposed a mixed penalties-
rewards model, whereby taxpayers must pay a penalty on tax evaded, whilst they receive a 
reward for the tax paid. According to the authors’ analysis, the combination of penalties and 
rewards would lead to a welfare improvement, as taxpayers are in a better position, and the 
tax revenue collected will increase, provided that the level of penalties for non-compliance 
are increased so as to compensate for the expense of providing the rewards. According to the 
authors, in addition to being an incentive to comply, the rewards can also be seen as 
compensation to the taxpayer for the burden of being audited. Although not explicitly stated, 
the authors appear to be highlighting the positive effect that rewards can have on the intrinsic 
motivation and tax morale of taxpayers. 
 
In addition to Falkinger and Walther’s theoretical analysis, several experimental studies on 
the use of rewards for tax compliance have been undertaken. Alm et al. (1992b) conducted a 
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laboratory experiment in which the effects of three different types of rewards were examined, 
namely entry into a lottery scheme, a fixed reward, and a reduction in the probability of 
future audit. For each reward session, a subject audited and found to be fully compliant 
received the respective reward. In comparison to the control session with no reward, each 
type of reward had a significant positive effect on compliance, with the lottery session having 
the largest effect on compliance. 
 
Torgler (2003) conducted an experiment with ‘real’ taxpayers, as opposed to students, in 
Costa Rica, with the aim of determining the effect that fiscal exchange, moral suasion and 
positive rewards have on tax compliance, holding traditional deterrence factors constant. In 
regard to the reward session, a subject audited and found to be fully compliant received a 
fixed monetary reward. As expected, the use of rewards increased the compliance of subjects 
compared to the control group. Furthermore, the highest compliance rate was achieved 
through the use of rewards, where a 100 percent compliance rate was observed. However, 
Kastlunger, Muehlbacher, Kirchler & Mittone (2011) highlights that it must be noted that the 
sample size in the reward group is quite small, with thirteen participants, and the experiment 
only consisted of one round.  
 
Bazart & Pickhardt (2011) conducted experiments in Germany and France, whereby subjects 
who were audited and found to be fully compliant were entered into a lottery scheme, where 
they had the chance to receive individual lottery winnings. Again, the results indicated that 
the introduction of the reward system had a positive impact on compliance compared to the 
rounds without the reward system. 
 
Kastlunger et al. (2011) provide insight in to the effect that rewards have on the decision 
strategies of taxpayers. The authors assumed that taxpayers can be categorised as being either 
completely honest, completely dishonest, or a mild evader. It was hypothesised that, although 
the first and second group’s strategy was unlikely to be altered by the introduction of a 
reward, the mild evaders may be encouraged to become fully compliant so as to receive the 
reward. There would, therefore, be an all-or-nothing approach observed. Results indicated 
that whilst the number of total evaders was almost identical between the reward and control 
sessions, there were a higher number of completely honest subjects in the reward session, 
suggesting that mild evaders were persuaded in to becoming fully compliant due to the 
reward. 
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2.5 Overseas experience 
 
2.5.1 China 
 
 
Whilst the traditional approach to tax compliance is based on the application of deterrence 
measures, certain overseas jurisdictions, predominately in Asia, have in fact utilised rewards 
to provide an incentive for taxpayers to meet their tax obligations. China, for example, 
introduced a lottery receipt system in 1998, which operates simultaneously with the 
traditional punishment system in the context of indirect tax compliance, such as sales and 
value added taxes, and is almost identical to the lottery receipt system which has been 
operating in Taiwan since the 1950s (Wan, 2010). Wan (2010) notes that China, like many 
countries, faces the issue of tax evasion regarding sales taxes, due to the substantial costs 
which must be incurred by the government in order to monitor transactions between a firm 
and its consumers. Consequently, the costs involved in enforcing the tax provide an incentive 
for taxpayers to underreport the amount of tax due, as it is unlikely that such underreporting 
will be detected. Therefore, consistent with the sentiments of Slemrod (1992), rather than 
incurring more costs in an attempt to make non-compliance appear unattractive from a cost-
benefit perspective, China has instead adopted an approach based on providing an incentive 
for taxpayers to be compliant, in the form of lottery winnings.          
 
The lottery receipt system is facilitated by the use of a lottery receipt machine which issues 
an official receipt to consumers when a purchase is made. When the receipt is issued, the 
transaction value is simultaneously reported to the tax authority, consumer and firm. The 
issued lottery receipt contains a special number which enters the consumer into the lottery 
and, therefore, provides an incentive for consumers to demand a receipt from the seller. As a 
result, it becomes difficult for sellers to underreport tax due, thereby increasing the level of 
tax compliance (Wan, 2010). A 2002 report issued by the China Taxation Bureau (as cited in 
Wan, 2010) demonstrates the success that this reward system has had regarding increasing 
the level of tax compliance. The report noted that, as at July 2002, the total amount of lottery 
winnings paid amounted to 30 million yuan (approximately $6.4 million NZD), whilst the 
additional tax revenues received totalled 900 million yuan (approximately $192 million 
NZD) (Wan, 2010).  In addition, a study conducted by Wan (2010) indicated that sales tax 
revenue was 17.1 percent higher in the areas in which the lottery receipt system had been 
27 
 
implemented, compared to the areas in which it had not, which further illustrates the positive 
impact the use of rewards has had in China.  
 
 
2.5.2 Republic of Korea 
 
 
The Republic of Korea introduced a similar lottery system in the 1990s, which has since been 
revised into a ‘credit card tax deduction system’ (Wan, 2010). Kim (2005) indicates that tax 
evasion by the self-employed had become a serious tax administration problem in Korea, due  
largely to the significant volume of cash transactions which had led to a lack of transparency 
in business income. To combat this, the Korean Government implemented the 
aforementioned credit card tax deduction scheme in 1999, as a means of providing an 
incentive for buyers to use credit cards instead of cash, as the use of credit cards increases the 
transparency of business income through the records of credit card transactions being sent 
electronically to the tax authorities, thus making it more difficult for businesses to 
underreport their income (Kim, 2005). The incentive comes in the form of an income tax 
deduction for consumers who spend a certain level of their income using credit cards. As of 
2005, a taxpayer was entitled to a 20 percent deduction of their credit card expenditure when 
that expenditure amounted to at least 15 percent of their gross income, with a 5 million won 
(approximately $6 thousand NZD) deduction limit (Jun, 2009).  As of 2014, the level of 
incentive has since been scaled down, with a taxpayer entitled to a 15 percent deduction of 
their credit card expenditure when that expenditure amounts to at least 25 percent of their 
gross income, up to the lesser amount of 20 percent of the taxpayer’s income and 3 million 
won (approximately $3.6 thousand NZD) (KPMG, 2014).  
 
The implementation of this deduction reward scheme has proven to be an effective method of 
increasing the proportion of expenditure conducted using credit cards since its inception in 
1999, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. As such, the level of transparency of business income has 
increased, thus leading to improved tax compliance. 
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 Figure 2.4: Private consumption expenditure attributable to credit card usage 
Source: Jun (2009, p. 34) 
 
In addition to the credit card tax deduction system, a secondary reward system, known as the 
‘credit card slip lottery programme’, was implemented in 2001. Jeon (2013) notes that the 
rationale behind the introduction of this lottery system was due to concerns that the credit 
card spending threshold may discourage low income earners from participating in the credit 
card tax deduction scheme. Furthermore, the fact that the level of allowable deduction under 
the scheme was, at that time, restricted to 3 million won may also have reduced the incentive 
of participating in the scheme. As such, the lottery scheme, offering a prize of up to 100 
million won (approximately $121 thousand NZD), was introduced to provide extra 
motivation for consumers to use credit cards. According to Jeon (2013), the lottery 
programme proved successful, and the resultant growth in credit card use led to the lottery 
programme being discontinued in January 2006, as its initial objectives had been met.    
 
 
2.6 Conclusions from the literature 
 
 
As the preceding discussion has highlighted, the traditional deterrence model’s lack of 
explanatory power regarding compliance levels has given rise to the concept of tax morale, 
which emphasises the importance of encouraging voluntary compliance through the use of 
the ‘carrot’. One ‘carrot’ which has been identified as having the potential to improve tax 
compliance is the use of rewards for compliant taxpayers.  
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As highlighted above, the majority of studies investigating this topic have been theoretical 
and experimental in nature. Thus, there is an absence of research focused on gaining an 
understanding of the views and opinions of the tax profession and taxpayers regarding issues 
such as how effective a reward system could be in practice, the type of rewards which should 
be utilised, and the feasibility of introducing such a system. Through researching this topic 
from a different perspective, this study seeks to further enhance our understanding regarding 
the potential use of rewards as a means of improving tax compliance.  
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Chapter 3: Research approach, methodology and methods 
 
3.1 Ontology and epistemology 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) note that ontology is “concerned with the nature of social entities” 
(p. 20), and the question of whether social entities are considered to be objective and external 
to social actors, or whether they are social constructions which are established from the 
perceptions and actions of social actors. The ontological position underlying the proposed 
research is constructivism. The constructivist ontological position holds that social objects are 
socially constructed by social actors. Creswell (2003, as cited in McKerchar, 2010, p.76) 
notes that constructivism “is used to describe the activity of the individual from which 
meaning is made by using inductive reasoning.” This reflects the inductive nature of the 
proposed research, whereby meaning will be constructed from interpreting the views and 
perceptions of the research’s respondents. 
 
Epistemology concerns the issue of what should be regarded as acceptable knowledge 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). The epistemological position of the proposed research is 
interpretivism; an approach in which the researcher interprets the subjective meaning of 
social action. McKerchar (2010) notes that interpretivism builds knowledge through 
inductive reasoning, as opposed to identifying causal relationships or making predictions. 
This aligns with the purpose of the proposed research, which is not to make ‘hard and fast’ 
predictions as to the effects that the use of rewards will have on compliance behaviour; 
rather, the purpose is to gain an understanding of taxpayers’ and practitioners’ perceptions.   
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 
The methodology underlying this thesis is qualitative. Bryman and Bell (2011) describe a 
qualitative methodology as one which emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship 
between theory and research. Qualitative research also emphasises elucidating the 
perspectives of those being studied, in order to understand what they see as important and 
significant. This approach lends itself to allowing the researcher to be closely involved with 
those being studied, “so that he or she can genuinely understand the world through their eyes” 
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(Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 410). Therefore, this methodological approach is appropriate for 
the current research, as the focus is on gaining an understanding of how SBOs and tax 
practitioners view the concept of a reward system through their eyes. 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) note that one of the predominant methods utilised in research 
underpinned by a qualitative methodology is the semi-structured interview, as discussed in 
the following subsection. 
 
 
3.3 Method 
 
 
As this research is underpinned by a qualitative methodological position, the research project 
involved the use of semi-structured interviews, which is a predominant qualitative method. 
Thus no quantitative methods were employed and thus no statistical analysis has been 
included. Bryman and Bell (2011) describe a semi-structured interview as one in which the 
“the researcher has a list of questions on fairly specific topics to be covered ... but the 
interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply” (p. 467). The authors suggest the use 
of semi-structured interviews is appropriate in circumstances where “the researcher is 
beginning the investigation with a fairly clear focus ... so that the more specific issues can be 
addressed” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 473).  
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with two categories of participants, namely 
tax practitioners and SBOs who are required to file a tax return. As the researcher wished to 
give the participants considerable freedom in their responses, as well as allowing himself the 
opportunity to follow up on interesting points that they raised, the flexibility of semi-
structured interviews was appropriate. Furthermore, as the researcher had a fairly clear focus 
on several issues that he wished to cover in the interviews, the semi-structured interview was 
more appropriate than the unstructured interview. In regard to determining the appropriate 
number of interviews to conduct in qualitative research, the literature suggests that saturation 
often occurs at twelve interviews, although six interviews can be enough to develop 
meaningful themes and interpretations (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). In total, seven 
interviews were conducted, although it must be noted that these interviews were spread 
between both categories of participants. As such, the sample size for each category of 
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participant can be considered as being small. However, as this research is exploratory in 
nature, its aim is not to draw generalisable conclusions. Rather, the aim of the research is to 
gain an initial in-depth understanding of the views of the participants, which can lay the 
foundation for future research.    
  
As this research project involved interviews, approval from the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee was sought and received. 
 
3.3.1 Interviews with the tax practitioners 
 
 
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews conducted with the tax practitioners was to 
gain an understanding of how the tax profession perceived the potential use of a reward 
system, in regard to issues such as its feasibility, potential design, and potential effectiveness. 
In total, five interviews were conducted with tax practitioners, with each interview being 
between 40 to 60 minutes in duration. All five of the interviews were recorded with the 
consent of the practitioner, and were later transcribed by the researcher. Four of the 
interviews were conducted in person at the practitioner’s premises, and one interview was 
conducted over the telephone. In regard to the sample of tax practitioners interviewed, four 
practitioners worked for mid-tier accounting firms, three of whom were based in their 
respective firm’s Christchurch office, and one in their firm’s Dunedin office. Of these four 
practitioners, three were tax partners in their respective firms, whilst the other practitioner 
had approximately four years of experience working in tax. The fifth tax practitioner 
interviewed was a sole practitioner based in Christchurch, who had previously been a partner 
in a large accounting firm. 
 
As alluded to above, the sample of tax practitioners was drawn from both mid-tier accounting 
firms and sole practitioners. The rationale for selecting the sample from this particular subset 
of accountants was due to the fact that practitioners in this subset were likely to have more 
experience in dealing with the taxation affairs of SBOs and self-employed persons, who are 
the taxpayers of interest for the purposes of this thesis. In contrast, practitioners from larger 
firms would potentially have more experience in dealing with the taxation affairs of larger 
businesses, which are not the focus of this project. As such, it was thought that limiting the 
sample of practitioners to this particular subset was appropriate for meeting the needs of this 
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project. This form of sampling is known as purposive sampling, whereby the researcher 
samples participants in a strategic manner, with the goal of selecting participants who “...are 
relevant to the research questions being posed” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 442).     
 
All five of the practitioners were initially contacted by telephone, whereby a brief overview 
of the project was provided, and an interview was arranged for a time which was convenient 
for the practitioner. In order to locate and select the practitioners, the researcher initially used 
the websites of various mid-tier accounting firms in an attempt to identify suitable candidates 
with experience in dealing with the tax affairs of small businesses. As a result of this process, 
three practitioners were selected and contacted directly via their contact information that was 
provided on their respective firm’s website. However, one of the firms’ websites did not 
provide information regarding its tax practitioners. As such, the researcher phoned the firm 
and, after explaining the purpose of the call, asked to speak with a member of the firm’s tax 
team. Finally, the sole practitioner was identified through a personal contact who engages the 
services of the practitioner, and who notified the researcher that the practitioner would 
potentially be interested in participating in the research.  
 
After the initial contact had been made via telephone, information sheets were emailed to the 
practitioners. These information sheets provided details regarding the objectives of the 
project and informed the practitioners about the type of questions that would be discussed 
during the interview, as well as assurances that the practitioner’s identity would be kept 
confidential. This document also informed the practitioners of their right to withdraw their 
participation from the research within a period of two weeks from conducting the interview. 
In addition to the information sheet, a consent form was also provided to the practitioners 
immediately prior to the commencement of the interview.  
 
Once transcribed, the researcher analysed each interview in an attempt to identify common 
themes arising from the interviews, as well as areas of conflicting opinions and views 
between the practitioners. Once this initial analysis was conducted, the researcher interpreted 
these findings in light of the prior research and theoretical bases in order to analyse the extent 
to which the findings were consistent, or inconsistent, with the prior research, as well as 
identifying findings which shed light on areas of uncertainty. It should also be noted that no 
software was used to assist the researcher’s analysis.  
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3.3.2 Interviews with the small business owner taxpayers 
 
 
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews conducted with the SBOs was to gain an 
understanding of such taxpayers’ perspectives regarding the potential use of rewards to 
improve the tax compliance of SBOs. The general questions and topics covered in these 
interviews were largely the same as those covered in the tax practitioner interviews, which 
enabled the researcher to obtain an understanding of how both categories of participants 
perceived the various issues regarding the use of rewards. Initially, three interviews with 
SBOs were scheduled. However, one participant was unable to attend the interview on the 
date originally agreed. Several attempts were made by the researcher to reschedule the 
interview, but unfortunately this was not possible. As a result, two interviews were conducted 
with SBOs at their place of business in Christchurch, with each interview being recorded with 
the participant’s consent and later transcribed by the researcher. Both interviews were 
approximately 50 minutes in duration.  
 
The participants were involved in very different areas of businesses, with one owning a small 
electronic publishing business, and the other owning a small clothing business. Both 
participants were clients of one of the interviewed practitioners, who provided the researcher 
with their contact information after confirming that they were willing to be interviewed. This 
form of sampling is known as snowball sampling, and involves the initial participants of a 
study recruiting further participants from their acquaintances and contacts (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). As was the case regarding the tax practitioners, information sheets were emailed to the 
SBOs after the initial contact via telephone, with a consent form being offered immediately 
prior to the commencement of the interview.  
 
Once transcribed, the interviews were analysed in the same manner as identified above in 
regard to the practitioner interviews, with the additional aspect of identifying the 
consistencies and inconsistencies between the practitioners’ and SBOs’ views.  
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Chapter 4: Findings from the tax practitioner interviews 
 
4.1 The effectiveness of penalties  
 
 
One of the underlying arguments in the tax morale literature is that tax authorities should 
look to implement compliance strategies which emphasise the ‘carrot’ over the ‘stick’. 
Therefore, as a starting point, the researcher sought the tax practitioners’ opinions as to how 
effective they believed the use of deterrence measures, or the stick, such as penalties, are in 
regard to achieving tax compliance from taxpayers. A general point which was raised in 
several of the tax practitioner interviews was that, whilst the majority of taxpayers have at 
least a general awareness of the existence of penalties for non-compliance, they lack any in 
depth knowledge about them:    
 
I think they’re aware that there are penalties. A lot view the interest being charged as a 
penalty even though technically it’s not. They don’t know much detail about penalties. 
For example, most probably couldn’t tell the difference between avoidance and 
evasion, and would never have heard of the term ‘shortfall penalties.’ (Practitioner A) 
 
I think people have a different awareness of the penalties. I think people at a general 
level mostly understand that there’ll be interest on amounts not paid in time and 
potentially late payment penalties and non filing penalties. Whether there’s a greater 
appreciation for the level of shortfall penalties for not taking proper care... there’s 
probably less knowledge of those. (Practitioner B)  
 
Whilst the above comments indicate that perhaps raising taxpayers’ awareness of the 
penalties for non-compliance may improve compliance, the perception of the practitioners 
was that, in general, the effectiveness of penalties is relatively limited, and can even be 
detrimental to compliance in some cases: 
 
I don’t think penalties are a huge deterrent, or at least, they don’t seem to be... 
(Practitioner C) 
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Sometimes I deal with people who are already deeply in trouble with the IRD. They 
know they have an obligation but no idea how much the obligation is because they’re 
not opening envelopes [of letters sent to them from Inland Revenue], they have a 
mental block... It’s an example of why these penalties make absolutely no difference to 
compliance, because whilst people know the penalties are there, they simply don’t 
know how much, and if they do, it just causes them to run away from the problem... 
(Practitioner A) 
 
Practitioner B, in his experience of dealing with taxpayers, felt that taxpayers can generally 
be categorised into three types, and that the effectiveness of penalties is likely dependent on 
which type a particular taxpayer is categorised as: 
 
I break taxpayers down into three types: Those who are quite active in wanting to 
comply, so are very conscious of their filing deadlines and getting things done 
correctly, and do not look for ways to avoid tax; ones which need a little nudge across 
the line; and ones who just blatantly do not want to comply and seem very blasé about 
things... for the middle group, it [the threat of penalties] might shift things a bit and 
might motivate them enough to get across the line, but I think that, for the latter group, 
you’re always going to have those people who can’t be bothered, who don’t care and 
who are against the system, regardless of the level of penalties, and if the IRD imposed 
a penalty on them then they might actually take a bit of offence by it, and that 
sometimes makes them a bit defiant with the IRD, and they don’t want to pay tax 
because they want to cause the IRD a headache... (Practitioner B).  
 
Rather than seeking to increase taxpayers’ awareness of deterrence measures or the severity 
thereof, the practitioners believed it would be more beneficial for tax compliance if Inland 
Revenue sought to increase taxpayers’ awareness and understanding of the tax system in 
general:  
  
...first and foremost, I think it’s more important to raise taxpayers’ awareness of the 
actual taxes themselves, and how the tax system actually operates. For example, people 
need to understand that GST collected is not their money; PAYE withheld is withheld 
on behalf of another person and it’s not their money, and it’s effectively moving 
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towards theft [if they do not pay the tax to Inland Revenue]. People just don’t really see 
it. I’ve seen a lot of people fall off the cliff and then have to ask us [tax practitioners] to 
help... so awareness is possibly an issue. (Practitioner C) 
 
... I think that, rather than the IRD looking to use scare tactics so to speak, like telling 
taxpayers “this is the penalty if you do this, and this is the penalty if you do that”, I 
think taxpayers would respond better if the IRD actually spent more time educating 
taxpayers about the tax system, so they understand how taxes work. (Practitioner B) 
 
Although there are people out there who purposefully evade tax, like some small 
business people because it’s quite easy to do, I also see a lot of people get into trouble 
not because they intentionally meant to be non-compliant, but they’re just ignorant. 
They have no idea about tax or what they were meant to do. For people like them, 
penalties are not the solution. Raising their understanding of the system is the solution. 
(Practitioner E) 
 
 
4.2 Procedural justice 
 
As the above results indicated that the tax practitioners felt that penalties are perhaps not the 
most effective means of ensuring tax compliance, the researcher sought their views as to 
whether they felt there was a place for Inland Revenue to utilise more positive approaches to 
encourage tax compliance. The responses obtained generally indicated a belief that tax 
compliance could be improved through Inland Revenue seeking to ensure that it has positive 
interactions with taxpayers, which can help to create a positive perception of the department 
in the eyes of taxpayers: 
 
It’s not hard to see the image of the IRD in the minds of the public shifting if they had 
more positive interactions with them, like for example the IRD contacting compliant 
taxpayers and saying “it’s good to see you paying your tax on time, and filing your 
returns.” It’s similar to what the police can do. Whilst the police have to deal with 
unpleasant criminals, they still get a lot of public support simply by being a presence 
and being polite and helping people, and all the positive things the police do gives them 
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a positive image that outweighs the occasional negative image you have of them when 
they break up a student party for example ...their negative interactions are balanced by 
having a lot of positive interactions as well. (Practitioner A) 
 
I think it’s very important to ensure that taxpayers have a positive perception of the 
IRD, but I think that more comes down to the interactions that people have with Inland 
Revenue. I think also that just having a tax system that is seen as being fair overall... 
will probably have more effect on what peoples’ behaviour is going be as opposed to 
the effect that incentives might have. (Practitioner D)  
 
I think that, generally speaking, peoples’ attitudes about paying tax and attitudes 
towards the IRD are based more on peoples’ day to day experiences with the IRD, and 
there are a large number of interactions that small business owners have with the IRD 
which can impact on their attitude towards the IRD and compliance. (Practitioner C) 
 
 
However, Practitioner A expressed the opinion that he felt Inland Revenue’s current 
interactions with taxpayers are not always of an acceptable standard. For example, in regard 
to the use of penalties, Practitioner A, whilst acknowledging that penalties are a necessary 
and important aspect in achieving tax compliance, expressed concern with the manner in 
which Inland Revenue conducts itself when imposing penalties, which can potentially further 
reduce their effectiveness:   
 
The big stick will eventually whip them in to doing something through making 
demands or imposing penalties, but I think more success would come through the IRD 
ringing them personally and asking them what’s going on. That would have a much 
better effect than just sending letters with increased penalties rolling up. It’s 
dehumanising, highhanded, arrogant, bullying and it’s abusive in some situations. So, 
whilst of course there is a role for penalties, the way they are currently administered is 
just appalling. 
 
 
Practitioner E expressed the opinion that for some taxpayers, particularly those who are more 
defiant and willing to evade their taxes, positive interactions and perceptions regarding Inland 
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Revenue are not particularly important factors influencing their compliance behaviour. In 
regard to the question of whether he believed it was likely that some non-compliant taxpayers 
may alter their compliance behaviour in response to Inland Revenue improving its 
interactions and image, he stated: 
 
No, not really. There will always be people who try and hide things, whether it is cash 
jobs or whatever, and I think those people always will, and I don’t necessarily think that 
it matters whether they have a positive perception of the IRD or not, because it’s just in 
their nature to try and evade tax. I think it would take more than just the IRD treating 
them nicely for them to become more compliant. 
 
 
4.3 Rewards 
 
 
The above section highlighted that the practitioners were generally of the opinion that 
utilising more positive compliance approaches could be an effective means of improving 
overall tax compliance, which nicely leads onto the primary focus of this research, namely 
whether the use of rewards is potentially one positive approach which could improve tax 
compliance. As such, the researcher sought the opinions of the tax practitioners in regard to 
whether they believed the use of rewards could potentially be an effective method of 
improving tax compliance. The responses in general were supportive of the idea of 
introducing a reward system to operate alongside the traditional deterrence system. Some 
general comments are provided first. 
.... It’s a whole different mindset. It’s a huge contrast to the idea that “we’ll just beat 
you with an ever larger stick until you roll over into submission and you whimper 
appropriately.” (Practitioner A)  
 
It’s hard to think of giving rewards for paying tax where historically it’s been a penalty 
based system.... It’s a complete and utter different mindset, and one which I think has a 
lot of merit. (Practitioner B) 
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If it helps them [Inland Revenue] maximise their tax revenue then they should 
absolutely go for it. The one difficulty I have with it is that we’re rewarding people for 
doing what is already expected of them. That’s the problem I have with it. (Practitioner 
C) 
 
I think it’s a good idea [the potential use of a reward system]. Any way to encourage 
people to pay their taxes is useful, and something like this could be a good system 
because it has the potential to encourage people to pay their taxes... It’s a bit different 
because it’s coming from a completely different angle. Instead of trying to use the old 
sledge hammer approach with penalties to try and get people to comply, this approach 
is doing it from a different angle, and I think it’s a good approach to look at. 
(Practitioner E)  
 
Various rationales for using rewards were provided by the practitioners, and the potential 
effect they could have on different subgroups of taxpayers was discussed. Practitioner E 
provided a general rationale he felt was applicable to all subgroups of taxpayers, noting that 
rewarding taxpayers for compliance could help to create a more reciprocal relationship 
between Inland Revenue and taxpayers, and lessen the feeling that the relationship between 
the parties is one which is dominated by Inland Revenue. In response to the question of 
whether he felt the introduction of a reward system could help to improve compliance, he 
replied that: 
I think it could. I think it would help to break that stigma of the IRD if people got 
something in return for adhering to their taxes and paying on time. It may be important 
to change the perception of the IRD as being a taking organisation, you know, just take, 
take, take, and penalties, penalties, penalties, because that’s a major gripe I see that 
taxpayers and clients have... changing that by using rewards I think would encourage 
taxpayers to be more honest, and it might even help to put a face to the IRD if they 
were seen to be giving a bit more back to the good taxpayers.  
 
Practitioner A felt that the use of rewards would help Inland Revenue to create a more 
friendly tax environment which builds positive relationships with taxpayers: 
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I’m not sure whether they [Inland Revenue] would consider that they have a tax morale 
issue, or an image issue, but they just seem to have a negative aura. If they’re looking 
for a way to improve tax morale and their image... then they need a change of attitude 
themselves, just as much as they need to change taxpayers’ attitudes. They need to 
change their attitude towards taxpayers, from being one of ‘we’re out to look for the 
bad guys, and everyone is a potential bad guy.” If they had a reward focus... then the 
ones who receive the rewards are going to like them, and the interaction with the 
rewards group will be a lot more pleasant, and this could help to ensure that people 
keep complying in the future because there is a tangible incentive in place for them to 
do so. 
 
 
Several tax practitioners expressed opinions regarding the potential effect that the use of 
rewards could have on different subgroups, or motivational postures, of taxpayers. In regard 
to taxpayers who could be classified as resistant or disengaged, the responses generally 
indicated the view that rewards could be very effective for encouraging these groups of 
taxpayers to improve their compliance:  
 
I think rewards would be effective in bringing up to speed the fringe taxpayers by 
encouraging them to be fully compliant because they know that they are getting a gain 
by being compliant and they’re not having to take any risks anymore. Also, if someone 
has had a penalty, it can make some taxpayers a bit more resistant and sometimes they 
can even get a bit of a vendetta behind them against the IRD, which can lead to 
negative compliance behaviour in the future... but the IRD might have some more 
scope if they had a reward system in place to mend some bridges with disgruntled 
taxpayers and ones who have sort of tried to shut themselves out of the system, so it 
gives the IRD another tool to engage with taxpayers and get them onside which would 
hopefully build up their compliance levels. (Practitioner B) 
 
... I definitely think introducing rewards could improve the compliance of those 
taxpayers whose compliance is a bit iffy, like they’re paying some of the tax they 
should but are also purposefully evading some as well, and it gives another point of 
contact from IRD to resolve an issue or come to an agreement on something. It’s 
something in the taxpayers’ favour and something that IRD can offer to entice 
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compliance. Because it is a positive strategy rather than another threat of audit or 
penalties, I think people might be more willing to accept a route that involves rewards 
if they’re compliant rather than continuing to take the risk of cheating. (Practitioner E) 
 
However, despite the positives, some doubts were expressed as to the potential ability of 
rewards to significantly alter and improve non-compliant taxpayers’ behaviour: 
 
 
I’m not entirely sure [whether rewards would significantly impact the compliance 
behaviour of non-compliant taxpayers].... the benefits they see from evading, such as 
taking the odd cash job, is something which is a hard habit to change. They’d still want 
the reward for the tax they do pay. They’d still file their tax on time. The prospect of 
receiving a reward for paying tax may make them evade less tax than before, but 
whether they’d include all their tax in it, I don’t know whether that would necessarily 
change. (Practitioner A)  
 
The big issue is that with cash businesses, it’s so easy for them to hide it [income], and 
I’m not sure if a reward system would necessarily stop that. (Practitioner C) 
 
Speaking in regard to taxpayers who could be classified as disengaged, Practitioner A was of 
the opinion that the introduction of a reward system would do little to change this group’s 
compliance behaviour: 
 
No, they’re way outside the system. They’re the ones who need to be penalised. 
 
In contrast, Practitioner B, as indicated above, was of the opinion that the use of rewards may 
give Inland Revenue the opportunity to engage more with this group of taxpayers, and noted 
that maybe the aim of using rewards should not necessarily be to try and get every non-
compliant taxpayer to become 100 percent compliant. Instead, the aim of using rewards 
should be to increase the compliance levels of as many taxpayers with the least amount of 
cost: 
 
There will always be people who just through their personality or previous experiences 
have some negative view of the IRD. They don’t like paying tax, they don’t appreciate 
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the moral obligations that come with a welfare society and they don’t want to cooperate 
with the IRD.... it’s very hard to change those peoples’ views but I think that something 
like this [using a reward system] is a value for money game. It’s not about getting 
everyone being fully compliant; it’s about encouraging as many people as possible to 
increase their compliance above what it was prior [to using rewards] with the least 
amount of cost. I don’t believe you can change everyone, but I would think that the 
IRD would engage with more people if they introduced rewards than they otherwise 
would have been able to. 
 
Practitioner C made reference to taxpayers who could be classified as game players, noting 
that whilst rewards may be able to encourage disengaged taxpayers to become more 
compliant, they would be unlikely to affect the compliance behaviour of game players:  
 
I think rewards could possibly have a positive effect on taxpayers who have become 
quite non-compliant over time, because they would view the introduction of rewards as 
being something positive and something that would actually benefit them from paying 
their tax, so they may decide that it’s not worth their while to take the risk of cheating 
anymore, but then people are different and some people like to play games and try to 
win, and it’s competitive for them and they don’t care what kind of incentive is being 
offered, they’re still going to try and save as much as possible by not declaring all of 
their income. 
  
 
Practitioner B also made further reference to game playing taxpayers, commenting that he felt 
the introduction of rewards would make it easier for practitioners to dissuade such taxpayers 
from looking to exploit the tax law in order to save tax.  
 
Anything the IRD can do to improve tax compliance, like introducing rewards, would 
also make our jobs easier because we can say to clients, “hey look, I know you might 
not want to pay all of your tax and you’d like us to try and find some ways around it, 
but if you suck it up and just pay what you owe then you’ll get a benefit out of it 
anyway without taking any risk.” That would be a lot more effective than saying to 
them “look, this is the tax you need to pay because that’s what’s required, and if you 
look to exploit the law then you risk getting penalised.” The use of rewards would 
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make it a lot easier to get difficult clients to comply because we can explain to them 
that “look, if you get on board with this then you will get something out of it, so we 
don’t need to bend the law because you already have an incentive to just pay your tax.” 
It would give us the chance to do a bit of a sales pitch to get difficult taxpayers across 
the line, which is obviously what the IRD would want.  
 
 
4.3.1 Using rewards to maintain the compliance of deferent taxpayers 
 
 
Whilst the above section largely focused on the effect that rewards would potentially have on 
improving the compliance of defiant, non-compliant taxpayers, a discussion was also had in 
regard to the role that rewards could play in maintaining the compliance of deferent, 
compliant taxpayers. A concern was initially raised by Practitioner A in regard to the lack of 
acknowledgement given to ‘good’ taxpayers from Inland Revenue: 
 
...what I know is that the IRD only has two baskets. In basket one are the good 
taxpayers and in basket two are the bad guys. Most of the good taxpayers are just 
ignored... the IRD give you no credit for the fact that you’ve filed tax returns for so 
many years and you’ve done it correctly and paid all your tax. Instead, you’re treated 
no better or worse than the lowest scum ball out there. 
 
This raises the question of whether the lack of acknowledgement of good taxpayers could 
potentially lead to such taxpayers becoming non-compliant in the future, perhaps due to a 
reduction in their motivation to be a good taxpayer. Mixed responses were put forward on 
this issue by the practitioners. For example, Practitioner D did not foresee good taxpayers 
becoming non-compliant over time due to a lack of acknowledgment from Inland Revenue: 
...I think 90 percent of people are good people who are going to do the right thing and 
do it regardless, so if they get a letter of acknowledgment from the IRD, most people 
would say, “I was just going to do it anyway...” 
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Whilst on the other hand, when asked whether there was a risk of good taxpayers becoming 
non-compliant due to a lack of acknowledgment, Practitioner E noted: 
Yes, and I suppose that happens now, because good taxpayers don’t really get 
acknowledged for what they do, so I know that for some clients, if a cash job came 
along they would just take it because they don’t hear from the IRD in a lot of cases, 
good or bad, so they just think “I might as well just do this cash job [and not declare it 
for income tax purposes] and if I get caught, well, I get caught.” 
 
This leads on to the issue of whether the use of rewards for compliant taxpayers could act as a 
potential means of reducing any risk that may exist in regard to good taxpayers becoming 
non-compliant due to a lack of acknowledgement from Inland Revenue. The general view 
from the practitioners was that rewards would potentially act to reduce such a risk. For 
example, Practitioner E stated: 
 
I think some kind of reward would help to maintain or increase compliance, because 
most people like to be patted on the back.... 
 
Practitioner B was also supportive of the role that rewards could possibly play in this regard, 
stating that: 
 
Yes, those taxpayers who are already compliant would remain compliant, because they 
feel like their good behaviour is being acknowledged... without some type of a reward 
system, there’s just no positive reinforcement. There’s no acknowledgment of 
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to comply. If you’re only ever after people to get 
something out of them, I can’t imagine that people would think too nicely of you. 
  
He further commented that: 
 
The only time that the IRD contacts you is when tax payments are due or amounts are 
outstanding, and you’re only getting negative news from them... From a taxpayer’s 
view, they’re only in contact with me if something’s wrong. I don’t hear anything from 
them when things are going ok and I’m doing the right thing. In that sense, the reason 
why people may develop such a negative view towards the IRD is because they’re only 
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bearers of bad news. So, giving some kind of reward to compliant taxpayers would 
reduce this risk and keep them happy to comply. 
 
 
Practitioner C was somewhat supportive, recognising that:  
 
It could be effective for some people. I know that in regard to human psychology, some 
people are motivated by praise, and some people are motivated by other things. 
 
It is important to note that whilst the above discussion has highlighted that good taxpayers do 
not generally receive acknowledgement from Inland Revenue, taxpayers with a good 
compliance history can receive favourable treatment in circumstances where they have 
incurred a penalty regarding a compliance issue. This raises the question of whether this 
actually already constitutes a reward for good taxpayers who have been compliant in the past; 
a question in which opposite views were elicited from the tax practitioners. Practitioner A 
was of the view that the penalty relief provided to taxpayers with a clean compliance history 
does not amount to a reward: 
The only time it [a clean tax history] comes in to play is when they are looking at 
penalties and see you haven’t had one before and say “we’ll decrease it by 50%,” and if 
you’d made a disclosure you’d get a decrease as well, but that doesn’t feel like a 
reward.  
 
In contrast, Practitioner B thought such relief might be viewed by Inland Revenue as being 
analogous to a reward for compliant taxpayers, which may reduce their willingness to offer 
further rewards: 
...we could have a system that’s set up where if you’re continually compliant then you 
get the rewards, which is similar to kind of what we have at the moment, where if you 
have got a clean tax history, you might not get the full amount of penalties applied if 
you did happen to get into some kind of compliance problem. So, in that sense, whilst 
it’s not labelled a reward, taxpayers who have been compliant over time are in effect 
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getting some reward, so the IRD might think that they’re already offering enough of a 
reward for being compliant. 
 
 
4.3.2 Customer versus Taxpayer and the role of rewards 
 
 
When discussing the role that rewards could play in improving tax compliance, the practice 
of Inland Revenue calling taxpayers ‘customers’, as opposed to taxpayers, and the impact this 
practice has on taxpayers’ perceptions of Inland Revenue, arose. The tax practitioners 
expressed a negative view about this practice, as in their view, the practice of calling 
taxpayers customers has a negative impact upon taxpayers and their views regarding Inland 
Revenue:   
... unless they actually treat people like a customer, it’s a falsity [to call them a 
customer]. Most people scoff at the IRD using the term customer because they don’t 
treat people as customers. (Practitioner A). 
 
The IRD calling taxpayers customers is just like Work and Income calling people 
‘clients’... I think it makes people take a negative view of the IRD... (Practitioner D).   
 
These responses indicate that the main reason behind the practitioners’ negative view of 
Inland Revenue’s practice of calling taxpayers customers is that Inland Revenue does not 
attempt to actually treat taxpayers as customers. As such, this led to some of the practitioners 
expressing the view that the use of a reward system would help to reduce taxpayers’ 
negativity associated with being called a customer, as it would increase the legitimacy and 
genuineness of Inland Revenue using such a term:  
 
That’s the only way they can do it [reduce the negativity associated with calling 
taxpayers customers], because using names like ‘customer’ is easy but without taking 
any action [such as introducing rewards] it’s just cheap lip service... These are things 
which real service organisations do for their real customers [the use of rewards such as 
discounts]; otherwise the IRD using the word customers is just rather a joke. 
 (Practitioner A) 
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Using rewards to try and form a proper customer relationship with taxpayers is a pretty 
novel concept. It’s bringing commerciality into the tax world. People like receiving 
benefits when they’re a customer of a commercial organisation and organisations 
reward customers to try and build relationships, so I think a similar thing could work in 
the tax context. (Practitioner C)   
 
If they’re serious about it [having a proper customer relationship] they have to look at 
organisations that actually have customers and say “what do they do?” The IRD has 
been very anonymous, and most customer driven organisations hate anonymity; they 
actually like to form relationships, and they look to form them by offering rewards and 
incentives to people to build loyalty, but the IRD avoids forming relationships at all 
costs. (Practitioner E) 
 
4.4 Possible features and operation of a reward system 
 
 
An important issue to consider in regard to the potential use of a reward system is the type of 
rewards which would likely be the most effective in having a positive influence upon 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. Prior literature on this point has largely categorised 
possible rewards as being either financial or non-financial in nature. The researcher sought 
the views of the tax practitioners in regard to the types of rewards which they believed would 
be the most effective for motivating taxpayers to become, or continue being, compliant.  
 
 
4.4.1 Financial rewards 
 
 
The general consensus from the interviews with the tax practitioners was that the use of 
financial rewards, as opposed to non-financial rewards, would be the most effective approach 
for motivating taxpayers who could be classified as belonging to one of the defiant 
motivational posture categories:   
    
...those people who do the cash jobs and things like that,  they’ll always continue to do 
a cash job and not put it in the books, and I don’t think any amount of reward would 
change that, unless it was monetary. It would have to be monetary for someone like 
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that. A non-financial reward, such as a letter acknowledging that they have been a good 
taxpayer, wouldn’t be enough to motivate them to become a more compliant taxpayer. 
(Practitioner E) 
 
It would have to be a good monetary incentive and probably a continual one, which 
they could receive year after year. (Practitioner D) 
 
Getting a cheque back in the mail could be quite powerful, because they can see their 
bank account going up and it’s more tangible, and they’ll feel like they’re getting a real 
gain from meeting their compliance obligations. (Practitioner C)   
 
 
This next issue to consider is the type of financial reward that would be most likely to 
improve the compliance behaviour of defiant taxpayers. The general view of the practitioners 
was that the financial reward should take the form of a rebate calculated as a percentage of 
the tax paid by the taxpayer: 
 
I think the most effective reward would be a rebate which is volume driven, so the more 
tax paid, the bigger the reward. That should incentivise them to declare more of their 
income so they get a bigger reward, and they feel like they’re getting a real benefit from 
paying tax. (Practitioner A) 
 
...practically it does seem that an approach based on the idea that the more you pay the 
more you save might be the only way to make people more compliant. I think the 
taxpayers who are on the threshold of ‘shall I declare it all or should I run the gauntlet?’ 
would likely go for the refund and say “I might as well just pay my full tax and get the 
refund so I can sleep easy and not take the risk of getting caught evading.” (Practitioner 
C) 
 
 
Despite the potential positive impact that a percentage rebate would have in reducing 
taxpayers’ willingness to take the risk of evading, the point was also raised that some non-
compliant taxpayers would still engage in tax evasion despite the prospect of getting a bigger 
rebate if they declared more of their income: 
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If, for example, someone was saving three thousand dollars tax by not declaring all 
their income, and then a percentage rebate was introduced which would give them a 
refund amounting to, say, one thousand dollars if they declared all of their income, the 
risk/reward profile has changed, so absolutely it’s going to change people’s behaviour. 
However, some people will still think, “well, I can still save an extra two thousand 
dollars if I keep evading the tax. Getting a larger refund wouldn’t encourage every 
taxpayer to declare their extra income. (Practitioner B) 
 
It’s got to be a big enough incentive to stop them from doing the bigger cash jobs, and 
that could get quite costly, but an incentive like that [a percentage rebate] could be very 
effective in making them think that it’s not worth their while to do it ... People might 
think “alright, if I don’t do that cash job I’ve got nothing to worry about and if I know 
I’m going to get a couple of hundred bucks back here and be in the good books, then 
I’ll just declare the income.” I think they’d jump at it, but I still think that some people 
would declare what they were going to declare anyway. I just have a fear that they 
wouldn’t start to declare all of their cash jobs, just because of the type of people they 
are. (Practitioner E)  
 
Two of the tax practitioners also raised the point that there was a risk that the effectiveness of 
financial rewards may decrease over time if taxpayers were to start viewing them as the 
norm: 
  
It [a percentage rebate system] may have a positive impact on the taxpayers who are on 
the cusp but it’s not going to save the world, and I think it would become the norm. It 
would start with a hiss and a roar, but then it might just become part of the process and 
people would start to weigh up the numbers, like “do I pay everything and get the 
rebate, or am I better off doing something else?” (Practitioner C)    
 
Monetary rewards can often just become expected, so if you gave someone a monetary 
reward every year and something slips up one year, and they’re expecting to get their 
reward, they could get angry. (Practitioner B) 
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4.4.2 Non-financial rewards 
 
 
Despite the strong support put forward for the use of financial rewards, some of the 
practitioners were of a view that non-financial rewards could also have a part to play. In 
particular, the general view from the practitioners appeared to be that non-financial rewards 
may be more effective for maintaining the compliance levels of deferent taxpayers who have 
a positive opinion of the tax system and are already consistently compliant. Practitioner A put 
forward the idea that Inland Revenue could give taxpayers who have been consistently 
compliant some preferred status with Inland Revenue: 
 
It would be interesting to see if there’d be a behavioural response if people could have, 
for example, some higher status with IRD than just being a normal taxpayer. For 
example, most people like the recognition of being a frequent flyer and being a 
preferred customer, and being acknowledged by the organisation. 
 
Once taxpayers have been elevated to this preferred status, they would receive special 
treatment from Inland Revenue. Practitioner A offered the following example: 
 
... it’s an interesting idea that if the IRD were to say, “we see that you have been a good 
taxpayer and we consider you as one of our good taxpayers, and you have this preferred 
status”, then maybe when they rang the IRD they would get put through more quickly 
for support and help, such as a special phone number to call, and taxpayers are given a 
special customer number, and they’re put to the front of the queue... 
 
Practitioner E, whilst being somewhat supportive of this type of idea, recognised that perhaps 
its effectiveness would be limited, noting that: 
 
Clients always do say that if they’re ringing the IRD they can never get through. But, 
most of the time it’s the accountants who ring. So, to a certain degree that would help, 
but you’d probably have to put a few more positives on that list. 
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Practitioner E went on to discuss some additional types of non-financial rewards which he 
thought might therefore be necessary, one of which was allowing habitually compliant 
taxpayers more flexibility and leniency with tax filing times: 
 
Maybe something like extending filing times for some returns or in special 
circumstances, such as their accountant who does all their tax returns being sick... So 
maybe some kind of incentives like that which allows for a penalty to be waived and 
time limits extended if a staff member is sick and returns not filed on time, or payments 
not made on time due to unusual circumstances... A bit of flexibility would be just as 
good for taxpayers as a monetary reward. The IRD do that to an extent now, but I think 
that if you can be put on a special list due to demonstrating good previous compliance 
behaviour which could allow leniency to taxpayers in genuine circumstances, it would 
be effective... 
 
Practitioner B also expressed the view that a reward in the form of flexibility of timeframes 
for taxpayers with a good compliance history could be effective: 
 
Monetary rewards can often just become expected... But, if the reward is in the form of 
the department doing something to make your life easier, you appreciate it more and 
you feel like you’re getting a little and giving a little. I think discounts or rebates based 
on the amount of tax paid are a good idea, but I also think that a lot of taxpayers would 
appreciate the chance to have an extension of filing and paying dates which gives them 
more time, and they can hold onto the money for longer and therefore they can earn 
more interest with it... At the end of the day, tax is tax to people, and the biggest 
obstacle we sometimes have with clients is timeframes and things like that, so if they 
could get some leniency with the department due to their good behaviour in the past, I 
know that a lot of taxpayers would view the IRD positively and would continue to be 
compliant. 
 
In addition to the idea of giving compliant taxpayers some type of preferred status with 
Inland Revenue, Practitioner A also suggested that Inland Revenue could provide rewards 
which would have a direct influence on a taxpayer’s business. An example given was that 
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Inland Revenue could make use of its bulk buying power to provide discounted accounting 
software to small businesses: 
 
The IRD might be able to have volume discount arrangements where they give good 
taxpayers a voucher number, so if they want to upgrade their business systems to Xero 
or MYOB, they quote this number and they’ll get a 30% discount for example. The 
IRD could use its size and buying power to effectively negotiate good deals for people 
to help their compliance. People will tell others “wow, I got a voucher from the IRD 
which knocked 30% off the cost of my Xero”, and then the IRD would start getting 
some love. 
 
The idea of emphasising positive reinforcement through the use of direct communications 
with taxpayers, such as sending letters or certificates to taxpayers thanking them for meeting 
their tax obligations, was briefly raised by several practitioners, which received mixed 
opinions. Practitioner E was in favour of such an approach:  
 
Some clients would love to get a bit of paper at the end of the year saying 
“congratulations, we classify you as a good taxpayer for this year.” They’d love it. I 
could see it on some clients’ walls, and they’d probably use it as a marketing tool for 
their business. 
 
However, Practitioner D was less convinced with the utility of such a reward: 
 
It’s hard to say [whether such a reward would be effective] because some people would 
say “oh that’s really nice, I got a letter from the IRD, so it’s all worthwhile”, and other 
people would say “oh what a heap of rubbish.” 
 
 
4.4.3 Tax audits and the bomb-crater effect 
 
 
A possible scenario in which a taxpayer could receive a reward is where a taxpayer is found 
to be largely compliant after a tax audit by Inland Revenue. One of the potential advantages 
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of providing rewards to compliant taxpayers in these circumstances is that it may reduce the 
likelihood of the bomb-crater effect occurring. As outlined above, the bomb-crater effect 
refers to the risk that a taxpayer’s level of tax compliance may decrease in the period 
following a tax audit, due to the perception that they are unlikely to be audited again by the 
tax authority in the following period (Guala & Mittone, 2005). The researcher sought the 
views of the tax practitioners in regard to whether they perceived the bomb-crater effect as 
being a realistic risk in practice, in which mixed opinions were given. Practitioner A did not 
perceive this as posing a realistic threat to compliance, noting that:  
 
The IRD are already aware of the risk that people may think, “well, they’re not going to 
come around here anytime soon.”... I’ve never come across a client that says “I’m 
going to misbehave now because the prefect’s back is turned.”  An organisation either 
prides itself on being a compliant taxpayer or it doesn’t, and IRD auditors usually sense 
which type it is. 
 
On the other hand, when asked whether a risk exists that a taxpayer may seek to save tax 
through evasion in the period following a successful tax audit, Practitioner B stated that: 
 
I believe it does. Some taxpayers will be relieved, others will be on edge because they 
are thinking that the IRD will be sniffing around continually, but some might think that 
they’re off the hook and have got some wriggle room. 
 
Practitioner C and D took more of a middle ground, both echoing Practitioner A’s sentiments 
that they are not aware of any clients seeking to save tax through evasion in the period 
following a successful audit, whilst at the same time recognising that it is possible that such 
behaviour could occur. For example, Practitioner C noted that: 
  
I can understand why people would do that, but personally I haven’t seen somebody 
come out of a successful audit and say “right, we’ll rort the system next year.” 
 
Whilst Practitioner E stated that: 
 
55 
 
People seem to have a perception that you only get audited once every seven years. I 
don’t know where that came from, so if someone gets audited they think “it’s not my 
turn for another one.” 
 
These findings suggest that there is at least some level of risk that the bomb-crater effect 
could pose a threat to compliance levels in New Zealand. As such, the next point to consider 
is whether the utilisation of rewards for taxpayers found to be compliant after an audit could 
potentially act to reduce this risk. In response to the question of whether the use of rewards 
would be effective in this regard, Practitioner E was supportive of the idea, saying:   
 
I think it probably would, yes. If they’d been audited and come up clean, and got a 
rebate they’re probably going to think “why should I rock the boat when I’m safely in 
it?” They would possibly feel guilty taking advantage of the IRD. They would think, 
“I’ve done everything expected of me, and the IRD have done everything that is 
expected of them”, so I think they would have a bit of a guilt trip if they tried it on. 
 
A related point that was raised by Practitioner D and Practitioner E was the potential for 
taxpayers to develop negative feelings towards Inland Revenue after an audit. Practitioner D 
explained that: 
 
I think that the general view of an audit by a compliant taxpayer is that they begrudge 
the interruption to their business and the cost that arises if they need to involve an 
accountant, which is often the case.... This can definitely lead to a negative view of the 
audit process and the IRD. 
 
A similar view was put forward by Practitioner E, who opined that: 
 
There is a bit of negativity around the audit process, with taxpayers saying “why are 
you wasting my time doing this, this and that?” 
 
These responses raise the question of whether the use of rewards for taxpayers found to be 
compliant after an audit could be framed as a type of compensation for the monetary and time 
costs incurred by taxpayers during an audit, as a means of seeking to prevent feelings of ill 
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will being developed by taxpayers towards Inland Revenue. Practitioner E thought this could 
be the case: 
 
...if they come out clean, I think some kind of incentive would reduce the chance of a 
bad taste being left in the taxpayer’s mouth. 
 
Furthermore, Practitioner D was very supportive of the potential use of rewards in this 
scenario, preferring to restrict the use of rewards to this defined context:  
 
I think that if you had a clean audit, rather than having a wholesale rebate, it would 
maybe go some way to improving peoples’ perceptions of the IRD, like “we’ve done an 
audit and we know it’s cost you guys money and time, but it’s been really good, so 
what we’d like to do is to reward you for your good behaviour”. I think that in this 
context, the use of rewards maybe has more merit [than operating a wholesale rebate 
system] 
 
However, Practitioner A recognised the potential pitfall with limiting the provision of 
rewards to circumstances in which taxpayers have had a clean audit: 
 
You wouldn’t want people putting their hand up for an audit simply because they want 
the reward. The IRD has to focus resources on where there’s risk, and a lot of taxpayers 
would not receive the rewards. But, having done an audit on somebody, if they were 
found to be compliant, the IRD auditors could probably say “we’ll recommend you for 
‘gold status’ because we can see you’ve got strong compliance processes and you’ve 
been very cooperative.” 
 
 
4.5 Overcoming the difficulties with defiant taxpayers 
 
 
The tax practitioners raised certain concerns regarding the ability of a reward system to 
encourage non-compliant taxpayers to improve their compliance behaviour, which would 
necessitate consideration regarding how a reward system would be designed. 
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4.5.1 The need for a tax amnesty 
 
 
The first concern related to the problem that non-compliant taxpayers, particularly those who 
would be classified as disengaged, would be hesitant to come back into the tax system and 
declare their full income in fear that Inland Revenue would penalise them for their past non-
compliance. As such, the practitioners proposed that the introduction of a reward system 
would need to be accompanied by an amnesty if it were to be successful:  
 
The danger is, for the non-compliant taxpayers who have been non-compliant for 
forever and a day, if they suddenly turn around and file a tax return with a large amount 
of income, the IRD will be going “alright, what about the last four years? What about 
the omission of income? Let’s go back and look...” So is it [the introduction of a reward 
system] going to encourage people who are out of the tax system to come back into the 
tax system? Not without an amnesty. (Practitioner C)    
 
I think that people who have largely removed themselves from the system are probably 
too far gone because I would think that if they try to get back into the system, they’d be 
worried that the IRD would go back and look at what they’ve done in previous years, so 
there’d be a fear there and they probably wouldn’t even consider it I don’t think. To get 
them to consider it, you would need an amnesty because otherwise you’ve got the fear 
of the IRD looking back over the last 10 years. (Practitioner E). 
 
 
4.5.2 Using the ‘stick’ as well as the ‘carrot’ 
 
 
A further concern, which has been alluded to in prior sections, arose in regard to the 
possibility that although the use of rewards may encourage non-compliant taxpayers to 
increase their compliance levels, some taxpayers, particularly resistant and disengaged 
taxpayers, may still look to evade some taxes whilst still receiving a reward for the tax they 
have paid, as would be the case if the reward system operated as a rebate system. A possible 
solution to this issue was proposed by the tax practitioners, who felt that a reward system 
should be designed in a manner in which there are severe consequences for taxpayers who are 
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found to be engaging in evasion/avoidance and have benefited from the receipt of a reward. 
As a general comment, Practitioner D stated that:   
 
I think if we do that [introduce a rebate system], there needs to be some mega 
consequence for having taken the reward and then being found out that you haven’t 
deserved it, or that you haven’t been declaring all of your income. 
 
One example of a consequence put forward by Practitioner A was that taxpayers who are 
caught evading tax can never be eligible to receive rewards in the future, which would 
hopefully act as a significant enough deterrent to discourage taxpayers from taking the risk of 
evading: 
 
Maybe in that situation [taxpayers not declaring their full income], when we talk about 
a reward system, people who are caught evading tax can never have that status. If you 
lose it, you can never have it back. Whereas people who just might have done 
something incorrectly or carelessly may just have a stand down period of say, five years 
before they can get back their preferred status, but for the person who evades, it’s the 
irredeemable sin. Maybe that could make them think “I don’t want to take the risk of 
getting caught and losing my rewards.”  
 
Practitioner E echoed Practitioner A’s sentiments, adding that an additional deterrent would 
be for Inland Revenue to require that taxpayers who have been caught evading or avoiding 
tax to pay back the total amount of rewards that they have received, with interest penalties 
added on:  
 
I think something like that would be effective. I think it’s a bit of a variation of the big 
stick approach, saying that “we think you’re good at the moment, and we want to keep 
you good, so therefore we’ll give you discounts, rebates, or whatever, but if we ever 
find out that you’ve been evading or avoiding tax then we will want all of those rebates 
back, we want interest on those amounts, plus you’re on the bad people’s list and you 
may not be able to get rewarded again, or you will have to prove that you deserve them 
again. I think something like that would be necessary because, dare I say, the type of 
people you’re targeting need a big stick being waved at them as well. So, keep them on 
board with the reward to encourage them, but make it clear that if they’re ever caught 
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evading tax, then they’ll have to pay the rebates and interest penalties back, and they’ll 
be on the IRD’s watch list. 
 
Whilst there was agreement from the practitioners regarding the idea of banning tax evaders 
and avoiders from receiving rewards in the future, Practitioner B emphasised the importance 
of Inland Revenue being cautious in this regard, to ensure that it is only the serious offenders 
who receive such high-handed treatment: 
 
If rewards were to come in, I think the biggest thing to sort out would be the conditions 
on when you get the reward and what would prevent you from getting the reward, so 
taxpayers know how to get back on track to get it in the future... If you stumbled or 
faltered every now and then and the IRD said “no, look, you’ve made a mistake, you’ll 
cease to get your rewards for a period of x”, that might ruin the relationship you’ve 
built up, so if the IRD are going to give a reward, there can’t be too many strings 
attached to it, because then it becomes a game of if you become offside with it, you 
might just decide that you’ll get back that negative attitude again, as you would have 
towards penalties, but you’ve now got a negative attitude towards the IRD because you 
know that you no longer qualify for the rewards.  
 
 
4.6 Feasibility of a reward system 
 
 
When discussing the issue of potentially implementing a reward system into the tax system, it 
is necessary to consider the potential feasibility of implementing such a system in New 
Zealand. A common issue raised by the practitioners in regard to the feasibility of introducing 
a reward system in New Zealand was the potential inability of Inland Revenue’s IT systems 
to cope with the implementation and administration of such a system. For example, 
Practitioner A stated that: 
 
The current computer system is not capable of coping with a reward system. The IRD 
would say that they can barely function with the jobs that are demanded of them now. 
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In a similar vein, Practitioner B noted that: 
 
I don’t think the IRD’s IT system is up to it. There are already flaws in the system... By 
the time you have income tax, GST, KiwiSaver, Working for Families... it’s at a point 
now where the functionality is often lacking. If you were to superimpose a reward 
system in the existing IRD IT world, where they’ve got the existing penalty system, 
they’ve got the use of money interest... how you would actually logistically and 
technically go about adding in another layer of effectively a differential system for 
compliant taxpayers... and keeping track of what taxpayers have qualified for what 
things... it could all cause headaches... Logistically, you’d be doing one hell of a job to 
put it through.  
 
However, Practitioner B went on to note that Inland Revenue are planning on undertaking a 
$1.5 billion upgrade of its systems over the next ten years, which may provide a window of 
opportunity for a reward system to be introduced: 
 
If the IRD do get their IT upgrade, and depending on if the reward system was thought 
of sooner rather than later in that upgrade process, there would probably be a better 
chance of getting it in while everything is being figured out, rather than after the fact 
when they’d have to add it in. 
 
Practitioner C also highlighted that perhaps the implementation of such a system would need 
to be considered sooner rather than later, but did note that the added flexibility of the new IT 
systems should allow for the addition of a reward system:  
 
I would say that they [Inland Revenue] would need to figure it out quickly so they can 
build it into their IT system, although the new system is supposed to be highly flexible 
and state of the art, so you would hope that there would be enough flexibility in the new 
system to deal with this, but I think that the discussion would still have to happen 
sooner rather than later.  
 
As for the technical requirements that would likely be required to be implemented into Inland 
Revenue’s systems, Practitioner A noted that: 
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A proper CRM [customer relationship management system] component in the IRD’s 
system would be required. The CRM component would possibly be volume driven, so 
the more tax paid the bigger the discount. 
 
A further issue to consider in regard to the feasibility of implementing a reward system is 
whether the practical administration of such a system would be viable for Inland Revenue to 
operate. On this point, the practitioners believed that a reward system would be straight 
forward for Inland Revenue to administer. Practitioner C, using the example of a tax rebate, 
stated that: 
 
I think it would be easy [for Inland Revenue to administer]. This isn’t putting a man on 
the moon. This is offering someone a rebate based on known parameters and known 
thresholds. It should be very easy to programme that into the IRD’s systems. You’ve 
paid on time, and you’ve paid x amount of tax, and if this equals that then this is the 
outcome. I don’t think administering a reward system should be hard at all. It is just an 
extra part in the overall system.  
 
Practitioner D also thought that the administration of a reward system should be straight 
forward for Inland Revenue, and made reference to the early payment discount for first time 
provisional taxpayers which is already in operation in New Zealand, in accordance with 
sections RC 37-40 of the Income Tax Act 2007: 
 
They [Inland Revenue] should be able to do it. I mean, there is already an early 
payment discount for first time provisional taxpayers, so they already have at least 
some experience in administering rewards, and this [a reward system] is just like that 
but on a larger scale, so they should be able to handle it.    
 
 
A further aspect relating to the feasibility issue arose, with two practitioners drawing 
attention to the issue of how the implementation of a reward system would potentially impact 
upon accounting firms and practitioners. In particular, the practitioners were concerned with 
the possible adverse effects that a reward system may have on accounting firms and 
practitioners in regard to tax filing time frames. The circumstances in which this issue could 
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arise is if a reward took the form of extending tax filing times for compliant taxpayers, as 
discussed above in the non-financial rewards section: 
 
The other thing to keep tabs on is how it would affect filing. With public accounting 
firms, we have a year to get through our work, and each taxpayer generally has similar 
timeframes for filing requirements, and if you created a distortion in that, in the sense 
that taxpayers who meet certain requirements have a different filing time horizon, it 
might negatively affect the practitioners business in terms of internal staff management 
and work flow management because there are already peaks and troughs in terms of 
compliance.... if you start changing time horizons based on a reward system, there is 
always the question of whether practitioners have the capacity and ability in their 
business to handle new time frame requirements or work bottlenecks. (Practitioner B)  
 
A point to consider would be how changing filing times for some taxpayers would 
affect the other time horizons of events for practitioners. (Practitioner A) 
 
These comments highlight another feasibility issue that would need to be considered when 
determining whether to introduce a reward system, this time not in regard to whether Inland 
Revenue could handle the administration of such a system, but whether accounting firms and 
practitioners themselves could successfully adapt to the changes incurred through the 
implementation of a reward system.  
 
 
4.7 Inland Revenue’s potential amenability to using rewards 
 
 
A limitation of this research is that the views and opinions of Inland Revenue regarding the 
possibility of introducing a reward system have not been incorporated into this thesis. In an 
attempt to overcome this limitation, at least to a small extent, the researcher sought the 
opinions of the tax practitioners in regard to how they believed Inland Revenue might 
perceive the potential use of a reward system, and the difficulties which they would need to 
overcome. One concern raised by Practitioner A and Practitioner B was that Inland Revenue 
may be hesitant to implement a reward system as they are aware that taxpayers often view 
anything Inland Revenue does with suspicion: 
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The IRD knows that there’s a certain cynicism towards anything they do. Any reward 
system introduced would probably be met with disbelief and a degree of cynicism. The 
IRD might have a mountain to climb there and they may say “what’s the point?” 
(Practitioner A) 
 
Some taxpayers might be sceptical if rewards were introduced... People are generally a 
bit sceptical of the government, so if there was a media release about a tax reward 
system, people might be a bit sceptical, so it would be very important how the system is 
released in the media. While the IRD may have good intentions in that they genuinely 
want to encourage and reward compliance, if it is launched in a way so as to give 
people a negative perception of it, they may end up with a result that people are 
sceptical, and think “I was paying my tax anyway”. Perception is very critical for how 
people will accept it going forward. (Practitioner B) 
 
Practitioner B and Practitioner C expressed the view that it could be rather difficult to 
convince Inland Revenue personnel of the potential benefits of rewarding compliance. 
However, Practitioner C noted that only several key personnel would need to be in favour of 
the idea: 
 
Personally, I don’t think it would fly with the IRD... I feel that there’s an attitude of 
some people in the department that they are the law, the IRD is entitled to that tax, and 
if you were to try and convince IRD staff of this [the potential benefits of introducing a 
rewards system], there may be some pushback from them because in their mind, they 
have every right to go into peoples’ businesses and extract the tax due, so why should 
they reward that when it’s a duty that the taxpayer should have otherwise met... there 
could be a scepticism there. (Practitioner B)  
 
I think there would be some hardened investigators out there who would think, “I’ve 
seen some horror stories out there and I don’t think we should be helping these people.” 
But, you only have to convince a few people... and if it can be theoretically proven that 
this [the introduction of a rewards system] would increase our revenues by x amount... 
then it should be OK. (Practitioner C) 
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Practitioner A drew attention to the political aspect which would affect Inland Revenue’s 
ability to implement a reward system: 
 
The IRD itself might want to be more like a customer facing business, and behave 
more that way, but politicians will probably say “if it’s not going to do anything to 
give me more money to spend on my portfolios, then I’m not interested in the idea.” 
 
This point relates to the fact that in order for a reward system to be a viable compliance 
strategy, it must be shown that such a system would be likely to increase the net tax revenue 
collected over time: 
 
There’s quite an uncertain risk/reward aspect with will it actually increase the tax 
revenue collected over and above the costs involved of operating the system. It has to 
be remembered that the IRD are tasked with bringing in as much revenue as possible, 
so something like this [a reward system], whilst it might be a nice thing to have, it 
might actually cost revenue... (Practitioner A) 
 
If it could be demonstrated that the cost of implementing and administering the rewards 
were less than the gains, then the IRD should be in favour of it. They will spend more 
money to make more money. It’s just a question of economics. If there is a return on 
the investment... then logically they should be in favour of it, but it is a matter of 
demonstrating that putting incentives in place are going to drive behavioural changes 
that will result in increased collections... it’s difficult because it’s not just a matter of 
calculating the direct costs of the incentives, but it must also be determined whether 
there would be any indirect adverse effects... (Practitioner D) 
 
The difficulty of conducting a cost/benefit analysis was noted by Practitioner E, who 
postulated that the potential complexity may lead Inland Revenue to determine that a better 
approach is to increase the level of deterrence measures: 
 
They [Inland Revenue] would have to consider things like what percentage rate to use 
for a rebate and how much money they would be paying out to small business owners, 
and they’d of course need some kind of estimate regarding how much tax they think 
they lose each year so they can estimate how much money they think they can make, 
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and set a limit on how much they want to pay out in rewards. I think it would be quite 
complex. I’m sure they could do it, but the IRD might think that rather than spending 
money on rebates, they should just spend more money on more audits and catch people 
that way.  
 
 
4.7.1 Equity issues and PAYE taxpayers 
 
 
A potential difficulty with the implementation and use of a reward system in New Zealand 
was raised in regard to what could be perceived as its discriminatory effects against pay-as-
you-earn (PAYE) taxpayers, and the inequity that could arise between this group of taxpayers 
and small business taxpayers. PAYE is a withholding tax which is applied to the income 
payments of employees, such as wage and salary earners, and is deducted from an 
employee’s earnings by their employer on behalf of the tax authority. In New Zealand, 
employers can calculate the appropriate amount of tax to withhold on behalf of Inland 
Revenue through online resources provided by Inland Revenue. Due to the fact that wage and 
salary earners have their incomes taxed at source, they do not have any opportunity to evade 
their taxes, provided their wage or salary is their sole source of income. As such, this group 
of taxpayers does not pose a compliance risk to Inland Revenue and, therefore, any reward 
system that was implemented would not be applicable to this group of taxpayers. This 
position initially raised some concerns from Practitioner C, who stated that:     
 
Something which I think needs to be thought about is that there seems to be a bit of a 
gulf between the self employed business owner and the PAYE earner. Why should the 
PAYE earner, who pays their tax on time every time, be discriminated against 
somebody who is self employed or a small business owner, who is being incentivised to 
actually do what the PAYE earner is doing in the first place. This is also coupled with 
the fact that if you’re a self employed person, there is far more scope for deductions as 
well, so there’s a game to be played there as well. So, I think that’s probably one of the 
biggest hurdles, in that it wouldn’t be fair... I think there’s a real equity problem here. 
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Practitioner D also acknowledged the potential risk of PAYE taxpayers becoming upset in 
regard to a reward system applying to SBOs and the self employed, but excluding them from 
its scope: 
 
PAYE earners are probably the people who begrudge the small business owners who 
can already take advantage of the opportunities to save tax through deductions, and 
these opportunities don’t exist for wage and salary earners. Given how many they 
number, I think it’s a real risk and is a very good point. 
 
Similar sentiments to those of Practitioner D were expressed by Practitioner E, who noted 
that: 
 
I think that there would be some resentment from PAYE earners because I think that 
PAYE earners think that self employed people are on the pigs back sort of thing, like 
“they claim a deduction for this and they claim a deduction for that, and they do cash 
jobs, so why should we be subsidising for the self employed people?” So, I think there 
would be some resentment and they would be saying “Well, where’s our rebate?” 
 
These responses highlight the fact that there is a clear risk that the implementation of a 
reward system to encourage tax compliance from small business owners and the self 
employed could cause considerable unrest amongst wage and salary taxpayers. However, it 
must also be considered that the very reason why this group of taxpayers would not be 
eligible for any rewards is also the reason why Inland Revenue may not be concerned with 
any unrest that may be caused, that reason being that as this group of taxpayers’ income is 
taxed at source under the PAYE system, their opportunity to evade tax is severely limited. 
Therefore, any unrest caused will not adversely affect the level of tax collected from this 
group of taxpayers. As Practitioner E noted: 
 
... at the end of the day, they [Inland Revenue] probably wouldn’t mind if they upset the 
PAYE earners because they’re still getting their full whack of tax from them, so there 
really is no difference as far as the IRD is concerned.  
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Furthermore, Practitioner D highlighted, rather pragmatically, that: 
 
I think it would be very hard to get them [PAYE taxpayers] to accept it. But then again, 
you know, who cares, they can’t do anything about it. 
 
Despite the view that Inland Revenue may not be concerned with the potential negative 
reaction from PAYE earners, Practitioner C still harboured some reservations in this regard, 
stating that: 
 
You don’t want a revolt. There is a lot of money coming in from the PAYE earners and 
you don’t want to annoy them. 
 
Therefore, an important issue that arises is how Inland Revenue could implement a reward 
system without upsetting the PAYE earners. This highlights the question of how Inland 
Revenue would justify the implementation of such a system. Practitioner E stated that:  
 
The only way to justify it would be to emphasise that it’s for you [the PAYE taxpayers] 
at the end of the day.  
 
Therefore, it appears that the most viable way of justifying the implementation of a reward 
system to the PAYE taxpayers would be for Inland Revenue to emphasise to them that the 
reward system is being used as a means of increasing the level of taxes collected from the 
small business sector and, therefore, it is ultimately in the best interests of society in general, 
as the government would be in a position to increase its level of public spending. However, 
whilst this justification appears reasonable in theory, the practitioners raised doubts as to 
whether such a justification would actually be effective in practice. For example, Practitioner 
C stated that: 
 
I can see how you could attempt to justify it by saying it’s for the good of all, but 
they’ll [the PAYE earners] be going, “hang on a minute, they’re [small business owners 
and the self employed] getting a double whammy then. They’ve got that and the benefit 
of the rewards, so it’s not fair either”.   
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Practitioner D was unsure whether the majority of PAYE earners would be accepting of a 
reward system even if it was justified on the basis of being for the benefit of society as a 
whole, posing the question of: 
 
How many blue collar wage and salary earners would have that broad, accepting frame 
of mind? 
 
 
4.8 Summary of the tax practitioner interviews 
 
 
The findings from the tax practitioner interviews indicate that they held some doubts in 
regard to whether penalties are an effective tool for improving taxpayers’ compliance in 
practice. Instead of Inland Revenue seeking to raise taxpayers’ awareness of deterrence 
measures and increasing the severity of penalties, the practitioners were of the opinion that 
raising taxpayers’ understanding of the tax system in general would have a more positive 
impact upon tax compliance. As the practitioners felt that penalties are perhaps not the most 
effective tool for improving tax compliance, it was believed that there is a place for more 
positive compliance strategies to be utilised by Inland Revenue. For example, the 
practitioners expressed the importance of ensuring that the interactions Inland Revenue has 
with taxpayers are conducted in a respectful and positive manner, which highlights the role 
that procedural justice has to play in improving tax compliance. 
 
The findings indicate that the practitioners were largely supportive of the idea of utilising 
rewards as an additional compliance strategy, and highlight that rewards could potentially be 
more effective than penalties for encouraging defiant taxpayers to improve their compliance 
behaviour. In addition, the practitioners felt that the use of rewards could also be an effective 
means of maintaining the compliance of deferent taxpayers in the long-term, and could help 
to reduce the risk of the bomb-crater effect occurring. 
 
In regard to the type of rewards which could be applied, the practitioners noted that a 
financial reward in the form of a percentage rebate would be the most likely type of reward to 
have a positive impact upon the compliance behaviour of defiant taxpayers. However, it was 
also noted that in order for a reward system to have a positive impact upon defiant taxpayers, 
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it is very likely that such a system would need to be introduced in conjunction with a tax 
amnesty, in addition to there being severe consequences for taxpayers who are found to be 
engaging in evasion/avoidance and have received the benefit of a reward. In regard to the 
potential effectiveness of non-financial rewards, the practitioners believed such rewards 
could have a role to play in maintaining the compliance levels of deferent taxpayers. 
 
The findings highlight some concerns as to the feasibility of introducing a reward system in 
New Zealand, as Inland Revenue’s IT system may struggle with its implementation. 
However, these concerns were tempered by the fact that Inland Revenue is due to receive a 
$1.5 billion upgrade of its IT systems over the next ten years, which would enable the 
implementation of a reward system. As for the administration of such a system, it was 
believed that it should be straightforward for Inland Revenue to operate. It was also noted 
that any potential adverse effects that a reward system may have on accounting firms and 
practitioners must be considered. 
 
Finally, the practitioners raised several difficulties that Inland Revenue would need to 
overcome in order to successfully implement a reward system. Such difficulties include 
minimising the risk that taxpayers may view the introduction of a reward system with 
scepticism; the challenge of gaining support from Inland Revenue staff for the use of 
rewards; and the complexity of determining whether the increased tax revenue that could be 
collected from the use of rewards would outweigh the costs involved. Equity concerns were 
also raised in regard to the potential discriminatory effects that a reward system could have 
against PAYE taxpayers. 
 
The following chapter presents the findings from the SBO interviews. 
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Chapter 5: Findings from the small business owner 
interviews 
 
5.1 Rewards 
 
 
Both interviewees were of the opinion that the use of rewards could be an effective approach 
for improving the tax compliance of SBOs. SBO A indicated that there is a perception 
amongst SBOs that the tax system is unfair, as it is perceived as being more favourable 
toward larger businesses, and this perceived unfairness can be detrimental to the compliance 
of some SBOs. He went on to express that the introduction of rewards for compliant SBOs 
would likely have a positive impact upon how some SBOs view the tax system, which could 
improve their compliance: 
 
 
One thing that’s always disturbed me is that it’s said that the majority of growth in this 
country comes from medium and small businesses, but the tax regime is actually set up 
for huge businesses, so there’s a perception amongst small businesses that the tax 
system is unfair, so I think that can have a poor impact on compliance behaviour. If 
rewards were brought in, I think it would help to keep people on track because they 
would see that as them being treated fairly. (SBO A) 
 
Furthermore, speaking in regard to Goods and Services Tax (GST), SBO A supported 
Practitioner E’s proposition that many taxpayers view Inland Revenue as being a “taking 
organisation”, noting that the fact that SBOs do not receive anything in return for collecting 
GST on behalf of Inland Revenue creates a disincentive for SBOs to be compliant; a problem 
which he believed would be redressed by the introduction of rewards: 
 
Way, way back, when we used to have sales tax which was collected by customs, small 
business owners would do all that work collecting it, and it was acknowledged that you 
were doing that work on behalf of the customs department, so you got a little 
percentage of it, and it incentivised you to do the job. Now, we’re still doing that work 
for GST and essentially doing someone else’s job but we don’t get anything for it. So 
there is a disincentive to comply because we don’t get anything back from being 
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compliant. So yeah, I think that receiving a reward for being compliant would give an 
incentive to comply.  
 
SBO B put forward the view that rewards could have a positive motivating effect for 
taxpayers to be compliant because receiving a reward would create a more positive 
relationship between taxpayers and Inland Revenue, as taxpayers would appreciate getting 
something back from Inland Revenue: 
 
I think one of the things that would happen if the IRD were to offer rewards is that 
people would start to feel more willing to comply, not only because of the incentive 
aspect of getting the reward, but also because people would feel more, I guess, 
respected by the IRD... I guess you’d feel more valued by the IRD because you’re 
getting something from them. 
 
Similar to what was noted in the practitioner interviews, the SBOs indicated that whilst the 
use of rewards would be likely to have a positive impact upon the compliance of a significant 
number of taxpayers, certain taxpayers, such as those who have been habitually non-
compliant, may be unresponsive to the introduction of rewards:  
 
I definitely think it would work for some people, like especially those small business 
owners who are maybe thinking about having a go at evading some tax and are on the 
cusp of doing it, or those who are already maybe evading a bit. I think for that type, 
rewards would be a good incentive for them to just be honest and pay the proper tax. 
But people who are habitually evading a lot of tax, I’m not sure. A lot of them will 
probably always try and hide income. (SBO A) 
 
 
5.1.1 Using rewards to maintain the compliance of deferent taxpayers 
 
 
During the course of the practitioner interviews, an issue was raised in regard to the lack of 
acknowledgment given by Inland Revenue to good, habitually compliant taxpayers. It was 
also suggested that the only time that Inland Revenue contacts taxpayers is when something 
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has gone wrong, so taxpayers are generally only having negative experiences with Inland 
Revenue. This was corroborated by SBO A: 
 
 
The only experiences I generally have with the IRD are negative, like for example, if I 
do a GST return late and then I get banged with a penalty, but habitually I’m always on 
time and I pay the correct amount of tax, and you’d quite like that fact to be recognised. 
I know that sometimes they might rescind a penalty, but it still feels like they could do 
more to acknowledge compliant taxpayers. 
 
In response to the question of whether there is a risk that this lack of acknowledgment could 
lead to some taxpayers becoming non-compliant in the future, he noted: 
 
There could well be, yes. I would imagine that there are people out there who would 
think like that. (SBO A) 
 
SBO B also believed there was a risk of this occurring, particularly with taxpayers who have 
a perception that tax evasion amongst small businesses is common. She believed that the 
introduction of rewards for compliant taxpayers would help to reduce this risk:  
 
There probably is a risk of that happening. Some people probably think “well, I know a 
lot of people are doing cash jobs and stuff, but I pay my tax and don’t really get any 
acknowledgment for doing the right thing, so maybe I should start [evading] too.” So a 
reward for compliance would probably stop people from thinking like that.  
 
Similarly, SBO A indicated that rewards would likely help to motivate honest taxpayers to 
maintain their compliance because they would appreciate the fact their good compliance 
behaviour is being recognised and acknowledged by Inland Revenue: 
 
Yeah I think rewards probably would motivate me because it would signal to me that 
the IRD recognises and appreciates the fact that I’m a good taxpayer, so I think that 
would motivate me to keep being a good taxpayer.  I think most people would 
appreciate that and react in a similar way.  
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5.2 Possible features and operation of a reward system 
 
5.2.1 Financial rewards 
 
 
In regard to the issue of what type of reward would be the most effective for motivating 
taxpayers to be compliant, both SBOs were strongly in favour of financial rewards:  
 
Money. Money would be the most motivating for me to keep being compliant, and if 
we talk about taxpayers who are evading tax, then the reward would definitely need to 
be monetary. (SBO B) 
 
SBO A expressed the view that a likely reason why a lot of people evade tax is because they 
perceive that they would otherwise be paying an unfair amount of tax, which would 
necessitate the use of financial rewards to motivate them to pay more tax, as opposed to non-
financial rewards:  
 
I think the most effective reward to incentivise a non-compliant person would be a 
monetary reward, like a refund. I would think that one of the reasons why people evade 
tax is that they don’t see the tax system as being fair and they feel like they would be 
losing too much money if they paid all their taxes, so I would think that they would 
respond more to a financial reward rather than a non-financial reward.  
 
 
The general view that arose in the practitioner interviews was that the use of non-financial 
rewards may potentially be more effective for maintaining the compliance of deferent, honest 
taxpayers. As both SBOs classified themselves as deferent taxpayers, the researcher sought 
their views regarding this matter. SBO B, whilst still favouring financial rewards, did note 
that certain types of non-financial rewards may be effective for this group of taxpayers. This 
is discussed in the following section. However, SBO A was adamant that deferent taxpayers 
would prefer financial rewards:  
 
No, I still think that people who are good honest taxpayers would prefer to be 
incentivised financially. I certainly would. I think for all types of taxpayers, the best 
way to incentivise them to be compliant is through using monetary rewards. 
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Another point of difference between the practitioners and SBOs arose in regard to the issue of 
whether there is a risk that financial rewards may reduce the motivation for compliant 
taxpayers to continue being compliant; a concern which has been raised in prior literature and 
received some support in the practitioner interviews. However, both SBOs did not foresee 
this problem arising: 
 
I don’t think so. I can’t see why that would be the case. Financial rewards certainly 
wouldn’t demotivate me anyway. (SBO A)  
 
I wouldn’t imagine that people would react negatively to getting a monetary reward in 
return for paying taxes and being a good taxpayer. I think people would appreciate 
getting the reward and it would be another motivating factor to comply. I don’t see a 
problem with using money to reward people. (SBO B) 
 
In regard to the type of financial reward that would be the most likely to have the greatest 
effect on taxpayers’ compliance, the SBOs, like the practitioners, were in favour of a 
percentage rebate. Interestingly, both SBOs made reference to taxpayers who could be 
categorised as game players, noting that a percentage rebate could be particularly effective 
for curbing avoidance behaviour: 
 
I think a volume based rebate system could be particularly useful for incentivising 
people to stop engaging in avoidance... it might incentivise them to stop looking for 
things that are legal but dodgy. They’d probably think it’s not worth their while to do it, 
nor worth the risk. (SBO A) 
 
I have a few friends who are often going on about the different schemes they use to find 
ways to pay less tax, you know, they go out of their way to try and avoid as much tax as 
they can, but I think a rebate system could potentially help to stop people like them 
from doing things like that [finding ways to avoid tax]. If it was a percentage rebate, 
then the way to get the most benefit from it is to pay more tax isn’t it? So I think you’d 
feel like you’re getting a good benefit from paying the proper amount of tax, and 
there’d be less of an incentive to try and avoid tax, or evade it or whatever... Why take 
the risk when you could get money back from the IRD anyway? (SBO B) 
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5.2.2 Non-financial rewards 
 
 
Whilst both the small business owners were of the view that financial rewards would be the 
preferred type of reward for most taxpayers, SBO B indicated that certain types of non-
financial rewards could still have a role to play. In particular, SBO B raised the idea that the 
reward offered by Inland Revenue could be of a nature which would attempt to directly 
benefit taxpayers’ businesses. According to SBO B, this type of reward could be designed in 
several ways. For example, Inland Revenue could organise free business seminars for 
compliant taxpayers to attend. Such seminars would be hosted by business experts, and 
would provide opportunities for small business owners to learn new skills, potentially 
enabling them to improve and expand the success of their businesses. Alternatively, Inland 
Revenue could provide free consultations with a business mentor. A second example of how 
such a reward could act to potentially improve the success of a taxpayer’s business is for 
Inland Revenue to aid compliant taxpayers in the promotion of their businesses. This could 
involve Inland Revenue providing a small amount of funding for the business owner to 
increase the level of their business advertising. In regard to this type of reward, SBO B noted 
that: 
 
“Something which would actually help my business to grow would be a very strong 
motivation [to meet my tax compliance obligations]. I think that [a reward which seeks 
to benefit small businesses] would be very motivating for many small business 
owners.... particularly because a lot of small businesses struggle to grow financially 
after they lose money to tax.”  
 
As for non-financial rewards in the nature of gifts such as free admission to cultural events or 
free access to public and government services, SBO B was less supportive: 
 
...the idea of being rewarded by receiving free public transport or access to cultural 
events doesn’t really appeal to me so much. Sure, they are nice things but I think people 
would be more motivated by a reward which could help their business. That, or money.  
 
 
76 
 
5.2.3 Tax audits and the bomb-crater effect 
 
 
The findings indicated that both SBOs were of the opinion that there is a risk that the bomb-
crater effect can occur. SBO A, who had been the subject of a tax audit several years ago, 
noted that after the completion of the audit, he personally did not feel tempted to evade tax in 
the following period, but was sure that there are SBOs who would be: 
 
Oh yeah obviously some people would see it as a chance to save some tax in following 
years. I had an audit done a few years ago and it didn’t make me want to try anything 
stupid afterwards but some people would definitely try it on, so I think it’s a definite 
risk. 
 
SBO B, who has not been the subject of a tax audit, also noted that she believed a risk 
existed: 
  
I’ve never really thought about that kind of situation, but yes, I suppose that it is 
possible that someone would look at it as an opportunity to save some tax because they 
probably wouldn’t anticipate another audit anytime soon. (SBO B) 
 
In regard to the issue of whether rewarding taxpayers found to be largely compliant after an 
audit would help to reduce the risk of the bomb-crater effect, both SBOs believed this would 
be the case. For example, SBO A noted:  
 
Yes I think so. They would probably help due to a combination of things, like making 
people feel guilty evading after getting a reward, and making people have a positive 
perception of the IRD. 
 
 
Interestingly, in addition to the use of rewards, both SBOs also highlighted that the manner in 
which the Inland Revenue auditors conduct themselves during the audit, and the overall 
nature of the interactions during the process, would be an important factor influencing a 
taxpayer’s future compliance behaviour, highlighting the importance of procedural justice: 
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I came out of the audit feeling really good because the auditors were really good. They 
were pleasant the whole time and gave me feedback about the process, and one of the 
guys said that he would make a note on my file that my business was a good taxpayer, 
so they made it a rather positive experience which left me with a good perception of the 
IRD. (SBO A) 
 
I think that getting some positive feedback after the audit, and just being able to get on 
well with the IRD employees during the audit would be a good motivation to keep 
being compliant in the future. (SBO B) 
 
 
5.3 Overcoming the difficulties with defiant taxpayers 
 
5.3.1 The need for a tax amnesty 
 
 
As was the case in the practitioner interviews, the SBOs raised concerns regarding the likely 
unwillingness of habitually non-compliant taxpayers to become fully compliant due to the 
fear of the consequences for their past evasion: 
 
One problem I can see is that taxpayers who have been habitually evading will be 
worried about increasing the amount of tax they pay because it will draw attention to 
the fact that they’ve been evading in the past. (SBO A)  
 
If I put myself in the shoes of someone who has been evading tax for an extended 
period of time, then if I wanted to take advantage of the rebate system and start paying 
my tax properly, I probably would be too scared to do it, even if I wanted to come clean 
so to speak. I would be worried that there would be consequences for my past evasion. 
(SBO B) 
 
These findings further highlight that a reward system would need to be implemented in 
conjunction with a tax amnesty. 
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5.3.2 Using the stick as well as the carrot 
 
 
Similar to the practitioner interviews, the SBOs raised the issue that, in the context of a rebate 
system, there would be a risk of some taxpayers continuing to evade their taxes whilst still 
receiving a rebate for the tax they do pay, which would necessitate the implementation of 
severe consequences for such actions: 
 
I think that [a rebate system] could work but then you’d need the carrot and the stick, 
because if someone is saving money from evading their tax, they might look at it and 
say “well I’m getting some money back but I can still save more if I keep evading”. 
They might think it’s worth the risk of evading some tax and still receiving the rebate 
for the tax they do pay, so you’d have to make it so they think that it’s not worth the 
risk of evading taxes anymore. (SBO B) 
 
 
In regard to the type of consequences for being caught evading whilst receiving rewards, the 
SBOs believed that the ideas put forward by the tax practitioners, that is, never being eligible 
to receive rewards again in the future, and being required to pay back the rebates received 
with penalty interest, would be effective deterrents. For example, SBO A noted: 
 
I think it would certainly go a long way to achieving that. You’d have to be a big risk 
taker to carry on evading if there were those types of consequences for getting caught. I 
think with a rebate system, these consequences would probably make the majority of 
taxpayers just declare their full income rather than looking to evade taxes and taking 
the risk of getting caught. They’d rather just get the reward with no risk, even if that 
reward is a bit less than what they’d save by evading tax. I think that would be an 
effective approach, you know, they’re [Inland Revenue] offering rewards on the one 
hand but also ramping up the penalties on the other. 
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5.4 Equity issues and PAYE Taxpayers 
 
 
The findings indicated that the SBOs did not believe that the introduction of rewards for 
SBOs would be perceived by PAYE taxpayers as being inequitable, provided Inland Revenue 
clearly explains to the public that the reason rewards are being used is to improve overall 
compliance levels, which would actually make the tax system more equitable:     
 
 
I’m sure some people would find it unfair but you could rationalise it though. Their 
compliance process is very simple, someone else is reporting their income, and they 
don’t really have to do anything. Personally I can’t really see there being too many 
complaints about it if the IRD sells it the right way, and emphasises that it’s going to 
help the overall tax take, so it might eventually reduce the amount of tax each 
individual will have to pay, then I think people would accept it. (SBO A) 
 
There is a potential fairness issue I suppose. I imagine some PAYE people would 
wonder why they weren’t getting a reward and could get upset that they weren’t getting 
anything but small business people were. But then I guess it would be the IRD’s 
responsibility to actually explain to the public why they’re using the reward system, 
and explain that it’s being used to try and improve overall compliance which will make 
the tax system fairer. I used to be a PAYE taxpayer and if it was explained to me like 
that, I think I would be accepting of it. (SBO B)  
 
Furthermore, as indicated in section 5.1 above, SBO A indicated that there is a perception 
amongst small business owners that the tax system is unfair due to it being seen as favouring 
large businesses. As such, SBO A was of the opinion that the introduction of rewards for 
compliant SBOs would actually improve the fairness of the tax system, rather than leading to 
inequity.   
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5.5 Summary of the small business owner interviews 
 
The findings indicate that both interviewees were of the view that the use of rewards could be 
an effective method for improving the tax compliance of SBOs. SBO A expressed the 
opinion that the introduction of a reward system would improve SBOs’ perceptions of the 
fairness of the tax system, and would provide an incentive for SBOs to be compliant. SBO B 
noted that the introduction of rewards would likely create a more positive relationship 
between taxpayers and Inland Revenue. Both SBOs indicated that they believed there was a 
risk that a lack of acknowledgment for habitually compliant taxpayers could lead to some 
taxpayers becoming non-compliant in the future, and that the introduction of rewards for 
compliant taxpayers would reduce this risk. The SBOs also highlighted that the use of 
rewards could reduce the likelihood of the bomb-crater effect occurring.  
 
In regard to the type of rewards that the interviewees believed would be the most effective for 
motivating taxpayers to be compliant, strong support was provided for financial rewards in 
the form of a percentage rebate, although SBO B did note that non-financial rewards of a 
nature which would benefit a taxpayer’s business could also be effective. However, as was 
indicated in the tax practitioner interviews, the SBOs noted that in order for a reward system 
to be successful, it is likely that it would need to be introduced in conjunction with a tax 
amnesty, in addition to there being severe consequences for a taxpayer who receives the 
benefit of the rewards whilst evading/avoiding tax. 
 
Finally, the SBOs did not believe that the use of a reward system would be perceived by 
PAYE taxpayers as being inequitable, provided Inland Revenue clearly explains that the 
rationale underlying the introduction of such a system is to make the tax system more 
equitable by improving overall compliance levels.  
 
The following chapter provides an analysis of the research findings from both the tax 
practitioner and SBO interviews.    
 
 
 
 
81 
 
Chapter 6: Analysis 
 
6.1 The effectiveness of penalties 
 
 
The responses from the practitioner interviews indicated that they held some doubts as to the 
effectiveness of penalties as a tool to improve taxpayers’ compliance. Two practitioners were 
of the opinion that perhaps the penalty system is not particularly well understood by the 
majority of taxpayers. Whilst this might suggest one way in which Inland Revenue could 
attempt to improve compliance is by raising taxpayers’ awareness of the penalties and 
consequences for non-compliance, the practitioners were of the opinion that such action 
would be unlikely to be beneficial, as the effectiveness of penalties is perceived as being 
limited. Practitioner C noted that in his experience, penalties do not appear to be an effective 
deterrent to prevent evasive or avoidance behaviour, whilst Practitioner A expressed the 
opinion that penalties can often cause taxpayers to “run away from the problem”, which 
hinders the effect that the penalties have on the taxpayers’ behaviour. Practitioner B 
highlighted that penalties can also have a detrimental effect on the future compliance of 
certain types of taxpayers. He noted that some taxpayers, particularly those who have a 
negative view of the tax system and are unwilling to be compliant, whom in the context of 
motivational postures would be categorised as a resistant or disengaged taxpayer, may 
increase their level of defiance regarding tax compliance in response to receiving a penalty, 
sometimes even getting a “vendetta behind them against the IRD”, which can have a negative 
impact upon their future compliance behaviour. This is important in light of Braithwaite’s 
(2008, as cited in Hodson, 2011) proposition that a grievance, such as “they’ve got a vendetta 
against me”, can push a resistant taxpayer to become disengaged with the tax system, or to 
become a game playing taxpayer. According to Practitioner B, receiving a penalty could be 
perceived by some resistant taxpayers as Inland Revenue having a vendetta against them.  
 
Whilst the practitioners acknowledged that deterrence measures such as penalties are a 
necessary component of Inland Revenue’s compliance strategy, the findings highlight that the 
practitioners believe that instead of focusing on raising awareness of the penalty system, or 
increasing the severity of penalties, it may be more effective for Inland Revenue to raise 
taxpayers’ understanding of the tax system in general. This is in light of the fact that the 
practitioners suggested that a lot of non-compliance is the result of ignorance on the part of 
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taxpayers in regard to the operation of different types of tax. This corroborates the findings of 
Webley (2004, as cited in Kirchler, 2007), in which it was found that self-reported non-
compliant SBOs had less accurate knowledge about the tax system and believed that sales 
and withholding taxes were coming out of their own business funds. This is pertinent to a 
point raised by Practitioner C, who noted that Inland Revenue needs to emphasise to SBOs 
that tax collected on behalf of the government, such as GST, is not the business’s money, but 
rather, is money which belongs to the government. This is important in light of the findings 
from Webley’s (2004) study (as cited in Kirchler, 2007), which found that small business 
owners differ in how they perceive tax collected on behalf of the government, with some 
perceiving that money as belonging to their business, whilst others perceived it as belonging 
to the state. As Kirchler (2007) highlights, taxpayers who perceive that this money belongs to 
the government and mentally separate it from money generated from business turnover are 
likely to be more compliant. As such, the findings support the proposition by James & Alley 
(2002) that resources aimed at assisting taxpayers through educating them may yield greater 
revenue than if resources were spent on additional enforcement activities.   
 
 
6.2 Procedural justice 
 
 
Feld & Frey (2007) have interpreted the concept of tax morale as encompassing a 
psychological tax contract between taxpayers and the tax authority which is built on two main 
pillars, the first of which is procedural justice. The authors propose that taxpayers are more 
likely to be voluntarily compliant when they perceive that the tax authority has treated them 
in a fair, respectful manner during the course of their interactions. The findings from both the 
practitioner and SBO interviews indicated support for the importance of this aspect of the 
psychological tax contract, emphasising the importance of ensuring that Inland Revenue is 
perceived in a positive light by taxpayers. The findings indicated that having positive 
interactions and relationships with taxpayers is a key way in which Inland Revenue can build 
a positive image, which can have a beneficial impact upon tax compliance. Practitioner C 
noted that as Inland Revenue has a large number of interactions with SBOs, it is imperative 
that Inland Revenue ensures that these interactions are conducted in a respectful and positive 
manner, as these interactions are largely what form the basis for SBOs’ attitudes towards 
Inland Revenue, which can impact upon their attitudes towards tax compliance. Practitioner 
D stated that he felt the interactions that taxpayers have with Inland Revenue would be more 
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likely to have an impact upon taxpayers’ perceptions of Inland Revenue compared to the 
effect that using rewards and incentives may have.  Practitioner A drew an analogy between 
Inland Revenue and the New Zealand police force, noting that whilst it is inevitable that the 
police will sometimes be perceived in a negative light by the public, overall they are still 
largely perceived in a positive manner because they make an effort to ensure that their 
positive interactions with the public outweigh the negative ones. In a similar vein, 
Practitioner A noted that Inland Revenue can build a positive image by seeking to ensure that 
its positive interactions with taxpayers outweigh the negative ones.  
 
The findings from the SBO interviews indicated the importance of procedural justice in the 
context of tax audits, with both SBOs indicating that the way in which Inland Revenue staff 
interact with taxpayers during this process will likely influence how the audited taxpayer 
perceives Inland Revenue. SBO A, who had experienced a tax audit in the past, noted that he 
came out of the audit with a positive perception of Inland Revenue because he felt that the 
audit had been a positive experience, as the Inland Revenue auditors provided feedback 
throughout the process and had treated him in a respectful manner. Similarly, SBO B 
indicated that she felt taxpayers would be more willing to be compliant after a tax audit if 
they had received positive feedback from the Inland Revenue auditors, and felt like they had 
a positive relationship throughout the process. 
 
This procedural justice component of the psychological tax contract has been incorporated 
into the compliance strategy of Inland Revenue through the implementation of the Inland 
Revenue Compliance Model, which emphasises the importance of Inland Revenue 
encouraging taxpayers to adopt a deferent motivational posture through having positive 
interactions with them and encouraging voluntary compliance, whilst reserving the use of 
coercive deterrence measures for those taxpayers who have adopted a defiant motivational 
posture (Alley et al., 2012; Morris & Lonsdale, 2004). However, Practitioner A expressed 
concern with the “appalling” manner in which Inland Revenue sometimes imposes penalties, 
noting that he was aware of cases where taxpayers have been treated in an almost abusive 
fashion. The practitioner noted that whilst penalties are a necessary compliance tool, the way 
they are imposed can be improved so as to reduce the likelihood of creating hostility between 
the taxpayer and Inland Revenue, such as trying to understand the underlying reasons behind 
the taxpayer’s non-compliance and ensuring that the taxpayer understands what is expected 
of them, as opposed to continually sending notifications of increased penalties. This 
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highlights that procedural justice has a role to play even in regard to the interactions between 
taxpayers and Inland Revenue in the context of the penalties process. 
 
Despite the support for the importance of procedural justice, Practitioner E expressed that for 
some taxpayers, most notably those who could be categorised as belonging to a defiant 
motivational posture group, procedural justice and positive interactions with Inland Revenue 
would be unlikely to have a significant impact upon their compliance behaviour. As such, this 
leads on to the primary issue of whether the use of rewards for compliance would be likely to 
improve the compliance behaviour of defiant taxpayers, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
 
 
6.3 Rewards 
 
The second aspect underlying Feld & Frey’s (2007) psychological tax contract is that 
incentives, both negative and positive, should be utilised in a tax authority’s compliance 
strategies. The findings from the practitioner and SBO interviews were largely supportive of 
the idea of using positive rewards as an additional compliance tool. Several responses 
indicated that the use of rewards could potentially improve tax compliance by having a 
positive impact upon the vertical reciprocity aspect of tax morale, thereby improving the 
relationship between taxpayers and Inland Revenue and incentivising taxpayers to improve 
their compliance. Practitioner E noted that he felt the use of rewards would encourage 
taxpayers to be more honest because rewards would change the dynamic of the 
taxpayer/Inland Revenue relationship, from one which is dominated by Inland Revenue due 
to them being perceived as a “taking organisation”, to one which is perceived as being more 
reciprocal due to Inland Revenue giving something back to compliant taxpayers. This 
perception of Inland Revenue being a taking organisation was indicated by SBO A in the 
context of GST, who made reference to the fact that whilst small businesses collect GST on 
behalf of Inland Revenue, they do not receive anything in return for doing that work, which 
can create a disincentive to be compliant. In contrast, SBO A noted that in the past when 
businesses collected sales tax on behalf of the New Zealand Customs Service, they received a 
percentage of the tax as an acknowledgment that they were doing the work of collecting it, 
which provided an incentive for small business owners to be compliant because they were 
getting something back from the authority.  
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Furthermore, the results highlighted that the overall tax environment may be improved by 
Inland Revenue giving something back to compliant taxpayers in the form of a reward. For 
example, Practitioner A noted that taxpayers who receive a reward from Inland Revenue will 
be more likely to view Inland Revenue kindly, and therefore the interactions between Inland 
Revenue and this group of taxpayers would be more pleasant. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by SBO B, who felt that taxpayers would be more willing to comply if they 
received a reward because they would feel valued and respected due to getting something 
back from Inland Revenue in return for their good compliance behaviour, further illustrating 
the positive influence the use of rewards could have on the reciprocity of the taxpayer/Inland 
Revenue relationship. 
 
The findings indicated a belief that the use of rewards for compliance could potentially be 
more effective than penalties for encouraging defiant taxpayers to improve their compliance 
behaviour. Practitioner B noted that, in his experience, taxpayers who have been penalised by 
Inland Revenue can sometimes become more defiant and unwilling to be compliant. As such, 
the practitioner felt that the introduction of a reward system could be an effective tool “to 
mend some bridges with disgruntled taxpayers” and get them back into the tax system. 
Similarly, Practitioner E expressed that defiant taxpayers may react more positively to the use 
of rewards because it would be perceived as being a positive initiative which is in their 
favour, and provides another avenue by which Inland Revenue can seek to encourage defiant 
taxpayers to improve their compliance. These findings are important in light of Smith’s 
(1992) proposition that “cycles of antagonism might begin to be broken by a positive 
concession by the administrator” (p. 226). In this sense, the practitioners’ responses indicate 
that the introduction of a reward system could be viewed as a positive concession by Inland 
Revenue which could reduce the level of defiance of non-compliant taxpayers and thus 
improve their compliance. Furthermore, these findings can also be interpreted in light of 
Crowding Theory’s assertion that external interventions which are perceived as being 
supportive in nature can increase peoples’ motivation to perform a desired behaviour (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001). This is because the findings indicate that rewards could have a positive impact 
upon taxpayers’ motivation to be compliant, as it is likely that taxpayers would view the use 
of rewards as being a positive intervention in their favour. As such, the findings support Feld 
et al’s. (2006b) proposition that rewards could be more effective than punishments for 
motivating compliance because rewards would be perceived by taxpayers as being a 
supportive, as opposed to a controlling, intervention from Inland Revenue.   
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The interviewees also provided insight into the potential effect that rewards could have on the 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers with a game playing motivational posture. Practitioner C 
was of the opinion that taxpayers who enjoy playing games with Inland Revenue in an 
attempt to minimise the amount of their tax liability would be unlikely to be responsive to the 
introduction of rewards because they enjoy the competitive aspect of trying to beat Inland 
Revenue. However, it is important to note that game playing taxpayers who seek to avoid tax 
through exploiting ambiguities in the law generally do not act alone. Instead, such taxpayers 
require the aid of tax practitioners who have a mastery of tax law (Braithwaite, Reinhart & 
McCrae, 2004; Hodson, 2011). As such, it is recognised that Inland Revenue needs to take 
steps to ensure that tax practitioners uphold the integrity of the tax system and do not exploit 
it for the benefit of clients (Morris & Lonsdale, 2004). According to Practitioner B, the 
introduction of a reward system would make it easier for practitioners to dissuade game 
playing taxpayers, or “difficult taxpayers”, from seeking to take an aggressive tax position, as 
practitioners can explain to them that they already stand to receive a benefit from paying their 
tax. In the practitioner’s view, this would be a more effective approach than seeking to deter 
the taxpayer from taking an aggressive tax position by highlighting the risk and threat of 
penalties if Inland Revenue deems the taxpayer guilty of tax avoidance. This corroborates the 
findings of Braithwaite et al. (2004), who found that taxpayers categorised as game players 
are less likely to acknowledge the effect of deterrence measures in regard to the likelihood of 
getting caught, the likelihood of sanctions being imposed, and the seriousness of the 
consequences of the sanctions. Practitioner B’s view, that rewards could improve the 
compliance of game players, was shared by the SBOs, who both indicated that the 
introduction of rewards would reduce the incentive for such taxpayers to seek out ways of 
avoiding their tax liability. 
 
A common justification for the use of rewards that arose in the practitioner interviews was 
that the introduction of rewards could improve compliance by reducing taxpayers’ propensity 
to take the risks involved with evasion, as taxpayers would be aware that they stand to 
receive a benefit from paying their tax. This issue regarding the impact that rewards could 
have on taxpayers’ risk preferences is discussed in section 6.4.1. 
 
Finally, the findings from both the practitioner and SBO interviews highlight that, whilst the 
use of rewards could have a positive effect on the compliance of some taxpayers, it is very 
likely that they would have minimal impact upon certain taxpayers, such as those who have 
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been habitually evading. This issue, and potential solutions to it, are addressed below in 
section 6.5. 
 
 
6.3.1 Using rewards to maintain the compliance of deferent taxpayers 
 
 
A concern was raised in the tax practitioner interviews regarding the lack of acknowledgment 
that Inland Revenue gives to ‘good’ taxpayers for their compliance behaviour. This point was 
supported by SBO A, who noted that whilst he is an habitually compliant taxpayer, the only 
experiences he generally has had with Inland Revenue have been negative, such as when he 
has made an error on one of his tax returns, whilst on the other hand, there is no 
acknowledgment of the fact that he is an habitually compliant taxpayer. This corroborates the 
view of Practitioner B, who noted that the only time the majority of taxpayers hear from 
Inland Revenue is when something has gone wrong, so they are only having negative 
experiences with Inland Revenue, which can lead to people developing a negative view of 
Inland Revenue. These concerns raised the question of whether this lack of acknowledgment 
could potentially increase the likelihood of ‘good’, or deferent, taxpayers becoming non-
compliant in the future, due to their motivation to be a compliant taxpayer decreasing. This 
issue arises in light of the proposition put forward by Feld et al. (2006b), who noted that if 
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to be a compliant taxpayer is not recognised or acknowledged, 
their intrinsic motivation may decrease and their willingness to act opportunistically may 
increase. As such, the authors conclude that the provision of certain types of rewards for good 
taxpayers can act to maintain the tax morale and intrinsic motivation of such taxpayers, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of these taxpayers becoming non-compliant in the future.  
 
The results from the tax practitioner interviews provided mixed opinions regarding this issue. 
For example, Practitioner D felt that if a taxpayer is motivated to be a compliant taxpayer, 
their motivation will not diminish in light of a lack of acknowledgement from Inland 
Revenue, whereas Practitioner B and Practitioner E expressed the opinion that they believed 
there was a risk that good taxpayers could be more likely to become non-compliant in the 
future due to a lack of acknowledgment from Inland Revenue for their good compliance 
behaviour. The findings from the tax practitioner interviews, whilst not providing a consensus 
on this point, do provide some support for the first element of Feld et al. (2006b) proposition, 
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namely that a lack of acknowledgement of good taxpayers can increase the risk of them 
becoming non-compliant in the future. Further support was obtained from the SBOs, who 
were both of the opinion that there is a risk that the lack of acknowledgment can reduce the 
willingness of compliant taxpayers to continue being compliant, and increase the likelihood 
that they may be tempted to act opportunistically. For example, SBO B noted that some 
SBOs, particularly those who perceive tax evasion to be common amongst SBOs, might start 
to think that they should also start to evade some tax because they do not get any recognition 
from Inland Revenue for the fact that they are doing the right thing when others are not.  
 
The second element of Feld et al’s. (2006b) proposition is that the use of rewards for 
compliant taxpayers can act to maintain their compliance levels in the long-term through 
having a positive influence on taxpayers’ tax morale and motivation to be a good taxpayer. 
The results obtained from the tax practitioner interviews indicated strong support for this 
view, with, for example, both Practitioner B and Practitioner E highlighting the important 
role that rewards could play in regard to increasing the level of positive reinforcement to 
encourage the continuance of the desired behaviour of tax compliance. It was noted that in 
the absence of some type of reward system, the presence of positive reinforcement is severely 
lacking, which can potentially be harmful for tax compliance in the long-term. The findings 
from the SBO interviews provide further support for the proposition that rewards would help 
to maintain the compliance levels of good taxpayers. SBO A expressed the view that 
receiving a reward from Inland Revenue would be a strong motivation to continue being 
compliant, as taxpayers would feel like their good behaviour is being appreciated by Inland 
Revenue. Similarly, SBO B was of the view that receiving a reward for being compliant 
would reduce the likelihood of taxpayers entertaining the thought of becoming an evader 
because they would appreciate the acknowledgment from Inland Revenue.      
 
The findings generally provide support for Feld, et al’s. (2006b) proposition that the 
introduction of a reward system could be an effective means of maintaining compliance from 
good taxpayers. However, it must be recognised that a degree of doubt exists as to whether 
Inland Revenue would view the use of rewards as being necessary in this regard. This is in 
light of the fact that taxpayers with a history of good behaviour are already eligible for 
favourable treatment from Inland Revenue in certain circumstances. For example, in 
accordance with section 141FB of the Tax Administration Act 1994, a taxpayer can have a 
shortfall penalty reduced by 50 percent if they have not, in the previous two years in regard to 
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GST, FBT, PAYE and RWT, and four years in regard to all other taxes, received a shortfall 
penalty. In light of this, Practitioner B highlighted that Inland Revenue may already view this 
as being a reward for good taxpayers, and thus Inland Revenue may not deem the 
introduction of a formal reward system necessary in this context. However, contrary to this 
view, both Practitioner A and SBO A did not view this penalty relief as constituting a reward, 
indicating that whilst they were aware that Inland Revenue could reduce penalties, it was 
their opinion that Inland Revenue could do more to acknowledge compliant taxpayers.  
 
 
6.3.2 Customer versus Taxpayer and the role of rewards 
 
 
During the course of the tax practitioner interviews, the practice of Inland Revenue calling 
taxpayers ‘customers’ arose. The use of the term ‘customer’ appears to clearly signify that 
Inland Revenue recognises the importance of ensuring that taxpayers have a positive 
perception of Inland Revenue, and that Inland Revenue believes that the practice of calling 
taxpayers customers is a means through which they can form positive relationships with 
taxpayers, thereby improving the likelihood that taxpayers will be compliant. This is evident 
from comments made in the Report to the Treasurer and Minister of Revenue by a Committee 
of Experts on Tax Compliance (1998) document, in which Chapter 16 addressed the issue of 
Inland Revenue’s relationships with taxpayers. Paragraph 16.3 introduces the point that since 
1995, Inland Revenue has been attempting to change and improve the way in which it 
interacts with taxpayers, and that “a core aspect of this change has been an instruction to refer 
to taxpayers as 'customers'.” Paragraph 16.4 states that:  
 
The object is to improve the department's service to taxpayers and its relationship with 
taxpayers. It is hoped that the best-practice private-sector processes and standards that 
the term 'customer' implies will encourage staff to achieve this improvement. In turn, it 
is anticipated that improved levels of service to 'customers' will lead to better levels of 
voluntary taxpayer compliance.  
 
These comments illustrate Inland Revenue’s attempt to bring an element of ‘commerciality’ 
into the tax context, in an attempt to improve how it is perceived by taxpayers. 
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The practice of tax authorities calling taxpayers ‘customers’ has received some limited 
attention in the tax morale literature, most notably from Kornhauser (2007), who takes a 
negative view of the potential effects that using such terminology can have on the compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. Kornhauser’s criticism stems from the argument that this commercial 
element’s introduction into the tax context can reduce taxpayers’ tax morale and motivation 
to be compliant, as it “devalues the civic duty aspects of paying taxes...” (p. 637). Kornhauser 
(2007) further criticises this practice, on the basis that it may cause taxpayers to react 
negatively towards the tax authority because of the imbalance of the so called customer 
relationship, due to the tax authority having the power to impose penalties, stating that “if the 
taxpayer is merely a customer, then paying taxes is no different than paying off a car loan, 
except that the IRS may be viewed more hostilely than other creditors because it carries a 
bigger stick” (p. 638).   
 
Like Kornhauser (2007), the results from the tax practitioner interviews also indicated a 
negative view of Inland Revenue’s practice of calling taxpayers ‘customers’. However, the 
reasons for holding this negative view differ to those of Kornhauser (2007). The findings 
highlighted that the practitioners’ negativity stems from the fact that Inland Revenue 
currently does not attempt to actually treat taxpayers as customers through seeking to 
improve relationships with them, and this consequently can lead to taxpayers viewing Inland 
Revenue negatively because they do not believe that Inland Revenue is making a genuine 
effort to improve its relationships with them. These sentiments reflect concerns that were 
raised by the Committee of Experts on Tax Compliance (1998), where it was noted that a 
potential pitfall of Inland Revenue’s attempt to create a customer-based relationship with 
taxpayers is that taxpayers may not perceive Inland Revenue as being genuine and sincere in 
this regard, due to the fact that taxpayers must pay their taxes without directly receiving 
benefits in return, and will be subject to penalties for failing to pay the correct amount of tax 
when it is due. Despite this, however, the Committee noted that this customer-based approach 
should not necessarily be discontinued, provided it is implemented in a manner which 
maximises its benefits.  
 
The results from the tax practitioner interviews indicated that the introduction of a rewards 
system for compliant taxpayers is one way in which the benefits of this approach could 
potentially be maximised, as this is the type of action that proper customer serving 
organisations do, and would therefore signal to taxpayers that Inland Revenue is genuine in 
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its attempt to improve its relationships with taxpayers. It is apparent, therefore, that in the 
view of the tax practitioners, it would potentially be beneficial for Inland Revenue to attempt 
to increase and emphasise the commerciality aspect of its relationship with taxpayers. This is 
in contrast to the view put forward by Kornhauser (2007), who was of the opinion that 
attempting to incorporate commerciality into the tax realm is damaging to taxpayers’ tax 
morale, and therefore poses the risk of decreasing taxpayers’ compliance levels. However, 
the introduction of rewards may overcome one of the problems which Kornhauser (2007) 
identified regarding the incorporation of commerciality into the tax system, namely that 
taxpayers may develop hostility towards the tax authority if it tries to treat them as a customer 
due to the ‘big stick’ that it wields. The rationale behind the introduction of rewards, 
however, is that the reliance on the tax authority’s big stick is reduced in favour of 
emphasising the ‘carrot’ to encourage compliance, and could therefore negate the risk of 
hostility arising. This is turn would increase the likelihood of Inland Revenue’s objective 
underlying this customer based approach being achieved, namely that it will “...lead to better 
levels of voluntary taxpayer compliance” (Committee of Experts On Tax Compliance, 1998).   
 
 
6.4 Possible features and operation of a reward system 
 
 
One of the main areas of uncertainty in prior literature is the question of how a reward system 
should be designed so as to maximise its potential positive influence on tax compliance. This 
uncertainty relates to the type of rewards which would be the most effective for motivating 
compliance, and the manner in which such rewards should be administered. A related issue to 
consider is the effect that rewards would likely have on different subgroups of taxpayers. The 
analysis below attempts to shed some light on these issues in the New Zealand context. 
 
 
 
6.4.1 Financial rewards 
 
 
Financial rewards have been identified in prior literature as being one type of reward which 
could encourage compliance. The general consensus from the tax practitioner interviews was 
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that financial rewards would be the most likely type of reward to have a positive influence on 
the compliance behaviour of taxpayers belonging to the defiant motivational posture 
subgroups, such as resistant, disengaged and game playing taxpayers. For example, 
Practitioner C, Practitioner D and Practitioner E emphasised that money would be the only 
motivating factor for these groups of taxpayers, and that non-monetary rewards would be 
unlikely to have an impact on them. These sentiments were shared by the SBOs, who both 
agreed that financial rewards would be necessary to motivate defiant taxpayers to improve 
their compliance. SBO A noted that he felt one of the main reasons why taxpayers become 
defiant and evade or avoid tax is because they perceive that they would otherwise be paying 
an unfair amount of tax and, therefore, the only way to motivate them to improve their 
compliance is to provide a monetary incentive to do so.  
 
Whilst consistent views were obtained from both the tax practitioner and SBO groups in 
regard to the necessity of using financial rewards to improve the compliance of defiant 
taxpayers, differing opinions were held between the two groups in regard to the type of 
reward which would be the most effective for maintaining the compliance levels from 
taxpayers in the deferent motivational posture subgroups. As will be discussed in more depth 
below, the tax practitioners generally felt that non-financial rewards could be more effective 
for taxpayers of this type, as opposed to financial rewards. However, the findings from the 
SBO interviews indicated that each SBO, who both categorised themselves as being deferent 
taxpayers, viewed money as being more motivating than non-financial rewards for both 
deferent and defiant taxpayers.  
 
However, prior literature has voiced concerns as to the efficacy of financial rewards, on the 
basis that financial rewards may decrease taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to be compliant 
due to them treating the financial reward as a ‘right’ or ‘claim’ (Feld et al., 2006b; Feld & 
Frey, 2007; Kornhauser, 2007). These concerns regarding the potential negative impact of 
financial rewards appear to be directed more toward the deferent subgroups of taxpayers who 
are at least partially intrinsically motivated to be an honest taxpayer, as opposed to the defiant 
subgroups of taxpayers. This view is supported by Torgler’s (2002) proposition that research 
should consider whether the introduction of financial inducements could reduce the intrinsic 
motivation of honest taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. The findings from the 
SBO interviews do not support these concerns, as both SBOs indicated that they did not 
believe financial rewards would have a demotivating effect on deferent taxpayers. Rather, 
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they felt such rewards would be appreciated by deferent taxpayers and would be another 
motivating factor for them to remain compliant. The findings, therefore, suggest that from the 
perspective of taxpayers, financial rewards would be the most effective type of reward for 
improving the compliance of defiant taxpayers and maintaining the compliance of deferent 
taxpayers.  
 
The next issue to consider is how the financial rewards should be administered in order to 
have the greatest effect on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, as Feld & Frey (2006) note that 
the way in which rewards are provided to taxpayers will be an important determinant of how 
effective they are. The prior literature has proposed that the financial reward could be 
proportional to the amount of tax paid by a taxpayer, so the reward system would operate in a 
manner which is analogous to a percentage rebate system. Conversely, the financial reward 
could be administered as a set amount, so the reward is the same size for all recipients (Feld 
et al., 2006b). The general consensus from both the tax practitioners and the SBOs was that 
administering the financial rewards as a percentage rebate would likely be the most effective 
approach to incentivise taxpayers to improve their compliance. A common theme that arose 
in support of using a percentage rebate system was that it could improve compliance by 
reducing taxpayers’ willingness to take the risk of evading or avoiding tax by placing them in 
a position where they are guaranteed to receive a rebate. Practitioner C noted that he felt a lot 
of taxpayers would prefer to pay their proper amount of tax and receive a rebate so they can 
“sleep easy”, rather than continuing to take the risks associated with evasion. Practitioner B 
noted that the introduction of a percentage rebate system would alter the risk/reward profile 
of evasion. Practitioner B illustrated this by using the hypothetical example, involving 
arbitrary amounts of money, of a taxpayer who is evading $3000 of tax by underreporting 
their income prior to the introduction of a rebate system. However, subsequent to the 
introduction of a rebate system, the taxpayer would be owed a rebate amounting to $1000 if 
they reported all of their income and paid the proper amount of tax. As the practitioner noted, 
the benefit the taxpayer now receives from evading is reduced from $3000 to $2000, which 
equates to the net gain of $2000 after deducting the foregone $1000 rebate the taxpayer 
would have received for being fully compliant and taking no risk, from the $3000 the 
taxpayer receives from evading and taking the associated risks. Practitioner B was of the 
view that this altered risk/reward profile would lead to some taxpayers behaving in a more 
risk averse manner as they decide that the extra gains they could make through evading are 
not worth the risk, and instead they would prefer to receive the risk free rebate. Similarly, 
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Practitioner E expressed that he felt a percentage rebate would help to make taxpayers take 
the view that taking the risk of doing cash jobs and not reporting the income is not 
worthwhile. 
 
Similar sentiments regarding risk preferences were expressed in the SBO interviews where, 
interestingly, both interviewees made reference to the fact that they believed a percentage 
rebate system would reduce the likelihood of game playing taxpayers seeking to look for 
legal, but “dodgy”, methods of avoiding tax as it would not be worth their while, nor worth 
the risk. These findings from the practitioner and SBO interviews are consistent with the 
prior research which has experimentally tested Prospect Theory’s risk preference predictions. 
For example, results from Anderson (1996), Dusenbury (1994), Robben et al. (1990), 
Schepanski & Kelsey (1990), and White, Harrison & Harrell (1993) indicated that taxpayers 
tend to be risk averse when in a position to receive a tax refund, which has prompted 
researchers to suggest that a potential way to improve tax compliance is for tax authorities to 
take action so as to put taxpayers in a position in which they will receive a guaranteed refund. 
The current findings tend to suggest that the use of a percentage rebate system could be one 
potentially effective means of achieving this. 
 
Whilst the practitioners expressed support for the view that using a percentage rebate system 
could reduce the number of taxpayers willing to take the risk of avoiding or evading tax, it 
was also noted that such a system would not result in all non-compliant taxpayers becoming 
risk averse, which is consistent with Dusenbury’s (1994) caution that habitual tax evaders 
will not necessarily become risk averse when placed in a position to receive a refund. 
Practitioner E noted that he was concerned that some non-compliant taxpayers would 
continue to take the risk of evading because it is in their nature to do so. Practitioner B made 
reference to his hypothetical example of a taxpayer evading $3000 of tax, who would be 
eligible to receive a $1000 rebate if they declared all of their income. As noted above, whilst 
Practitioner B felt that some taxpayers would prefer to take the risk free option of receiving 
the $1000 rebate, he also felt that some taxpayers would take the view that it is still worth the 
risk of evading in order to receive the extra $2000 net benefit.  
 
A further issue to consider in this regard is the fact that rewards can induce strategic 
behaviour from taxpayers, such as where taxpayers could exploit the rewards system by 
evading tax and yet still receive a reward (Feld et al., 2006a). The authors note that the way 
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to negate this threat is to make the receipt of a reward dependent on a taxpayer being found to 
be completely honest. However, requiring this standard of compliance would necessitate 
Inland Revenue conducting tax audits for all small businesses to confirm their compliance, 
which is not practicable. As such, the percentage rebate system proposed by the practitioners 
would not require a taxpayer to be found completely honest in order to receive a rebate. 
Instead, the receipt of the rebate would simply be based on the payment of tax, with the size 
of the rebate increasing as a function of the amount of tax paid. Therefore, there is a risk that 
a taxpayer may act strategically because on the one hand they could receive a benefit from 
evading a portion of their taxes, whilst on the other hand they still receive the benefit of the 
rebate based on the amount of tax they do pay. The risk of taxpayers acting in a strategic 
manner was raised by SBO B, who noted that some taxpayers may think it is worth the risk of 
evading some tax whilst still receiving the rebate for the tax they do pay. Practitioner C also 
stated that some taxpayers may start to “weigh up the numbers” and determine that it is worth 
the risk of not being 100 percent compliant.  
 
This raises the issue that the way in which a non-compliant taxpayer frames the compliance 
decision could impact on the level of risk a taxpayer is willing to take when they are in a 
position to receive a rebate, and the likelihood that they will act strategically. The following 
hypothetical scenario outlines this issue: 
 
A taxpayer earns a taxable income for the year of $50,000. Based on the current income tax 
rates in New Zealand, the taxpayer’s income tax liability would be approximately $8020. 
However, if we assume that this taxpayer has been evading tax, or is contemplating doing so, 
by underreporting their income by, for example, $10,000, then the income tax which is owed 
on the $40,000 of declared income amounts to only $6020, resulting in a $2000 tax shortfall 
for the government.  If a percentage rebate of 5 percent was introduced, the taxpayer would 
be entitled to receive $401 if they declared the full $50,000 and paid the proper amount of tax 
($8020). On this basis, the net benefit that the taxpayer would receive from evading is 
reduced from $2000 to $1599. In this case, the taxpayer frames the decision as a trade-off 
between taking a risk free gain of $401, or taking a risky gain of $1599. This frame is 
consistent with that provided in Practitioner B’s hypothetical example above.  
 
There is, however, an alternative way that a taxpayer may frame the decision, which would 
increase the chances of a taxpayer acting strategically. As the percentage rebate is based on 
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the amount of tax paid, a non-compliant taxpayer would still receive a reward based on the 
amount of tax they do pay. In the current scenario where the taxpayer is evading $2000 tax, 
the taxpayer would still receive a rebate of $301 based on the $6020 tax they would pay, 
which would give them a gross benefit of $2301 should they take the risk of evading, and a 
net benefit of $1900 after deducting the $401 rebate they would receive if the proper amount 
of tax was paid. In this case, the decision is framed as a trade-off between taking the risk free 
gain of $401, or the risky gain which consists of both the amount of evaded tax and the 
reward that would be received for the level of taxes actually paid. As the net gain is greater 
when viewed from the second frame’s perspective, there may be a higher likelihood that a 
taxpayer would be willing to take the risk of evasion if they frame the decision in this 
manner.  
 
Therefore, whilst the results lend support to Prospect Theory’s assertion that the prospect of 
receiving a guaranteed rebate may reduce some taxpayers’ willingness to take the risks 
associated with evasion due to a gain already being assured (Robben et al. 1990), they also 
highlight that some taxpayers would be likely to act strategically and take the risk of evading 
tax in addition to receiving the rebate for the tax they do pay. As such, the practitioners and 
SBOs noted that the use of a percentage rebate system would necessitate the inclusion of 
deterrence measures in order to dissuade defiant taxpayers from doing so; an issue which is 
discussed in section 6.5.        
 
Further support was expressed for the use of a percentage rebate on the basis that the size of 
the reward available to taxpayers under this approach increases as a function of the amount of 
tax paid, so in order for taxpayers to gain the maximum advantage from the rebate, it stands 
that they should declare all of their income for tax purposes. Practitioner A stated that he felt 
such a system would incentivise taxpayers to honestly declare their income because the more 
tax they pay, the bigger the reward they receive from Inland Revenue. In this sense, taxpayers 
may perceive that they are making a gain from paying their tax. Similarly, SBO B noted that 
the way to receive the maximum benefit from a percentage rebate is to pay a higher amount 
of tax, which they thought could lead to taxpayers perceiving that they are making a bigger 
gain the more tax they pay, which would reduce the incentives to avoid or evade tax. These 
findings are also consistent with Prospect Theory, as Kornhauser (2007) notes that according 
to Prospect Theory, tax compliance should increase if paying taxes is seen as a gain as 
opposed to a loss. According to the aforementioned responses, it is possible that the use of a 
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percentage rebate is one means of making taxpayers perceive paying taxes as a gain. This 
illustrates why the use of a percentage rebate would be more effective than a single set 
amount for all taxpayers, and is consistent with Feld & Frey’s (2007) assertion that a 
percentage rebate has a greater impact on shifting the relative prices in favour of paying taxes 
than does a single set amount.      
 
 
6.4.2 Non-financial rewards 
 
 
It has been suggested in prior research that the use of non-financial rewards could potentially 
be more effective than financial rewards as a means of motivating taxpayers to increase or 
maintain their level of tax compliance. For example, Feld & Frey (2007), Feld et al. (2006b), 
and Kornhauser (2007) note that a reward which is received in the same monetary dimension 
as the tax payments is likely to be treated by taxpayers as a ‘right’, which consequently 
reduces its positive influence upon taxpayers’ tax morale. In contrast, the aforementioned 
authors posit that a non-monetary reward which is distinguished from the tax payments is 
more likely to be perceived by taxpayers as a sign of acknowledgment from the tax authority 
for their good behaviour and, therefore, it will have a stronger influence upon taxpayers’ tax 
morale. As highlighted above, the results indicated mixed views regarding this issue. Both 
SBOs expressed the view that financial rewards would be a more effective motivator than 
non-financial rewards, and would be perceived as a sign of acknowledgment by taxpayers. 
However, despite favouring financial rewards, SBO B did note that she felt certain types of 
non-financial rewards would be also be motivating for small business owners to be 
compliant.   
 
The results from the practitioner interviews were more supportive of the aforementioned 
proposition regarding the use of non-financial rewards, in the sense that the general view was 
that, whilst financial rewards would be necessary to improve the compliance of defiant 
taxpayers, non-financial rewards may be more effective for maintaining the compliance of 
deferent taxpayers. Practitioner B and Practitioner C did voice concerns as to the possibility 
of taxpayers treating monetary rewards as a right, noting that there was a risk that monetary 
rewards could just become expected by taxpayers, which could reduce their positive impact. 
Furthermore, Practitioner B felt that a taxpayer would be more appreciative if the reward took 
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the form of something which benefited them or their business by “making their life easier.” 
To this end, he suggested that extending and allowing more flexibility regarding the filing 
and payment timeframes for taxpayers who have been consistently compliant would be 
greatly appreciated by taxpayers. This idea was also put forward by Practitioner E, who felt 
that many taxpayers would appreciate increased flexibility regarding filing and payment 
times as much as they would appreciate monetary rewards.  
 
Practitioner A put forward the idea that taxpayers who have been consistently compliant in 
the past could be given preferred status with Inland Revenue which would give them certain 
benefits, such as providing access to a special phone number which reduces the wait time 
when taxpayers call Inland Revenue for assistance. This idea is consistent with that put 
forward by Kornhauser (2007, p. 639), who proposed that “taxpayers who have paid the 
correct amount of taxes in a timely fashion for a stated amount of time... might be given 
faster access to assistance such as special phone lines that have a shorter wait.” Due to the 
fact that tax authorities are often notorious for having long waiting times on phone calls, such 
a reward could be an effective way of maintaining taxpayers’ tax morale and reducing the 
risk of taxpayers developing a negative perception of Inland Revenue due to this issue. 
However, as Practitioner E points out, the effectiveness of this type of reward may be limited 
by the fact that it is often the taxpayer’s accountant, as opposed to the taxpayer themselves, 
who will phone Inland Revenue if a query has arisen. Therefore, whilst a reward in this form 
could potentially have a positive effect, it is likely that additional non-financial rewards 
would be required in order to have a significant impact on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.      
 
Further examples of non-financial rewards which could directly benefit a taxpayer’s business 
were proposed in both the tax practitioner and SBO interviews. For example, Practitioner A 
proposed that Inland Revenue could take advantage of its bulk purchasing power in order to 
provide discounted accounting software such as Xero and MYOB to small businesses that 
have been consistently compliant. This type of idea seems appealing, as there is a clear 
mutual benefit being received by both parties; on the one hand, taxpayers are rewarded for 
being compliant, whist on the other hand, Inland Revenue benefits from the fact that more 
small businesses will have improved accounting software, which theoretically should lead to 
more accurate records being kept, which in turn increases the likelihood of the correct 
amount of tax being paid by these small businesses. Similarly, SBO B proposed the idea that 
Inland Revenue could reward compliant taxpayers by seeking to aid them to grow their 
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business, such as, for example, organising free business seminars or providing free 
consultations with a business mentor. In a similar vein to the idea put forward by Practitioner 
A, this idea can also be seen as providing a mutual benefit to both parties, as the taxpayers 
receive the opportunity to grow their businesses and revenues, which would consequently 
benefit Inland Revenue through the higher levels of tax revenue which would be collected if 
taxpayers’ businesses were to increase their revenues.  
 
Practitioner E proposed the idea that Inland Revenue could send letters or certificates to 
taxpayers who have been deemed to be compliant for the previous tax period. Speaking from 
the perspective of his clients, Practitioner E felt that taxpayers would appreciate receiving 
such a reward and would potentially use it as a marketing tool to promote their business. This 
type of reward is consistent with an idea put forward by Torgler (2010), who proposed that a 
useful form of reward would be a certificate issued by the tax authority to a business which 
acknowledges that, to the best knowledge of the tax authority, the business has declared and 
paid the correct amount of tax on time, and has acted in a cooperative manner with the tax 
authority. The author highlights that such a reward would be beneficial to a business as it 
indicates that the business is a ‘good’ taxpayer, which will enhance the business’s image and 
reputation. This is consistent with Practitioner E’s claim that taxpayers would use such a 
reward as a marketing tool to promote their business.  
 
The use of this type of reward could also have additional benefits in regard to the effect they 
could have in improving taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax compliance by drawing attention to 
the fact that a large number of small businesses are honest taxpayers. Kornhauser (2007) 
notes that taxpayers’ compliance behaviour can be influenced by how they perceive other 
taxpayers to be behaving. For example, if a taxpayer has the perception that a large number of 
other taxpayers are cheating on their taxes, there is a risk that this perception can negatively 
influence the compliance behaviour of the taxpayer. The tax morale literature refers to this 
concept as horizontal reciprocity, which provides that taxpayers are likely to be more willing 
to comply with their tax obligations if they are aware that the majority of other taxpayers are 
compliant as well (Kornhauser, 2007). As such, it follows that an effective means of 
improving tax compliance from small businesses could be for Inland Revenue to emphasise 
and give attention to the small businesses who are being compliant, which may encourage 
other small businesses to follow suit (Kornhauser, 2007). This could be achieved through the 
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provision of some type of certificate or award to compliant businesses which would act to 
raise awareness of the importance of being a ‘good’ taxpayer.      
 
Prior research has also suggested that the provision of non-financial rewards in the form of 
reduced public transport fees or free admission to cultural events could be an effective way of 
acknowledging the good behaviour of taxpayers in order to motivate them to be compliant 
(Feld & Frey, 2007; Feld et al., 2006b; Kornhauser, 2007). However, these types of rewards 
did not receive any support from the interviewees with, for example, SBO B noting that she 
did not believe such rewards would have the same level of effectiveness of motivating 
compliance compared to financial rewards, or non-financial rewards of a nature which can 
benefit taxpayers’ businesses.    
 
The research findings presented in this subsection provide a degree of support for the general 
proposition that non-financial rewards could be useful for encouraging compliance, as they 
highlight that such rewards could be effective for maintaining compliance from deferent 
taxpayers, but less so for improving compliance from defiant taxpayers. Furthermore, the 
findings tend to suggest that in order for non-financial rewards to have a significant impact 
upon tax compliance, such rewards should take the form of something which benefits a 
taxpayer’s business, rather than the taxpayer on a personal level. There is, therefore, little 
support for the use of non-financial rewards in the form of reduced public transport or free 
admission to cultural events, as suggested in the prior research, such as Feld & Frey (2007), 
Feld et al. (2006b) and Kornhauser (2007). 
 
 
6.4.3 Tax audits and the bomb-crater effect 
 
 
Whilst the preceding discussion has drawn attention to the fact that the proposed percentage 
rebate system would apply on a wholesale basis to SBO/self employed taxpayers without the 
requirement for a taxpayer to be found fully compliant, another circumstance identified in 
prior literature, in which rewards could apply, is where a taxpayer is found to be largely 
compliant and honest after a tax audit. Prior experimental studies investigating the effect that 
rewards have on the compliance behaviour of participants have all used this scenario as the 
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basis for testing the impact of rewards (Alm et al., 1992b; Bazart & Pickhardt, 2011; 
Kastlunger et al., 2011; Torgler, 2003). A potential additional advantage of utilising rewards 
in this scenario is that the use of rewards may act to reduce the likelihood of the bomb-crater 
effect arising. The findings from the tax practitioner interviews generally supported the view 
that the bomb-crater effect is a risk which does exist in practice, although this view was not 
unanimously held. For example, Practitioner A noted that he had never heard of a taxpayer 
seeking to save tax through evasion after a tax audit, and further noted that he believed Inland 
Revenue auditors would likely sense whether a taxpayer was of a nature to attempt such 
action, and would therefore put measures in place to prevent it from happening. In contrast, 
Practitioner B and Practitioner E were of the opinion that the bomb-crater effect does pose a 
threat to compliance, as some taxpayers do perceive the chances of being audited again in the 
future as being low, which is consistent with the explanation offered by Guala & Mittone 
(2005). These sentiments were also shared by the SBOs. Practitioner C and Practitioner D 
provided a degree of support for the view that the bomb-crater effect poses a compliance 
threat, noting that whilst they personally have not seen examples of such a phenomenon 
happening, they could understand why taxpayers may engage in such behaviour and could 
foresee it occurring.    
 
As the general view arising from the tax practitioner and SBO interviews supports Guala & 
Mittone’s (2005) proposition that the bomb-crater effect exists in the tax compliance context, 
the question arises as to whether the use of rewards can act to reduce the risk of the bomb-
crater effect occurring. This issue was addressed by Kastlunger et al. (2011), who provided 
experimental evidence indicating that subjects’ compliance levels subsequent to an audit 
were higher when the reward was introduced as compared to the control condition, which 
tends to suggest that the introduction of rewards tempers taxpayers’ willingness to evade their 
taxes subsequent to an audit, thereby reducing the impact of the bomb-crater effect. 
Practitioner B and Practitioner E supported this view, indicating that in their opinion, the 
provision of a reward to a taxpayer found to be compliant after a tax audit would likely 
reduce their willingness to evade tax in the future, most likely due to the feelings of guilt that 
would arise after they had received a reward from Inland Revenue. Similarly, SBO A noted 
that he felt rewards could help to reduce the bomb-crater effect as taxpayers would likely feel 
guilty evading tax after having received a reward, as well as the fact that receiving a reward 
would give people a positive perception of Inland Revenue. Therefore, the findings tend to 
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suggest that the positive experimental results obtained by Kastlunger et al. (2011) would be 
replicated in practice. Furthermore, the findings highlight the important role that procedural 
justice has in ensuring that audited taxpayers continue being compliant in the future, with 
both SBOs raising the point that taxpayers would be more likely to be compliant in the future 
if they have had a positive experience during the course of the audit, and have felt respected 
by the Inland Revenue staff.   
Whilst Practitioner D was also supportive of using rewards in the audit context, he viewed the 
issue from a slightly different perspective. Practitioner D, whose sentiments were shared by 
Practitioner E, expressed the view that taxpayers can develop negative feelings towards 
Inland Revenue after an audit, due to the financial and time burden that may be imposed upon 
the taxpayer. Consequently, there is a risk that such ill feelings toward Inland Revenue could 
be detrimental to compliance. Therefore, the use of rewards in this scenario could be framed 
as being compensatory in nature, so as to recognise the disruption to the taxpayer’s business 
and the associated costs incurred, which would help to ensure that the any ill will held by 
taxpayers towards Inland Revenue is kept to a minimum.  
 
This is consistent with the view put forward by Falkinger & Walther (1991), who conducted a 
theoretical study in economics which investigated the potential for introducing financial 
rewards as a means of improving compliance. The authors highlighted that in the audit 
context, the use of rewards could be framed in two distinct ways. First, “the reward can be 
seen as an incentive for declaring income accurately” (p. 72), or alternatively, “it may also be 
seen as a compensation… for the burden of investigation which the taxpayer has had to 
suffer” (p. 72). The results from the tax practitioner interviews, in conjunction with the view 
put forward by, Falkinger & Walther (1991), highlight the dual role that rewards can play in 
regard to improving compliance when applied in the audit context. First, the use of rewards 
seeks to improve compliance through acting as an incentive for taxpayers to be compliant, so 
as to be eligible to receive the reward should they be audited. Second, the use of rewards 
seeks to maintain the compliance of taxpayers after they have been audited by acting as 
compensation for the burden incurred by the compliant taxpayer, thereby maintaining a 
positive relationship between the taxpayer and Inland Revenue.    
 
Practitioner D, in his assessment of the different circumstances in which rewards could apply, 
noted that he felt restricting their application to the audit scenario may be a more effective 
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approach to increase compliance through improving taxpayers’ perceptions of Inland 
Revenue, as opposed to applying them in a wider context, such as implementing a wholesale 
rebate system. The advantage of this is that it significantly reduces the scope for taxpayers to 
act strategically as in the case where the percentage rebate applies on a wholesale basis 
without taxpayers being subject to an audit. However, Practitioner A cautioned against 
limiting the reward system to this narrow context.  The rationale for this view was based on 
the fact that as Inland Revenue only has limited resources available to conduct audits, 
limiting the application of rewards to this context may inhibit their potential to improve 
compliance on the larger scale that could be achieved if a wholesale rebate system was 
implemented, as such a system would be applicable to a larger number of taxpayers, thereby 
increasing their scope for influencing compliance behaviour. Furthermore, limiting their 
application to the audit context would only partially solve the problem regarding the lack of 
acknowledgment for good taxpayers, as discussed above. These concerns are consistent with 
those raised by Feld et al. (2006a), who note that applying the rewards solely to taxpayers 
selected through a random audit can be problematic due to the fact that, as only a limited 
number of taxpayers would be rewarded each year, it is likely that many previously rewarded 
taxpayers would not be rewarded again in the future, which could have negative effects on 
their future compliance behaviour.  
 
Therefore, whilst the application of rewards in the audit context is desirable as a means of 
reducing the compliance threat which stems from the bomb-crater effect, it is likely that a 
reward system would need to be applied in a broader context if it were to have a significant 
impact upon compliance levels. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that in order to 
maximise the potential compliance benefits that could be obtained from a reward system, it is 
likely that such a system would need to be applied in multiple contexts. That is, a broad 
context in which the reward was applied, for example, as a wholesale rebate, which would act 
to encourage taxpayers to improve and maintain their compliance behaviour, and a narrow 
context, targeted at improving compliance levels through reducing the impact of the bomb-
crater effect that arises in the audit context. This would also allow for different types of 
rewards to be provided in different contexts. For example, whilst a percentage rebate is well 
suited to apply on a wholesale basis, the provision of certain non-financial rewards, such as 
certifications of compliance, flexibility of timeframes, and accounting software are perhaps 
more suited to the narrow audit context in which Inland Revenue can verify that the taxpayer 
has been compliant for an extended period of time and is deserving of such rewards.   
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6.5 Overcoming the difficulties with defiant taxpayers 
 
 
The results obtained from the practitioner and SBO interviews highlight two particular 
difficulties regarding defiant taxpayers which would need to be considered when designing 
and implementing a reward system. The first difficulty would necessitate the use of a tax 
amnesty, whilst the second difficulty would necessitate the use of the ‘stick’ in addition to the 
‘carrot’.  
 
 
6.5.1 The need for a tax amnesty 
 
 
It was highlighted in both the tax practitioner and SBO interviews that in order for the 
introduction of a reward system to have the effect of motivating and inducing non-compliant 
taxpayers to become compliant, or at least more compliant than they were prior to the 
introduction of the reward system, it is very likely that the reward system would need to be 
introduced in conjunction with a tax amnesty. The rationale behind this requirement is that 
whilst a non-compliant taxpayer may wish to improve their compliance levels in response to 
the introduction of a reward system, they may be hesitant to do so due to the fear that Inland 
Revenue will conduct an investigation into their past non-compliance, which would 
subsequently result in penalties being imposed. As such, it is not difficult to envision the 
implementation of a reward system having only a limited impact on increasing compliance 
levels if it was not accompanied by a tax amnesty.  
 
As noted in section 2.3, the use of tax amnesties as a means of improving tax compliance is 
largely based on the same rationale underlying the research putting forward the possibility of 
introducing rewards, namely that there are doubts as to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
relying on legal sanctions as a means of increasing tax compliance levels (Hasseldine, 
1998b). As such, it seems appropriate that both the introduction of a reward system and use 
of a tax amnesty could be used together as a way of seeking to increase compliance. 
Furthermore, there are additional reasons why a tax amnesty and the introduction of a reward 
system could potentially complement each other as a compliance strategy. First, Hasseldine 
(1989) notes that there are doubts as to the ability of tax amnesties to ensure long-term 
compliance and, therefore, “taxpayers may need to... be encouraged via some other method to 
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comply” (Hasseldine, 1989, p. 522). Therefore, the concurrent introduction of a reward 
system could act as a method of encouraging taxpayers to become compliant in the long-
term. A second reason is that after a tax amnesty is run, previously honest taxpayers may 
anticipate a future amnesty, and therefore their tax honesty may be reduced, thereby causing a 
detrimental impact on long-term compliance levels (Torgler, 2007). Furthermore, honest and 
compliant taxpayers may perceive the use of tax amnesties as being unfair and view them as a 
signal that tax evasion is a forgivable and insignificant action, which can lead to a reduction 
in their motivation to comply in the future (Feld et al., 2006a; Torgler, 2007). However, as 
the results of the current research have indicated, the introduction of a reward system would 
likely act to maintain the compliance levels of ‘good’ taxpayers who are currently compliant, 
therefore negating this potential pitfall of tax amnesties. 
 
Therefore, whilst a tax amnesty would almost certainly be required for a reward system to be 
successfully implemented, it appears that the two strategies could complement each other as a 
means of ensuring a long-term improvement in tax compliance levels. A final point to note in 
regard to the use of an amnesty in this context is the ability for Inland Revenue to utilise a 
limited scope tax amnesty. Sawyer (2005) notes that in 2004, the New Zealand Government 
proposed the use of limited tax amnesties, which would have enabled Inland Revenue to offer 
tax amnesties to specific industries or groups in which tax evasion had become ingrained. As 
it currently stands, however, the limited scope tax amnesty programme has not been 
implemented. Nevertheless, the introduction of a reward system could provide an appropriate 
opportunity for Inland Revenue to utilise limited tax amnesties, as Inland Revenue could 
target industries which it believes contain many small businesses who are habitual tax 
evaders, and who would therefore be more unwilling to improve their compliance behaviour 
in response to the implementation of a reward system. Therefore, if the New Zealand 
Government was hesitant to run a general economy wide tax amnesty for the purpose of 
introducing a reward system, the use of limited scope tax amnesties may be an effective 
alternative.    
 
6.5.2 Using the stick as well as the carrot 
 
 
As alluded to previously in the context of using a percentage rebate system, the findings from 
both the practitioner and SBO interviews raised concerns that, whilst the prospect of 
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receiving a guaranteed gain in the form of a rebate would encourage some taxpayers to act in 
a risk averse manner, some taxpayers would still seek to take the risk of evading or avoiding 
tax in order to make a larger gain, inducing strategic behaviour. As such, the interviewees 
proposed that to be effective, a reward system should be designed so as to include rather 
severe deterrence measures for non-compliance as a means of dissuading taxpayers from 
taking the risk of evasion or avoidance. Practitioner D noted that there would need to be 
“mega consequences” for a taxpayer found to have been receiving rebates whilst intentionally 
underreporting their income. Practitioner E put forward the idea that a taxpayer found to be 
evading or avoiding tax be required to repay the amount of refunds received, including an 
additional payment of penalty interest. In addition, both Practitioner E and Practitioner A 
proposed that a further appropriate consequence would entail the taxpayer being ineligible to 
ever receive a reward again in the future, or having to demonstrate to Inland Revenue that 
they are deserving of receiving them again, such as being fully compliant for a certain 
number of years.  
 
Support for these types of consequences was provided by both SBOs. For example, SBO A 
expressed that a taxpayer would have to be “a big risk taker” to be willing to evade taxes if 
these were the consequences of getting caught, and that the majority of taxpayers would be 
content to receive the risk free rebate rather than take the risk of evading, even though the 
gains they make from the rebate are less than what they would make from evading. 
Therefore, there was support for an approach in which a reward system provides a ‘carrot’ on 
the one hand, but wields a ‘stick’ in the other. This approach is still consistent with a tax 
morale approach to tax compliance, as whilst tax morale emphasises adopting methods other 
than deterrence to improve compliance, it recognises that both sticks and carrots should work 
together to ensure compliance (Kornhauser, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the combination of using rewards and deterrence measures is consistent with 
Inland Revenue’s current compliance approach under the Inland Revenue Compliance 
Model, whereby Inland Revenue reserves the use of deterrence measures for taxpayers who 
have adopted a defiant motivational posture, and focuses on using positive interactions to 
encourage taxpayers to adopt a deferent motivational posture (Leviner, 2009; Morris & 
Lonsdale, 2004). Similarly, in the context of a reward system being introduced into the 
Compliance Model, the rewards would be utilised to encourage taxpayers to adopt a deferent 
motivational posture, whilst the increased deterrence measures proposed by the interviewees 
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would apply to those taxpayers who have adopted a defiant motivational posture and have 
chosen to receive the benefits of the rewards whilst still engaging in non-compliance.     
 
 
6.6 Feasibility of a reward system 
 
 
The prior literature regarding the potential use of a reward system for compliant taxpayers 
has largely left the issue of the practical feasibility of implementing and administering a 
reward system untouched. It is, however, important to consider such an issue, as whilst the 
introduction of a reward system may potentially be an effective method of improving tax 
compliance from a theoretical perspective, if such a system is unfeasible to implement, its 
practical utility is severely impeded.  
 
In regard to the feasibility of implementing a reward system in the New Zealand context, the 
general consensus of the tax practitioners was that Inland Revenue’s IT system, in its current 
state, may struggle with the implementation of a reward system. The practitioners’ rationale 
for harbouring these concerns was largely on the basis that Inland Revenue’s IT system is 
potentially already stretched to its limits with the various aspects it must handle. This 
problem has arisen due to the fact that whilst Inland Revenue’s IT system was originally 
established to solely carry out the function of income and company tax collection, over time 
the system’s areas of responsibility have grown to include additional aspects, such as 
KiwiSaver, student loans, and Working for Families. As such, the practitioners felt that 
adding an additional area of responsibility in the form of a reward system may increase the 
complexity of the IT system to an unfeasible level.  
 
However, despite the practitioners’ concerns as to the feasibility of implementing such a 
system into Inland Revenue’s current IT system, they did note that this is less of a concern in 
light of the planned $1.5b upgrade of Inland Revenue’s IT system over the next ten years, as 
this new and improved system should be able to competently handle the implementation of a 
reward system. This does, however, raise a further issue for consideration, namely whether 
any potential reward system would need to be implemented during the IT system upgrade 
process, or whether the reward system could still be introduced after the upgrade is 
completed. Uncertainty surrounds this issue, with Practitioner B feeling that it may be 
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necessary to implement the reward system during the upgrade process, whilst Practitioner C 
felt that the increased flexibility that the upgraded IT system will likely possess should allow 
for the addition of a reward system after the upgrade phase has been completed. At the very 
least, it seems the tentative conclusion that can be drawn on this aspect of the feasibility issue 
is that the implementation of a reward system is likely to be feasible, provided the IT upgrade 
is successfully implemented. 
 
The second aspect in regard to the feasibility of introducing a reward system into the New 
Zealand tax system relates to the actual administration of such as system. Overall, the 
responses from the practitioners regarding the feasibility of administering a reward system 
indicated that it should be reasonably straight forward for Inland Revenue to operate such a 
system. In particular, Practitioner D made reference to the fact that Inland Revenue does have 
experience in the administration of rewards, albeit on a smaller scale than the type of reward 
system which is the subject of this project, in the form of an early payment discount for first 
time provisional taxpayers, in accordance with sections RC 37-40 of the Income Tax Act 
2007. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the administration of a reward system should 
be feasible for Inland Revenue to handle.  
 
A final feasibility issue that arose from the interviews with tax practitioners related to the 
potential adverse effects the introduction of a reward system could have on accounting firms 
and practitioners. This particular concern was raised in regard to the effects that a reward 
system could have on tax filing timeframes and workflow issues if a reward took the form of 
an extension of tax filing time frames. Whilst these concerns were only raised by two of the 
five tax practitioners interviewed (Practitioner A and Practitioner B), it does highlight that the 
consequences of implementing a reward system will not only have to be considered in regard 
to Inland Revenue, but consideration would also need to be given to how the implementation 
of such a system would impact upon accounting firms and practitioners so as to ensure that 
they do not incur any unintended adverse effects. 
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6.7 Inland Revenue’s potential amenability to using rewards 
 
 
As is the case concerning the feasibility of introducing a reward system, the question of how 
amenable a tax authority may be to the possibility of introducing a reward system has 
received little attention in prior research. In an attempt to shed some light on this critical issue 
in the New Zealand context, the researcher sought the opinions of the tax practitioners in 
regard to how they believed Inland Revenue might perceive the potential use of a reward 
system, and some of the potential difficulties which Inland Revenue would need to overcome 
in order to successfully implement such a system.  
 
The responses from the tax practitioner interviews indicated several potential difficulties 
which would need to be overcome. First, Practitioner A and Practitioner B were of the view 
that taxpayers are generally sceptical of Inland Revenue and, therefore, there may be a 
significant level of scepticism surrounding the introduction of a reward system which could 
result in its implementation having a negative impact upon taxpayers. In Practitioner A’s 
view, Inland Revenue may be deterred from attempting to introduce a rewards system due to 
this level of scepticism that would need to be overcome. In order to overcome this particular 
challenge, Practitioner B emphasised that a lot of attention would need to be focused on the 
manner in which the system was advertised and released in the media. 
 
Whilst the first difficulty relates to the challenge of gaining support for a reward system from 
taxpayers, a second potential difficulty identified by the tax practitioners was the challenge of 
gaining support from Inland Revenue staff for the use of such a system. This difficulty arises 
from the fact that, in the opinion of Practitioner B and Practitioner C, some Inland Revenue 
investigators operate with the mindset that it is their job, and possibly their right, to take a 
sceptical view of taxpayers, and to employ high-handed techniques to extract tax from them. 
Such a mindset is not conducive to implementing and administering rewards to taxpayers. If 
this is the case, it would therefore be necessary for Inland Revenue as an organisation to have 
a shift in its mindset towards the way it views and treats taxpayers. This sentiment was 
expressed by Practitioner A, who felt that if Inland Revenue is serious about improving 
compliance and its image, it must not only focus on changing taxpayers attitudes towards it, 
but Inland Revenue itself must change the attitude it has towards taxpayers, from one which 
views all taxpayers as being potential tax evaders, to one which focuses on fostering positive 
110 
 
relationships with taxpayers. Inland Revenue does appear to have taken action in this regard 
through the implementation of its Compliance Model, which seeks to improve the 
interactions Inland Revenue has with taxpayers in order to encourage, rather than coerce, 
compliance (Morris & Lonsdale, 2004). As such, whilst the introduction of a reward system 
is a novel concept, Inland Revenue has shown that it is willing to implement compliance 
strategies which seek to reduce the reliance on deterrence measures.  
 
A further difficulty for Inland Revenue identified by the tax practitioners relates to the 
challenge of establishing whether the increased tax revenue that could be collected from the 
introduction of a reward system would outweigh the costs of administering the rewards. As 
Feld et al. (2006a) note, in order to justify the use of rewards, such an approach must raise net 
tax revenues over time after deducting the cost of rewards. Practitioner D noted that whilst 
Inland Revenue would spend money on administering rewards in order to increase the level 
of taxes collected, the challenge lies in undertaking an analysis to determine whether the 
introduction of a reward system would lead to an overall behavioural change from taxpayers 
which would result in increased tax collections over and above the costs incurred. Practitioner 
A and Practitioner D highlighted that the question of whether the potential benefits outweigh 
the costs is very uncertain, with Practitioner D emphasising that it is necessary to not only 
consider the direct costs of paying out rewards, but to also determine whether there are any 
indirect costs that may arise if the introduction of a reward system were to incur a negative 
reaction from taxpayers. Such costs may be incurred, for example, from PAYE taxpayers 
taking umbrage with the introduction of a reward system; a potential risk discussed below. 
Practitioner E also commented on the potential complexity of undertaking a cost/benefit 
analysis, noting that such complexity may deter Inland Revenue from implementing a 
rewards based approach in favour of focusing on deterrence measures. This emphasises Feld 
et al’s. (2006) point that a tax administration faces a trade-off between the costs and benefits 
of giving rewards, and the costs and benefits of utilising other approaches, such as penalties 
and audits. 
 
This particular difficulty of establishing the net benefit of implementing a reward system 
highlights the underlying political aspect which may further complicate the issue of whether 
introducing such a system is viable. As Practitioner A noted, Inland Revenue itself may see 
the potential benefits that could be gained through improving the tax morale of taxpayers, and 
therefore it may wish to take steps to improve its interactions with taxpayers, such as seeking 
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to operate in a manner analogous to that of a customer facing organisation, but unless Inland 
Revenue can explicitly demonstrate to the government of the day that such action will lead to 
increased tax revenue, it is highly unlikely that Inland Revenue will be permitted to take such 
action. However, this raises the question of whether Inland Revenue would require the 
legislative backing of the New Zealand Government in order to implement a reward system 
or, alternatively, whether the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) already possesses the 
authority to implement such a system, in accordance with section 6A of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994. Under this section, the CIR is charged with the care and 
management of the taxes covered by the Inland Revenue Acts. It is the duty of the CIR to 
collect over time the highest net revenue that is practicable within the law. In discharging this 
duty, the CIR must have regard to the resources available, the importance of promoting 
voluntary compliance by taxpayers, and the compliance costs incurred by taxpayers. As such, 
it is arguable that the CIR may have the discretion to implement a reward system, on the basis 
that such a system would potentially aid Inland Revenue to collect over time the highest net 
revenue that is practicable within the law, whilst also promoting voluntary compliance by 
SBO taxpayers through providing a positive incentive to do so.   
 
 
6.7.1 Equity issues and PAYE taxpayers 
 
 
A potential difficulty with the implementation and use of a reward system in New Zealand 
raised by the tax practitioners concerns its discriminatory effects against PAYE taxpayers, 
and the inequity that could arise between this group of taxpayers and small business 
taxpayers. The responses of the tax practitioners highlighted the fact that there is a clear risk 
that the implementation of a reward system to encourage tax compliance from small business 
owners and the self employed could cause considerable unrest amongst wage and salary 
taxpayers.  
 
This issue can be viewed in light of Adam Smith’s (1991) four canons of taxation, or 
principles of good taxation, “...which provide a framework within which a tax system or tax 
proposals can be considered and evaluated” (Alley et al., 2012, p. 31). One such principle of 
a good tax is that of equity. Alley et al. (2012) note that the concept of equity is comprised of 
two components, namely vertical equity and horizontal equity. Alley et al. (2012) explain that 
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vertical equity means that taxpayers in different situations should be treated differently. For 
example, taxpayers who earn a higher income should pay more tax than those who earn a 
lower income. Conversely, horizontal equity emphasises the importance of ensuring that 
taxpayers who are in similar situations receive similar tax treatment from the revenue 
authority (Alley et al., 2012). The component of relevance to the current discussion is 
horizontal equity, as the equity concerns raised by the practitioners relate to the fact that two 
groups of taxpayers (PAYE taxpayers and SBO taxpayers) in similar positions would be 
treated differently, as one group (SBO taxpayers) would receive the benefit of a reward 
system, whilst the other group (PAYE taxpayers) would not.  
 
Equity plays an important role in the quest to improve tax compliance. As Alley et al., (2012, 
p. 32) note, “equity in the tax system, and taxpayers’ perceptions of it, affects tax compliance. 
However well designed and administered a tax system may be, a tax or tax system that is 
perceived by taxpayers as unfair may not enjoy widespread support and may result in 
taxpayers seeking to avoid or evade their tax liabilities.” Furthermore, the Victoria University 
of Wellington Tax Working Group (2010, p. 33) highlighted that “where taxpayers consider 
the system is unfair and confidence declines, voluntary compliance tends to reduce. This will 
undermine people’s trust in the tax system and put at risk the sustainability of the tax revenue 
base.”  
 
These points are pertinent to the discussion of introducing a reward system, as they highlight 
the potential negative effect that such a system could have if it were to be perceived as being 
inequitable by PAYE taxpayers, due to them being ineligible to receive the benefits of the 
reward system. However, it is also important to consider the fact that that the very reason 
why this group of taxpayers would not be eligible to receive the benefits of the rewards is 
also the reason why Inland Revenue may not be concerned with any unrest that may be 
caused by the inequality of the reward system. For example, as the above quotes indicate, the 
non-compliance threat which can arise due to perceived inequality in the tax system is likely 
to be caused by taxpayers seeking to avoid or evade their taxes due to their discontent with 
what they perceive to be an unfairly designed tax system. However, as PAYE taxpayers’ 
income is taxed at source under the PAYE system, their opportunity to evade taxes is 
inherently limited. Therefore, any unrest caused by the implementation of a reward system 
will not adversely affect the level of tax collected from this group of taxpayers; a point which 
was noted in the tax practitioner interviews. As such, whilst there are clear equity concerns 
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which would arise from the introduction of a reward system, it would appear unlikely that 
these concerns would actually lead to non-compliance from this group of taxpayers.  
 
In contrast to the views expressed in the practitioner interviews, SBO A was of the opinion 
that the introduction of a reward system would not be inequitable towards PAYE taxpayers. 
The rationale for SBO A’s view was that the compliance process for PAYE taxpayers is very 
simple, as their employer is responsible for reporting their income. In contrast, the 
compliance process for small business owners and the self employed is much more onerous 
which, in SBO A’s opinion, would be one reasonable justification for providing the benefit of 
rewards to this group of taxpayers. Furthermore, in chapter 5.1 above, SBO A noted that 
there is a perception amongst small business owners that the tax system is unfair due to it 
being seen as being set up to be more favourable for larger businesses which, in the SBOs 
opinion, can potentially have a negative impact upon the compliance behaviour of some small 
business owners. This finding confirms the fears expressed by Alley et al. (2012) and the 
Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group (2010) as to the detrimental effect that 
perceptions of inequality can have on compliance. SBO A suggested that the introduction of 
rewards for compliant small business owners may improve their perception as to the equity of 
the tax system, which in turn could improve their compliance. As such, it is arguable that the 
introduction of a reward system could actually improve the equitability of the tax system. 
However, Practitioner C still expressed concern regarding the potential for unrest to arise 
from PAYE taxpayers, noting that as there is a significant amount of tax being collected from 
this group, it may not be in Inland Revenue’s best interests to be seen as introducing 
discriminatory policies against them. This highlights the importance of seeking to ensure that 
any proposed reward system is introduced in a manner which minimises the risk of PAYE 
taxpayers taking umbrage to it.  
 
According to the views obtained from the tax practitioner and SBO interviews, the approach 
that would be the most likely to gain the support of PAYE taxpayers is to emphasise that the 
reward system is being introduced as a means to increase the level of taxes collected for the 
benefit of society as a whole. Both SBOs expressed that they believed the majority of PAYE 
taxpayers would be accepting of a reward system if Inland Revenue explained to the public 
that its underlying purpose is to improve the fairness of the tax system by increasing the 
compliance from the small business sector, which could consequently reduce the tax burden 
of PAYE taxpayers.  
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Despite the potential for justifying the reward system to the PAYE taxpayer group, 
Practitioner C and Practitioner D expressed some doubt as to whether PAYE taxpayers would 
accept such a justification. Therefore, the equity issue which arises in regard to the 
introduction of a reward system is analogous to that which arises in regard to the use of tax 
amnesties. In the tax amnesty context, the equity issue arises in regard to the risk that honest 
taxpayers may be upset by the use of an amnesty, which could result in previously honest 
taxpayers becoming non-compliant. The solution put forward by Hasseldine (1989) in the tax 
amnesty context was for the tax authority to make an evaluation of taxpayer sentiment before 
introducing the amnesty. If Inland Revenue were concerned about the potential for a negative 
reaction from PAYE taxpayers to the introduction of a reward system, then an approach 
similar to that put forward by Hasseldine (1989) would appear to be appropriate. However, as 
identified above, it is possible that Inland Revenue could choose to implement a reward 
system regardless of how it is perceived by PAYE taxpayers, due to their inability to reduce 
their compliance.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion, contributions, limitations and future 
research 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
In response to the traditional deterrence model’s lack of explanatory power regarding 
observed compliance levels, the concept of tax morale has developed into a growing area of 
research which investigates the potential for utilising the ‘carrot’ to encourage voluntary 
compliance, and reducing the reliance on the ‘stick’ to coerce compliance. One carrot which 
has been identified as having the potential to improve tax compliance is the use of rewards 
for compliant taxpayers. The aim of this study was to supplement the theoretical and 
experimental research, which has investigated the potential use of rewards as a compliance 
tool, by gaining an understanding of how tax practitioners and SBOs perceive the potential 
effectiveness of utilising such an approach.  
 
The broad research questions which this thesis sought to answer were as follows:  
 
RQ1 - How effective would the use of a reward system be for improving tax compliance, and 
how should such a system be designed? 
RQ1(a) - How feasible would the implementation of a reward system be in New Zealand? 
RQ1(b) - How amenable would Inland Revenue be to using such a system, and what are some 
potential difficulties which Inland Revenue would need to overcome in order to successfully 
implement such a system?  
 
In regard to the first question, the findings were generally supportive of the concept of 
utilising rewards as a compliance tool. Several responses indicated that introducing rewards 
could have a positive impact upon taxpayers’ compliance behaviour due to improving the 
reciprocity between taxpayers and Inland Revenue, which is a component that has been 
identified as influencing taxpayers’ tax morale (Kornhauser, 2007). This could occur as a 
result of the provision of rewards improving the perceived fairness of the relationship 
between taxpayers and Inland Revenue. This is due to the impact that rewards could have on 
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altering the dynamic of the relationship from one which is dominated by Inland Revenue due 
to them being perceived as a “taking organisation”, to one which is perceived as being more 
reciprocal if Inland Revenue were to give something back to compliant taxpayers. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that the use of rewards may be more likely than penalties to 
improve the compliance of defiant taxpayers, as they could be an effective tool to mend some 
bridges with disgruntled taxpayers and get them back into the tax system, and they would 
offer Inland Revenue another means by which to encourage defiant taxpayers to become 
deferent. This corroborates Smith’s (1992) proposition that “cycles of antagonism might 
begin to be broken by a positive concession by the administrator” (p. 226), and indicates the 
introduction of rewards for compliance could be one example of a positive concession by a 
tax authority. Similarly, in the context of Crowding Theory, the findings noted that rewards 
could have a positive impact upon taxpayers’ motivation to be compliant, as it is likely that 
taxpayers would view the use of rewards as being a positive intervention in their favour. As 
such, the findings supported Feld et al’s. (2006b) proposition that rewards could be more 
effective than punishments for motivating compliance because rewards would be perceived 
by taxpayers as being a supportive, as opposed to a controlling, intervention from Inland 
Revenue.   
 
In regard to taxpayers who could be classified as game players, the findings noted that the use 
of rewards may potentially be effective in reducing this group of taxpayers’ willingness to 
engage in tax avoidance. Whilst Practitioner C was unsure whether the introduction of 
rewards would influence this group of taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, Practitioner B was 
of the opinion that the introduction of rewards would make it significantly easier for tax 
practitioners to dissuade taxpayers from taking aggressive tax positions, as practitioners 
would be able to explain to the taxpayer that they already stand to receive a benefit from 
paying their tax. Practitioner B’s sentiments were shared by both SBOs, who believed that the 
use of rewards could have a positive impact on the compliance of this group of taxpayers.  
 
The findings also supported Feld et al’s. (2006b) proposition regarding deferent taxpayers, 
noting that there is a risk that if taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to be a compliant taxpayer is 
not recognised or acknowledged, their intrinsic motivation may decrease and their 
willingness to act opportunistically may increase. Furthermore, the findings supported the 
authors’ view that the provision of rewards for compliant taxpayers can act to maintain their 
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compliance levels in the long-term through having a positive influence on taxpayers’ tax 
morale and motivation to be a good taxpayer. 
 
During the course of the interviews, several practitioners made reference to the practice of 
Inland Revenue calling taxpayers ‘customers’, and highlighted the  potentially negative 
impact this practice can have on taxpayers’ perceptions of Inland Revenue, due to Inland 
Revenue not actually attempting to foster a customer relationship. The findings indicated that 
introducing an element of commerciality into the tax system in the form of rewards could 
potentially be an effective way of signalling to taxpayers that Inland Revenue is genuine in its 
attempt to improve its relationships with taxpayers as it is the type of action that customer 
facing organisations implement, and could have positive flow on effects for tax compliance.  
 
In regard to the type of reward that would be the most effective for motivating taxpayers to 
be compliant, the findings provided overwhelming support for financial rewards. Whilst prior 
research has expressed concern regarding the use of financial rewards in this context 
(particularly in regard to the effect they may have on the compliance of deferent taxpayers, 
on the basis that financial rewards may decrease taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to be 
compliant due to them treating the financial reward as a ‘right’ or ‘claim’) the findings from 
the SBO interviews indicated that this was unlikely to be the case. Rather, both SBOs noted 
that they believed financial rewards would be appreciated by deferent taxpayers and would be 
an effective means of motivating them to remain compliant. As for how the financial rewards 
should be administered, the findings were in favour of using a percentage rebate system, 
whereby the size of the reward increases as a function of the amount of tax paid.  
 
One of the key rationales behind the support for this type of system was that it could 
potentially reduce taxpayers’ willingness to take the risk of evading or avoiding tax by 
putting them in a position where they are guaranteed to receive a rebate. These findings 
suggest that a percentage rebate could be used as a tool to influence taxpayers’ risk 
preferences in a manner consistent with that identified in research investigating Prospect 
Theory’s predictions in the tax compliance context, whereby taxpayers who are in a position 
to receive a guaranteed gain in the form of a refund tend to be less willing to take the risk of 
avoiding or evading tax. However, consistent with Dusenbury’s (1994) caution that habitual 
tax evaders will not necessarily become compliant when they are in a position to receive a 
refund, the findings indicated that such a system would not result in all non-compliant 
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taxpayers becoming risk averse. Further, consistent with Feld et al’s. (2006a) proposition that 
the use of rewards may induce strategic behaviour from taxpayers, the findings highlighted 
the risk that certain taxpayers may exploit the percentage rebate system by evading a portion 
of their taxes whilst still receiving the rebate based on the amount of tax they do pay.  
 
As such, it was noted that a reward system would need to be designed in a manner so as to 
include deterrence measures as a means of reducing the likelihood of taxpayers taking this 
risk. The findings indicated that measures such as requiring a taxpayer found to be 
intentionally underreporting income and receiving the benefit of the rewards to pay back the 
total amount of rebates received with penalty interest, and the threat of being ineligible to 
receive rewards in the future or for a specified period, could be effective deterrence measures 
in this regard. 
 
Whilst financial rewards received the most support, the findings did highlight that certain 
types of non-financial rewards could also be utilised, particularly in regard to maintaining the 
compliance of deferent taxpayers. Whilst prior research has recommended the use of rewards 
such as improved and cheaper access to public services like transport and cultural activities 
(Feld et al., 2006b), the findings did not support this suggestion. Instead, the findings 
indicated that a non-financial reward in the form of something which is beneficial to a 
taxpayers business is a preferred option. Examples provided included the provision of 
discounted accounting software, a certificate from Inland Revenue stating that the taxpayer’s 
business has been compliant for a specified number of years, and providing compliant 
taxpayers with preferred status with the Inland Revenue which would grant certain benefits, 
such as a special phone number for faster access to Inland Revenue.  
 
The findings also illustrated that the introduction of a reward system could have a role to play 
in reducing the likelihood of the bomb-crater effect arising. The responses indicated that the 
provision of a reward to a taxpayer found to be largely compliant after a tax audit could 
reduce the risk of the taxpayer seeking to evade a portion of their taxes in the following 
period, which corroborates the experimental findings of (Kastlunger, 2011). This could occur, 
for example, due to a taxpayer feeling guilty should they attempt to evade tax after receiving 
a reward from Inland Revenue, as well as the fact that receiving a reward would give people a 
positive perception of Inland Revenue.  
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Furthermore, consistent with Falkinger and Walther (1991), it was also indicated that the 
rewards in this context could be framed as compensation for the disruption to the taxpayer’s 
business and the associated costs incurred, which would help to ensure that any ill will held 
by taxpayers towards Inland Revenue is kept to a minimum. Practitioner D was of the opinion 
that it may be preferable to limit the provision of rewards to this narrower audit context, for 
taxpayers who have had a clean audit. The advantage of operating a reward system in this 
manner is that it reduces the risk of taxpayers acting in a strategic manner, as could be the 
case with a percentage rebate system which applies on a wholesale basis without taxpayers 
being subject to an audit. However, Practitioner A cautioned against this approach, observing 
that as Inland Revenue only has limited resources available to conduct audits, limiting the 
application of rewards to this context may inhibit their potential to improve compliance on 
the larger scale that could be achieved if a wholesale rebate system was implemented, as such 
a system would be applicable to a larger number of taxpayers.  
 
Therefore, the findings suggest that in order to maximise the potential compliance benefits 
that could be obtained from a reward system, it is likely that such a system would need to be 
applied in multiple contexts, such as the narrower audit context, and the wider wholesale 
basis. This could also facilitate the provision of different types of rewards in different 
contexts, such as a percentage rebate applying on a wholesale basis, and the provision of 
certain non-financial rewards in the narrow audit context, whereby Inland Revenue can verify 
that the taxpayer has been compliant for an extended period of time and is deserving of such 
rewards.               
 
A final important issue that arose regarding the first research question was the finding that in 
order for a reward system to successfully induce non-compliant taxpayers to become 
compliant, it is very likely that the reward system would need to be introduced in conjunction 
with a tax amnesty. This is due to the fact that, whilst a non-compliant taxpayer may wish to 
improve their compliance levels in response to the introduction of a reward system, they may 
be hesitant to do so due to the fear that Inland Revenue will conduct an investigation into 
their past non-compliance.  
 
In regard to the second research question, the findings indicated some doubts as to the ability 
of Inland Revenue’s IT system to adequately implement a reward system. However, these 
concerns were tempered by the fact that Inland Revenue is due to receive a $1.5b upgrade of 
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its IT system over the next ten years, which the practitioners expected would be able to 
competently handle the implementation of a reward system. This does, however, raise the 
issue of whether any potential reward system would need to be implemented during the IT 
system upgrade process, or whether the reward system could still be introduced after the 
upgrade is completed. Whilst the practitioners felt that the added flexibility of the upgraded 
system would allow for a rewards system being introduced subsequent to its completion, the 
general feeling was that it would be beneficial for the idea of introducing a reward system to 
be considered sooner rather than later.  
 
The tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the findings is that the introduction of a 
reward system would be feasible provided Inland Revenue successfully receives its IT system 
upgrade. Regarding the feasibility of administering a reward system, the findings indicated 
that it should be relatively straightforward for Inland Revenue to operate such a system, 
particularly in light of the fact that Inland Revenue has experience in administering rewards 
on a smaller scale in the form of an early payment discount for first time provisional 
taxpayers, in accordance with sections RC 37-40 of the Income Tax Act 2007.  
 
A final aspect regarding the feasibility of operating a reward system arose in regard to the 
potential adverse effects that a reward system could have on the workflow of accounting 
firms and practitioners. Such an issue could arise if a non-financial reward took the form of 
an extension of tax filing time frames which could affect the time horizons of other events for 
accounting firms and practitioners.  
 
In regard to the third research question, several difficulties were identified by the 
practitioners which could potentially reduce Inland Revenue’s amenability to introducing 
rewards into the tax system. First, it was noted that Inland Revenue may be deterred from 
attempting to introduce a rewards system due to the level of scepticism which is often held by 
taxpayers regarding anything Inland Revenue does. As such, it was highlighted that the 
manner in which such a system was advertised in the media would be critical for its success.  
 
Second, the practitioners raised some doubts as to whether Inland Revenue staff, particularly 
hardened and experienced investigators, would be open to the concept of rewarding taxpayers 
as it would be a vastly different and novel compliance approach to that which is utilised 
currently. However, Practitioner C highlighted that only several key personnel would need to 
121 
 
be open to the idea and, through the implementation of the Inland Revenue Compliance 
Model, Inland Revenue has indicated that it is willing to implement strategies which attempt 
to reduce the reliance on deterrence measures. 
 
Third, it was highlighted that whilst the introduction of a reward system may increase the 
level of tax revenue collected, it is very uncertain whether this potential increase would 
outweigh the costs of providing the rewards, due to the likelihood that performing a 
cost/benefit analysis could be a considerably complex process. As such, whilst Inland 
Revenue itself may wish to take steps such as this to improve taxpayers’ tax morale, it is 
highly unlikely that Inland Revenue will be permitted to take such action unless it can 
explicitly demonstrate to the government of the day that such action will lead to increased tax 
revenue. However, it must also be considered that, in accordance with section 6A of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994, the CIR may already possess the authority to implement a reward 
system without the requirement for legislative backing. 
 
A final potential difficulty highlighted by the practitioners is that the introduction of a reward 
system may be perceived by PAYE taxpayers as being inequitable. However, it was also 
recognised that Inland Revenue may not be concerned by this risk, as there is very limited 
scope for PAYE taxpayers to reduce their tax compliance if this group of taxpayers were to 
become disgruntled. Furthermore, it was noted by SBO A that the introduction of a reward 
system may actually improve the fairness of the tax system in the eyes of small business 
owners, which could in turn have a positive impact upon the compliance of this group of 
taxpayers.   
 
 
7.2 Contribution to the literature 
 
 
This study sought to make several contributions to the literature. First, whilst theoretical and 
experimental research has been conducted in regard to the potential benefits of utilising 
rewards to encourage tax compliance, there is an absence of research focused on 
understanding taxpayers’ and tax practitioners’ views as to the potential effectiveness and 
feasibility of introducing a tax reward system. This research has taken the first steps in regard 
to redressing this lacuna in the literature by approaching the topic from a different 
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perspective. Through approaching the topic in this manner, the research has provided insight 
into how the tax profession and taxpayers believe a reward system could be designed so as to 
maximise its effectiveness. 
 
Secondly, as it currently stands, there has been no research conducted in relation to the 
possibility of utilising rewards to encourage tax compliance in a New Zealand context. This 
research has therefore provided a starting point for investigating the suitability of 
implementing a reward system in New Zealand. However, as will be noted in further detail in 
the following subsection, the research has largely examined the views of practitioners and 
SBOs in Christchurch and is therefore somewhat limited in that regard. Nevertheless, the 
research has provided a basis from which further research may be conducted on a wider scale.   
 
Finally, this research will potentially be of interest to tax policy makers, as it has provided 
insight in to the potential effectiveness of introducing rewards into the New Zealand tax 
system. Such insights may be useful for policy makers to further investigate the potential 
benefits of introducing such a system. 
 
7.3 Limitations and key assumptions 
 
In regard to the limitations and assumptions underlying the research, several issues must be 
identified. First, the research has not taken in to consideration the views and opinions of 
taxpayers and tax practitioners outside of Christchurch, with the exception of one interview 
which was conducted with a tax practitioner in Dunedin. In other words, the research is 
largely confined to the views and opinions of persons in only one city in New Zealand, as 
opposed to incorporating a nationwide approach, which may arguably limit the 
representativeness of the research findings. Further research would likely be required in order 
to confirm the consistency in the views and opinions of persons located in other areas of New 
Zealand. Second, it must be noted that due to practical reasons, this research has not 
incorporated the views of Inland Revenue. Therefore, any reference as to how the revenue 
authority may perceive the proposed reward system will be speculation only. The inclusion of 
tax practitioners in this research project is somewhat of an attempt to overcome this 
limitation, as these subjects were able to offer a certain degree of insight as to how Inland 
Revenue might perceive the proposed reward system. Third, the taxpayers who participated 
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in this research are, at least to the researcher’s knowledge, largely compliant and could be 
classified as being ‘good’ taxpayers. As such, the research is limited to the extent that the 
views and opinions of taxpayers who have engaged in tax evasion or intentional non-
compliance have not been sought. Such views and opinions would have been useful as a 
means of understanding how ‘bad’ taxpayers would perceive the potential implementation of 
a reward system, and how such a system would potentially influence their tax compliance 
behaviour. However, due to the sensitive nature of the topic of tax evasion, such taxpayers 
were not sought for the purposes of this research project. Finally, the sample size of SBOs 
was small, consisting of only two participants. However, as this research was of an 
exploratory nature, its aim was not to draw generalisable conclusions. Instead, the aim of the 
research was to gain an initial in-depth understanding of the views of the participants, which 
can lay the foundation for future research.    
 
An assumption underlying this research is that the government and Inland Revenue have not 
already given consideration to the possibility of introducing a reward based scheme into the 
tax system, and have subsequently already deemed it inappropriate. This assumption is based 
on the fact that no public information has been released which would indicate that 
consideration has been given to the possibility of using rewards as a compliance strategy. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the government and revenue authority would at least be 
amenable to the potential implementation of such a system. 
 
 
7.4 Future research areas 
 
 
Several areas for future research can be outlined from this thesis. First, as identified in the 
previous subsection, a limitation of this research is that it has not included the views and 
opinions of taxpayers who have been intentionally non-compliant. Future research could seek 
to gain an understanding of this group of taxpayers’ views as to how they would perceive the 
potential effectiveness of introducing rewards into the tax system. Furthermore, future 
research could expand the scope of the sample size to include participants from different 
cities in New Zealand, in order to provide greater representativeness to the research findings.  
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Similarly, the views and opinions of Inland Revenue have not been incorporated in this 
thesis. Further research could attempt to obtain input from Inland Revenue regarding how it 
views the potential for using rewards as a compliance strategy, and the potential difficulties 
and challenges it would face in implementing such an approach. Such research could attempt 
to discern whether the CIR possesses the authority under section 6A of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 to implement a reward system, or whether legislative backing from 
the government would be required. Such research could also seek to obtain input from the 
government regarding this issue.   
 
Finally, the findings in this thesis indicated that, in line with Prospect Theory, the use of a 
percentage rebate system could be an effective way of reducing taxpayers’ willingness to take 
the risk of evading or avoiding their taxes. Future research could conduct experiments which 
test the impact that a percentage rebate has on the risk preferences of participants regarding 
their tax compliance behaviour, similar to those which have been conducted in previous tax 
compliance research investigating Prospect Theory’s predictions. Such research could 
attempt to model the costs and benefits of utilising such a system. 
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Appendix 2: Outline of the semi-structured interview questions 
 
Interview questions for practitioners 
- How effective do you believe the current deterrence approach is in regard to achieving tax 
compliance? For example, do you believe that the sole reliance on deterrence measures may 
reduce the intrinsic motivation of taxpayers to comply with their obligations, thereby 
inhibiting the effectiveness of such an approach?  
- Do you believe there should be less focus on deterrence based approaches and more focus 
on positive approaches to encourage compliance? If yes, what type of positive approaches? 
- How effective do you think the introduction of a reward system would be in regard to 
improving tax compliance? For example, could the use of rewards act as a motivating factor 
for non-compliant taxpayers to become compliant? Could the use of rewards for compliance 
act as a means to reduce the incentive of taxpayers, who are aware of the relatively low 
likelihood of being audited, to engage in tax noncompliance (e.g. tax avoidance or tax 
evasion)?  
- Is there a risk that the lack of acknowledgment for compliant taxpayers could increase the 
likelihood of them becoming non-compliant in the future? If yes, could the provision of 
rewards help to maintain their compliance in the future? 
- From your experience in dealing with clients, how do you think taxpayers would respond to 
a rewards system? 
- Do you believe that there is a risk of some taxpayers evading tax in the period following a 
tax audit in which the taxpayer was found to be compliant? If yes, do you believe the 
provision of a reward would reduce this risk? 
- What are the key features you believe should be included in the design of a reward system? 
For example, what type of rewards should apply, and how should they be administered? 
- How feasible is the implementation of a reward system? 
- How amenable do you believe Inland Revenue would be to the possibility of introducing a 
reward system, and what are some difficulties which would need to be overcome? 
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Interview questions for small business owners 
- How effective do you believe the current deterrence approach is in regard to achieving tax 
compliance? For example, do you believe that the sole reliance on deterrence measures may 
reduce the intrinsic motivation of taxpayers to comply with their obligations, thereby 
inhibiting the effectiveness of such an approach?  
- Do you believe there should be less focus on deterrence based approaches and more focus 
on positive approaches to encourage compliance? If yes, what type of positive approaches? 
- How effective do you think the introduction of a reward system would be in regard to 
improving tax compliance? For example, could the use of rewards act as a motivating factor 
for non-compliant taxpayers to become compliant? Could the use of rewards for compliance 
act as a means to reduce the incentive of taxpayers, who are aware of the relatively low 
likelihood of being audited, to engage in tax noncompliance (e.g. tax avoidance or tax 
evasion)?  
- Would the use of a rewards system motivate you personally to comply?  
- Is there a risk that the lack of acknowledgment for compliant taxpayers could increase the 
likelihood of them becoming non-compliant in the future? If yes, could the provision of 
rewards help to maintain their compliance in the future? 
- What type of rewards would motivate taxpayers the most? For example, would financial 
rewards, such as tax discounts, lump sum payments, or lottery winnings be preferred to non-
financial rewards, such as improved and cheaper access to public services? 
- Is there a risk that financial rewards may actually reduce compliant taxpayers’ motivation to 
continue being compliant?  
- Do you believe that there is a risk of some taxpayers evading tax in the period following a 
tax audit in which the taxpayer was found to be compliant? If yes, do you believe the 
provision of a reward would reduce this risk? 
- Is there a risk that PAYE earners may perceive the introduction of a reward system as being 
unfair? If yes, how do you believe Inland Revenue could address this issue?  
 
